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this work sat most of the time surrounded by his family and in the midst of the planning 
and execution of a wedding ceremony (his own); a situation which – if you ask him – 
must sometimes come awfully close to resembling the cannon-rumbling and bullet-
sizzling conditions of said battle (at least as he imagines them to have been). Still, in spite 
of this and almost in order to provide further proof for Nietzsche’s proposition that 
everything decisive comes into being “in spite of,” it was under those improbable 
circumstances that this work was brought to completion. There is no doubt in my mind 
that it would have been altogether impossible for this to have happened without the aid of 
all those who in one way or another contributed to my work and helped me stay the 
course to the end. 
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mention for his support and for lending me an elbow on which to lean during those brief, 
but nonetheless shattering, dark hours that befall any human being in the course of his 
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and turns into a child, it will be no doubt due in large measure to the many hours of joy 
and recreation (if also sometimes outright embarrassment), spent with the participants of 
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AN INTERPRETATION OF THE IDEALS OF SOVEREIGNTY, 
WHOLENESS AND BECOMING WHAT ONE IS 






Chair: Stephen Leicester Darwall 
 
My dissertation deals with three important ideals that Nietzsche recommends: the 
ideals of Sovereignty, of Wholeness, and of Becoming What One Is. I locate the main 
texts where Nietzsche addresses each of these topics and I offer a consistent and coherent 
interpretation of them.  
 
On my reading, the ideal of Becoming What One Is involves a process whereby 
we become mature and give expression to our own uniqueness. This process requires an 
active self-reflection on our part and a dynamic practice of relinquishing and regaining 
our capacity to be the cause of our own behavior (the capacity for autonomous self-





be autonomous, my interpretation provides a more detailed description of the 
mechanisms whereby one attains this ideal than that offered by other commentators. 
 
In the case of the ideal of Sovereignty, I argue that for Nietzsche becoming 
sovereign entails accepting and even embracing one’s susceptibility to moral guilt. For 
Nietzsche, having a sovereign conscience means understanding oneself as a morally 
responsible agent. This self-understanding confers on us a freedom that other creatures do 
not have, but at the cost of becoming subject to blame and guilt for our wrongdoings. In 
this respect, my account is at odds with the propensity in the secondary literature to 
characterize Nietzsche as a staunch opponent of the moral notion of guilt. 
 
Finally, my interpretation of Wholeness runs against the grain of the prevalent 
readings that characterize this as an ideal of psychic unity aimed at restructuring the 
various parts of the agent’s mind into a harmonious whole. I argue, on the contrary, that 
wholeness fundamentally concerns social – not psychic – integration: the person becomes 
whole by placing himself within the circle of genuine culture in which he works together 
with others in the perfection of nature and freedom. In this way, the person finds 
redemption from the meaninglessness of existence by ensuring that his energies survive 
into the future within a suprapersonal community in which life and creativity are 











This dissertation deals with three different ideals that Nietzsche advocates 
throughout his writings. Since they belong to Nietzsche’s ethics and his practical 
philosophy, these ideals fall within the broadly construed field of action theory and moral 
psychology. In the second chapter I offer a reading of the injunction to become what or 
who one is; in the third chapter I investigate the relation between the ideal of the 
sovereign individual and the moral phenomenon of guilt; and, finally, in the fourth 
chapter I elucidate the somewhat enigmatic notion of wholeness that Nietzsche entreats 
us to realize. All these chapters have been conceived as separate essays that explore 
particular problems that arise in and out of Nietzsche’s works. As such, the essays are, for 
the most part, highly focused and specific. Instead of guiding my approach by a 
contemporary understanding of the issues proper to a philosophy of action and moral 
psychology, in my investigation I pursue topics that Nietzsche himself lays out and that 
are taken directly from his texts. This means that I will not focus on questions such as 
whether Nietzsche held a compatibilist or an incompatibilist position with regard to 
human agency; or whether he was in favor of moral realism or on the contrary embraced 
an anti-realist outlook; or whether his ethical views are those of a virtue ethicist or a 





my goal is to understand the problems that Nietzsche himself explored in the way that he 
explored them. 
 
To be sure, while I favor an approach that focuses on Nietzsche’s own questions 
and concerns within the broadly construed field of action theory and moral psychology, I 
do not mean to suggest that pursuing this type of investigation is of no consequence to 
contemporary questions and concerns within this area of study. Quite the contrary, I 
believe that Nietzsche has interesting things to contribute to current discussions on moral 
psychology. However, I think we will be able to appreciate what those contributions are 
not by demanding that Nietzsche take up our own concerns, but by engaging his 
philosophy on its own terms and by trying to clarify his position on the very issues that 
he himself set out to resolve. My hope is that by pursuing these localized topics I will be 
able to construct, or perhaps reconstruct, a picture of Nietzsche’s thoughts on this subject. 
In what follows I intend to give a brief characterization of my overall approach and the 
way I think it contrasts with other approaches to Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
 
 As anyone who is familiar with Nietzsche’s work knows, he was not a systematic 
thinker and he rarely pursued arguments in a focused and sustained manner. Moreover, 
his style of writing was dauntingly heterogeneous: his books frequently exhibit no 
apparent thematic structure; in many cases, they lack linear narrative; they adopt a variety 
of voices and techniques; they comprise all sorts of literary genres, ranging from the 





narrative, or the polemical pamphlet; they constantly revel on all manner of rhetorical 
strategies, hyperboles, parodies, ironies, metaphors, and the like. 
 
This highly idiosyncratic aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy no doubt contributed 
to the relatively poor reception of his work within the Anglo-American world. Unlike 
other German writers such as Kant, Hegel or Husserl, Nietzsche was for the most part 
ignored, caricatured, decried and generally dismissed by analytic philosophers as a 
thinker of no philosophical consequence and worthy of no serious attention (a prime 
example in this respect is Russell).  Since the 1960s this trend steadily began to reverse 
itself, with the result that nowadays there is a flurry of secondary literature on Nietzsche. 
Yet, one need only glance at this literature to discover that, while there may be a general 
consensus as to the importance of Nietzsche’s work, there is a widespread disagreement 
about where this importance lies and how exactly to understand the significance of his 
various contributions (whatever they may be) to philosophical inquiry. Nietzsche has 
been subject to the most diverse and incompatible interpretations; and, again, his peculiar 
way of tackling philosophical issues is partly to blame for this. Still, it is also the case 
that many commentators take Nietzsche’s unconventional style as an excuse to engage in 
what can only be classified as confused and obscured thinking and interpretation. Many 
of the so called postmodern appropriations of his work exhibit this quality. The result of 
this tendency to forego the scholarly virtues of clarity and rigorous argumentation is that, 
for the most part, the secondary literature on Nietzsche has been somewhat dreadful and 






 More or less starting in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, there have been a 
series of attempts at rescuing Nietzsche from the clutches of this kind of interpretation. 
People like Richard Schacht, Maudemarie Clark, Brian Leiter, John Richardson, Peter 
Poellner, among others, have sought to organize Nietzsche’s thought under traditional 
categories and to render his work directly relevant to current analytic philosophy.1 
Though these interpretations differ in various ways, they all share the assumption that 
Nietzsche is trying to answer what are rather conventional philosophical questions. 
According to these interpreters, then, despite his multifarious styles, Nietzsche had more 
or less coherent and philosophically motivated views about a series of key issues in 
philosophy. All we need to do is apply the tools and resources available in contemporary 
philosophical discourse to understand the content and, therefore, the importance of 
Nietzsche’s work. 
 
 I share the general aspiration of presenting Nietzsche’s insights in a clear, 
rigorous, perhaps “analytical” manner. And I certainly wish to locate my efforts within 
the efforts of those who want to make Nietzsche’s work relevant to current philosophy. 
But I do not want to saddle Nietzsche with the demand or the expectation that his 
philosophy be continuous with our own way of understanding the issues. Adopting such 
demands and expectations does a disservice to Nietzsche and ends up misconstruing his 
work in important ways. It does so not simply because this strategy tends to deflate the 
polemical aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy and to de-emphasize the ways in which he is 
discontinuous with current academic discourses, but, more importantly, because this 
strategy conflates goals that, in my judgment, should be kept apart. Making Nietzsche 
                                                 





palatable to contemporary philosophy and vindicating the analytic approach in academic 
discourse may be lofty goals, but they should not be confused with the aim of getting 
Nietzsche right. In this respect, my own approach offers an important advantage over 
others. By starting with Nietzsche’s own way of framing the problems I can more easily 
avoid the temptation to conflate these aims. 
 
Along these lines, I am also able to resist an assumption that is very prevalent in 
the secondary literature, but which in my view is not all that warranted. This consists in 
thinking that Nietzsche must have coherent views on metaphysics, epistemology and 
ethics. Put differently, the idea is that his various reflections and conclusions within one 
of these areas of study must be connected and carry implications for his thinking about 
the others. His thoughts must support and sustain each other across fields. Now, I do not 
wish to deny that such connections could indeed exist. But I do not think it is a good 
strategy to assume that they must. Since Nietzsche confronts us with a way of thinking 
that is operating at different levels, in different contexts, at different times, out of 
different motivations, and so on, one should not expect a high level of coherence across 
diverse fields and subject matters. This means that one should be ready to accept the 
existence of contradictory views within the Nietzschean corpus as a whole. It does not 
mean that one should be ready to accept such contradictions within specialized and 
highly localized problems such as the ones I intend to explore. So one can still demand 
consistency in the treatment of particular issues without thereby worrying about whether 







A final advantage of my approach is that it is also able to steer clear of another 
pernicious tendency. Perhaps as a result of the impetus to find coherence in Nietzsche’s 
views on different matters, many interpreters tend to try to organize Nietzsche’s writing 
around one overarching principle or worldview. John Richardson, for instance, thinks that 
Nietzsche’s work is structured by a particular ontology, an interpretation of the essence of 
things as will to power. He then reads various aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy in the 
light of that ontology. Agents, for example, turn out to be not single entities but the result 
of a complex bundle of drives or forces that struggle for power.2 Brian Leiter also 
proceeds this way: he identifies a particular naturalist strand in Nietzsche and then tries to 
shed light on other issues like how one becomes what one is, or Nietzsche’s immoralism, 
by reading them as aspects of such naturalism.3 Interestingly, interpreters who do not 
necessarily share the aspiration to make Nietzsche’s view systematic in the way these 
other philosophers want to, nonetheless end up adopting a similar strategy. Thus, 
Alexander Nehamas, for example, focuses on the metaphor of the world as a text in need 
of interpretation and then proceeds to deal with various aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy 
by using this metaphor as a key to unlocking their true significance. Nietzsche’s 
immoralism turns out to consist in the injunction to liberate oneself from the yoke of a 
system of morals that demands unqualified obedience, and to construct instead one’s own 
moral code out of the combination of various features and qualities into a controlled and 
coherent whole (constructing an interpretation of morality much in the same way one 
                                                 
2 See, Richardson (1996). 
 





constructs an interpretation of the world).4 Unlike these readers, I do not want to assume 
that there is one key to unlocking Nietzsche’s thought on different issues. Instead, I take 
each topic on its own terms and try to unlock whatever significance it may contain using 
as many keys as I can find or muster and without worrying about whether those keys 
should fit all locks. 
 
Let me now briefly say something about the issue of the continuity in Nietzsche’s 
thinking. Since Lou Andreas Salomé first introduced the idea in her 1894 book on 
Nietzsche,5 it has become fashionable to speak of three periods in Nietzsche’s writing: an 
early period spanning from the publication of The Birth of Tragedy to the last Untimely 
Meditation, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth; a middle period starting with Human All Too 
Human and culminating in The Gay Science; and a late or mature period covering all his 
work from Thus Spoke Zarathustra onwards up to his mental collapse in January of 1889. 
This tripartite arrangement is often used by readers of Nietzsche who wish to defend a 
developmental account of his philosophy, according to which Nietzsche’s views on 
different philosophical matters changed significantly from one period to the next. A 
prime example is Maudemarie Clark’s book Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.6 Clark 
argues that Nietzsche’s views on truth underwent radical revisions and transformations 
during the course of his life. In the beginning, Nietzsche was under the spell of the 
Kantian idea that genuine truth belongs to the realm of things as they are in themselves, 
which – being inaccessible to us – meant that we only had contact with a world that is 
                                                 
4 See Nehamas (1985). 
 
5 See, Salomé (1894). 
 





merely apparent or illusory (i.e. false). Under the influence of the scientific paradigm, he 
then began to question this basic Kantian picture during his middle period; a critical 
examination that he carried over to his mature period with ever increasing momentum 
and which culminates, during the last two productive years of his life, in the realization 
that the repudiation of the Kantian doctrine restores our confidence in truth and dispels all 
prior skepticism. Thus, according to Clark, the last works of Nietzsche “exhibit a uniform 
and unambiguous respect for facts, the senses, and science” (Clark, 1990: 105). 
 
 I am not interested in arguing here against Clark’s conclusions. I think the jury is 
still out on what Nietzsche’s views on truth were, and on whether he changed them and 
how exactly he did so. Many commentators have tried to show that there is more 
continuity on Nietzsche’s ideas about truth than Clark would have us believe.7 More 
important for me is to point out that there is something fundamentally suspect in adopting 
this tripartite approach as some sort of exegetical principle. One gets the impression that 
readers who are bent on emphasizing discontinuities in Nietzsche’s thinking are 
motivated by a desire to rid Nietzsche’s work of positions that they themselves judge 
incoherent or deeply problematic. They focus on the discontinuity to show that in the end 
– or in the beginning, or in the middle, depending which Nietzsche you favor – Nietzsche 
comes through and joins the ranks of what rationally, good minded people ought to think. 
 
To be sure, this is just a suspicion and, to that extent, a bit of hand waiving. But it 
seems to me that it makes good sense to preempt such suspicions. Moreover, the need to 
do so is even more advisable and urgent given what we know about Nietzsche’s own 
                                                 





position with regards to his philosophical trajectory and the relationship he had toward 
his own work. Nietzsche constantly revised and enlarged his texts throughout the course 
of his life and, as Wayne Klein has observed, he did so in a way that raises difficulties for 
those who want to understand the relationship that Nietzsche’s books have to each other 
and to Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole.8  For instance, in his mature period Nietzsche 
composed a series of prefaces to his earlier writings like The Birth of Tragedy, Human All 
Too Human and Daybreak. He also added a fifth part, a preface and a concluding set of 
poems to The Gay Science, a book that originally had only four parts and no preface. 
Such additions raise questions about how to understand the connection between the new 
and the old material in Nietzsche’s works. The puzzle is accentuated further when one 
considers Nietzsche’s pronouncements regarding his books in letters and in his own 
published work. In Ecce Homo, for example, he claims that the fourth untimely 
meditation, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, is a vision of his future while the third 
meditation, Schopenhauer as Educator contains his innermost history, his becoming. In 
On the Genealogy of Morals he claims that the text is meant to supplement and clarify the 
one that preceded it, namely, Beyond Good and Evil without specifying why this is so 
and how exactly it is supposed to do so. In letters to friends he claims that Daybreak and 
The Gay Science can serve as introductions and commentaries to Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. He also claims that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the vestibule to his 
philosophy and that the books that follow it are meant to be expansions and explanations 
of the ideas contained there. Yet the rest of the books of his mature period pay little heed 
overall to what seem to be the seminal concepts of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, namely, the 
Will to Power, the Eternal Return and the Overman. 
                                                 






All this indicates that Nietzsche himself thought of his philosophy as continuous 
in some, to be sure, not easily accessible sense and, at the very least, put quite a bit of 
burden on the discontinuity thesis and make the suspicion I spoke of earlier more 
pressing and salient. In order to avoid this type of suspicion, then, I adopt a principle of 
charity that I will call the continuity principle. It consists in working under the 
assumption that there is a strong continuity in Nietzsche’s thinking about whatever issue I 
intend to examine, until the text itself proves me wrong. In other words – to take an 
example –, if Nietzsche talks about becoming who one is in his early writings and he 
characterizes it as the process of becoming a unique individual, one that is different from 
the mass of people, I will assume that should the phrase “becoming who one is” appear 
again in later writings, it will signify something very close to this prior meaning, unless 
the text resists this interpretation. This is not to deny or contest the idea that Nietzsche’s 
mind could change in the course of his life nor is it to suppose that he must use the same 
language when speaking about these issues. It is simply to assume that if such changes 
occur they will in all likelihood consists in a building upon earlier concepts and not in an 
outright rejection or reformulation of them; it is to assume that changes tend to be 
refinements and not repudiations of previously held ideas. 
 
 I have said that in these essays I take Nietzsche on his own terms. Let me now say 
a bit more about how I think this works. I will take chapter two on How One Becomes 
What One Is as an example of the approach I implement throughout this dissertation. In 





become who or what one is. I trace back the places in Nietzsche’s corpus where he is 
most vocal about this issue and attempt to give a coherent and comprehensive 
interpretation of those passages in a way that allows us to understand what the injunction 
means and what sort of thing it would entail to follow it; what type of process is involved 
in bringing it about that a person becomes who he is. In pursuing this line of inquiry I am 
driven to recruit concepts such as the notion of a person as a multiplicity that are found 
within the Nietzschean corpus, albeit in an incipient and imprecise form, in the service of 
constructing a plausible interpretation of the texts. My use of such concepts is rather 
liberal in the sense that I give myself quite a bit of leeway in my understanding of what 
they involve and the way they may function within Nietzsche’s views. I take this strategy 
to be warranted in the light of Nietzsche’s thin and unsystematic treatment of such 
concepts. Moreover, while I take some latitude here, the employment of these concepts is 
not arbitrary since the way in which they are understood and get recruited is to a large 
extent dictated by the exigencies that arise in the course of solving the problem under 
consideration and the clues that the text itself provides. 
 
When Nietzsche does not offer enough, by way of conceptual background, to shed 
light on the passages I examine, I am forced to enlist the aid of other sources. In my essay 
this happens, for instance, when I make use of David Velleman’s theory in order to fill in 
the assumptions that are required to make sense of Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the 
manner in which a person can be said to contribute to the process whereby he becomes 
what he is. In particular, I make use of Velleman’s characterization of autonomous 





autonomy is necessary for becoming what one is, too much self-understanding is 
detrimental to this process. I realize that in doing this my account walks a thin line 
between attributing certain positions to Nietzsche in an unwarranted way and discovering 
in Nietzsche the incipient form of certain views that are articulated and defended in 
contemporary discourse. In response to this worry all I can say is that the impulse to 
adopt this kind of maneuver is pragmatic in nature: I use it to fill in the gaps in 
Nietzsche’s account in a way that makes sense of what he is saying. To that extent it is 
governed by guidelines found within the text itself. Nietzsche does talk of understanding 
oneself and misunderstanding oneself when he is referring to the process of becoming 
who one is, and Velleman’s theory simply provides the occasion for spelling out what 
that may involve. This does not necessarily mean that Nietzsche thought of the issue in 
those terms or anticipated these ideas, but neither does it mean that he is just arbitrarily 
being aligned to a position that is completely foreign to his way of thinking. 
 
Similarly, I find this strategy fruitful because it allows me to start the dialogue 
with contemporary debates. By using Velleman’s theory as a foil for interpreting the text 
I not only shed light on what Nietzsche is saying, I also provide a space from which 
Nietzsche can speak to our concerns, an aim that I explicitly set out to pursue in this 
dissertation. In Nietzsche one finds interesting ideas that are certainly worth exploring 
from the point of view of contemporary theorizing, such as the notion that we have 
overestimated the value of autonomy, that though a good thing, autonomous self-control 
may also, under certain circumstances, be bad for us; or the idea that the unity of the self 





enjoy and not the type of unity that an isolated entity (an object) is thought to have; and 
so on. 
 
Finally, let me say that although these essays were conceived as self-contained 
projects that can be read independently of each other, they are nonetheless 
complementary and in my estimation shed, when read in conjunction, an important light 
on Nietzsche’s overall philosophical views. I hope that the novel results generated by the 
piecemeal approach I adopt here will not only lead us to reassess more traditional 
readings, but will also put us in the right path to tackle more ambitious projects like those 
of solving apparent contradictions in Nietzsche’s philosophy as a whole or understanding 
his stance on broader issues of epistemology and metaphysics. It is, of course, the 












On Becoming What One Is 
 
 
I want to explore an idea that appears constantly throughout various stages of 
Nietzsche’s philosophical development. This concerns his famous exhortation to the 
reader to “become what (or who) he is.” The idea appears in different formulations in 
Nietzsche’s work and can be traced back to as early as the third untimely meditation, 
Schopenhauer as Educator, where he writes: “The man who does not wish to belong to 
the mass needs only to cease taking himself easily; let him follow his conscience, which 
calls to him: ‘Be your self! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you 
yourself’” (UM III, 1). Later, in The Gay Science, it becomes synthesized into the 
aphorism: “What does your conscience say? – You should become who you are” (GS, 
270). This formulation is echoed again in one of Zarathustra’s speeches where we find 
the following pronouncement: “That is what I am through and through: reeling, reeling 
in, raising up, raising, a raiser, cultivator, and disciplinarian, who once counseled himself, 
not for nothing: Become who you are!” (Z, IV, 1). 
 
All these variations of the phrase are articulated as either commands or counsels, 
but Nietzsche also expresses this thought in other guises. For instance, in a different 
passage of the aforementioned Gay Science, the idea is articulated in the form of a desire: 





incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves!” (GS, 335). And in 
Nietzsche’s last book, Ecce Homo (his philosophical autobiography) he reintroduces the 
thought in the subtitle, this time expressed in the form of the descriptive statement “How 
One Becomes What One Is.” 
 
I call attention to these different formulations simply because this aspect of 
Nietzsche’s thought has been seized on by commentators of his work as a gateway for 
understanding his views on the self and on human agency in general, and many times 
different conclusions are drawn from different formulations of the statement.9 One reason 
why this seems a very apt place to look for Nietzsche’s views on the self is that the 
injunction “become who you are” remits us to a self that one is supposed to become. To 
that extent, this thought seems to present us with a possible vantage point from which to 
answer the question of just what sort of thing Nietzsche imagines a self to be. 
 
 I think this strategy is misguided. If there are lessons to be drawn regarding 
Nietzsche’s views on the category of selfhood from examining his “doctrine” of 
becoming who or what one is, those lessons are indirect and presuppose, rather than 
furnish, such views. Though I hope to be able to say something about Nietzsche’s 
conception of the self, in this essay I want to concentrate primarily on the more humble 
task of trying to interpret his remarks on becoming who one is. Who or what is the Who 
                                                 
9 Thus, for instance, people like Alexander Nehamas or Richard Schacht, who defend a kind of 
“constructivist” notion of selfhood according to which the self is something created and not something 
found or discovered, tend to emphasize the imperative form; whereas others like Brian Leiter focus on the 
more descriptive formulations in order to defend an “essentialist” view of the self as having immutable, 






that one is supposed to become, according to Nietzsche, and how does one become it? 
This is the question I will try to answer here. 
 
 Let me begin as most commentators do and that is by noting that an interpretation 
of becoming who one is faces at least one serious constraint: it must accommodate 
Nietzsche’s pronouncements against the notion of the self as a metaphysical substance. 
This criticism of what Nietzsche more broadly calls the “soul hypothesis” forms part and 
parcel of his attack on traditional metaphysics and his efforts against the dominance of 
Judeo-Christian values (which Nietzsche considers to be detrimental for life). It is 
remarkable that for the most part Nietzsche’s arguments against the self as a 
metaphysically abiding entity take place within the context of his criticism of the notion 
of a free will understood as a causa sui (cause of itself).10 I will not rehearse those 
arguments here. Suffice it to say that despite his rejection of this belief in a kind of soul 
atomism, Nietzsche does not consider it necessary to get rid of the postulate of “the soul” 
itself. On the contrary, as he suggests, “the path lies open for new versions and 
sophistications of the soul hypothesis – and concepts like the ‘mortal soul’ and the ‘soul 
as subject-multiplicity’ and the ‘soul as a society constructed out of drives and affects’ 
want henceforth to have civil rights in the realm of science.”11 
 
                                                 
10 See, for example, BGE 21 and in general the whole section entitled “On the Prejudices of Philosophers.” 
 
11 BGE 12. In Human All Too Human Nietzsche had also pointed towards this type of understanding of the 
subject as a multiplicity of souls when, remarking on the difference between the metaphysician and the 
student of history, he asserts that, unlike the former, the latter is happy “to harbor in himself not ‘an 





Unfortunately, Nietzsche was not a systematic thinker and, besides being gestured 
at in this way, the hypothesis of the soul or the self as a multiplicity of sorts receives no 
sustained attention in his published works. We fare no better when we look at Nietzsche’s 
unpublished notebooks, for though there we find somewhat more elaborate explanations 
of this idea, the passages are scant and their exposition remains at best partial. 
Nonetheless two passages warrant mentioning. In the first Nietzsche states the following: 
 
No subject “atoms.” The sphere of a subject constantly growing or decreasing, the 
center of the system constantly shifting; in cases where it cannot organize the 
appropriate mass, it breaks into two parts. On the other hand, it can transform a 
weaker subject into its functionary without destroying it, and to a certain degree 
form a unity with it. No “substance,” rather something that in itself strives after 
greater strength, and that wants to “preserve” itself only indirectly (it wants to 
surpass itself—) (WP, 488). 
 
In the other passage Nietzsche writes: 
 
The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as 
permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is 
the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy 
of “cells” in which common dominion resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of 
equals, used to ruling jointly and understanding how to command? (WP 490) 
 
One important thing to highlight about these passages is the employment of the political 
metaphor to talk about selfhood. The notion of the self as a multiplicity is supposed to 
capture the thought that, whatever reality a self has, it is to be understood along the lines 
of a social structure whose unity, as Nietzsche puts it elsewhere, is that of “regents at the 
head of a communality” (WP, 492). We also learn here that this communality or 
government does not simply want to preserve its structure; instead its fundamental 
orientation is to surpass itself, that is, to incorporate more complex structures, to grow, to 
appropriate, to dominate, and other such concepts that Nietzsche employs whenever he 






To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that these passages solve any philosophical 
issues with respect to the hypothesis of the self as a multiplicity. If anything they seem to 
raise all sorts of puzzles. In what sense can one speak of a regent or a series of regents 
here? Who is that regent? Does it have any particular set of characteristics? How does it 
interact with its subjects and what is the nature of such interaction? Does the regent 
remain always the same? Or is there a constant shifting of rulers in the way the 
previously quoted passage suggests there is a constant shifting of centers? These are just 
some of the interpretative problems that confront any reader of Nietzsche on this subject. 
 
The fact that it is very hard (if not impossible) to answer these questions, in the 
light of the unsystematic treatment Nietzsche gives to these issues, may send some 
interpreters down a spiral of despair. I, however, find it rather liberating. The space is 
open for us to make use of this very suggestive image of multiple selves however we see 
fit. I thus welcome the interpretative “elbow room” that Nietzsche has left us and I shall 
attempt to benefit from it later in this paper. Let me now turn back to the issue of 
becoming who one is. 
 
Starting from these and other premises, Alexander Nehamas transforms the issue 
of how one becomes what one is into the problem of how, given Nietzsche’s rejection of 
the self as a metaphysical unity, it is possible to still speak of a unity of the self at all. 
Accordingly, Nehamas ends up suggesting that to become what one is entails becoming a 





that one thinks, wants and does” (Nehamas, 1983: 403). On the other side of the spectrum 
we find someone like Brian Leiter who takes Nietzsche’s criticism of the free will 
hypothesis as part of a larger project of defending a “naturalist” conception of the self 
according to which there are essential natural facts about a person that determine in a 
non-trivial manner what a person becomes. Under this interpretation becoming who one 
is consists simply in the process whereby a person becomes what, according to his 
essential attributes, he was always “destined” (causally determined) to become (Leiter, 
2001: 283-287). 
 
Though I find both interpretations suggestive, I think neither of them captures the 
real spirit of what it means to become who one is. I believe that in order to approach this 
problem we need to first ask ourselves what is the “Who” that Nietzsche is urging his 
readers to become. In the passage from Schopenhauer as Educator that I quoted at the 
beginning of this essay we get the first glimpse of an answer. The “Who” one is supposed 
to become is one that stands in direct opposition to the person that one currently 
represents as an acting, thinking and desiring member of the mass. Thus the injunction to 
become who one is turns out to be an injunction to become that kind of self that sets one 
apart from the mass of people. In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall the passage 
from The Gay Science where Nietzsche describes the desire to become who we are as the 
desire to become “human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give 
themselves laws, who create themselves!” (GS, 335; emphasis added). Thus, contrary to 
what Nehamas would have us believe, becoming who one is consists not so much in 





in the commonplace sense of that term according to which each person is a unique 
individual. Instead, the type of uniqueness at stake here seems to be one that a person 
exhibits when he becomes a great human being, or when he achieves something 
extraordinary; when he stands out from the crowd. It is uniqueness in the sense in which 
Nietzsche thought Napoleon or Goethe were unique. 
 
This raises some interesting issues having to do with Nietzsche’s anti-
egalitarianism that I cannot pursue in this essay, but which are, nonetheless, worth 
mentioning here in passing. Indeed, in the light of Nietzsche’s paradigmatic cases, one 
may wonder whether he thought this kind of uniqueness was really available to all human 
beings or whether he envisioned it as being the purview of a privileged few. After all, 
evidently not everyone will become a Napoleon or a Nietzsche; most of us will not make 
world historical changes in any field of life. The vast majority of us are condemned to 
remain forever members of what Nietzsche calls (not always pejoratively) the herd. At 
other times, however, Nietzsche speaks in a manner that betrays a much more egalitarian 
conception of becoming who one is. Thus, for instance, in Schopenhauer as Educator he 
insists that “each one of us bears a productive uniqueness within himself as the core of 
his being” (UM III, 3). And in the unpublished notebooks he claims that “the ‘higher 
nature’ of the great man lies in being different, in incommunicability, in distance of rank, 
not in an effect of any kind – even if he made the whole world tremble” (WP, 876). Such 
passages make it sound as if the uniqueness or greatness that is achieved in the process of 
becoming who one is does not consist in the realization of great tasks or revolutionary 





as it were, internally. It consists in the achievement of a kind of maturity or independence 
that is instantiated in one’s ability to “live according to one’s own laws and standards” 
(UM III, 1). In this respect, becoming who one is means becoming autonomous in the 
social or political sense of that term, even if such autonomy never translates itself 
externally into great accomplishments of the kind that make the world tremble.12 I shall 
have occasion to reemphasize this connection between the notion of becoming who one is 
and achieving maturity or independence later. For now, let me turn to the issue of how 
one is supposed to become the person one is. 
 
In asking this question I take myself to be inquiring after the mechanism that 
Nietzsche thinks operates when a person becomes who he is. More to the point, I am 
interested in understanding whether and how the person contributes to the process that 
leads him to become who he is. Indeed, as we have seen, many of Nietzsche’s statements 
on this topic are articulated as commands or counsels. As such, they seem to suggest that 
to become who one is requires an active involvement on the person’s part, so that failing 
in this task must be construed as a failure in the exercise of some sort of agential capacity 
and not just as the outcome of some pre-established natural path.13 If people were just 
                                                 
12 The sense of autonomy at stake here parallels in an interesting way Kant’s discussion of the need to 
emerge from one’s self-imposed immaturity in his essay “An Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment?” See, Kant (1996). In that work, Kant exhorts his readers to become mature by learning to 
use their own understanding, a course of action that in his view amounts to extricating oneself from the 
minority status that is characteristic of the unthinking masses. See Kant (1996). Below I introduce the 
notion of autonomy in what I will call its strictly practical sense, that is, the sense it has when we are 
referring to the human capacity to be practical contributors to our own behavior. In order to disambiguate 
between the two notions, in this essay I will restrict myself from now on to the use of the word autonomy 
only when speaking of our practical capacity. I will use terms like independence, sovereignty, maturity, and 
the like, to refer to the political or social sense of autonomy that I think is at work in Nietzsche’s 
understanding of becoming who one is. 
 
13 Even though the way I put the point here sets it in a collision course with the essentialist readings I 





arenas for causal events to which they could not contribute, it would make little sense to 
exhort them to engage their motives in one direction or another. To counsel them is to 
acknowledge that they can motivate themselves to do things and, thus, to admit that they 
are capable of participating actively in their actions. It seems that becoming who one is 
depends on the exercise of autonomous agency, that is, it involves that capacity a person 
has to be the cause of his own behavior.14 
 
Once again, it is important to remark that there is no place in Nietzsche’s work 
where one can find a sustained discussion of what such a capacity entails or how it 
works. In the places where Nietzsche criticizes the notion of free will understood as a 
causa sui he usually also emphasizes his rejection of what he takes to be the opposite of 
this concept, namely, the concept of an “un-free will.” In place of this dichotomy 
Nietzsche proposes a different sort of bipolarity:  “in real life,” he writes, “it is only a 
matter of strong and weak wills” (BGE, 21). Of course, nothing Nietzsche says about 
what it means to have a strong or a weak will really serves to directly clarify what he 
thought about, what I am here calling, our capacity to be autonomous in the strictly 
practical sense. Nonetheless, if what I said above is plausible, it seems he very much 
presupposed the existence of such a capacity, although he never took the trouble to 
articulate in an explicit manner what it could involve. I suspect that, in examining 
Nietzsche’s description of the employment of this capacity in the process of becoming 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the form of practical injunctions necessitates such collision. Having said that though, I do think that even 
if in the end they may be able to accommodate it, at the very least, Nietzsche’s use of the injunctive voice 
puts his pronouncements in strong tension with the general tenor of the essentialist readings. 
 





who one is, we will be able to find resources to interpret how such a capacity functions in 
a way that makes sense of what Nietzsche is saying. 
 
Nietzsche’s implicit assumption of the existence of a capacity for autonomous 
agency serves another purpose in my view. Many commentators like to remark that there 
is a kind of paradox at the center of the notion of a person who is encouraged to become 
who he is.15 For it seems that this notion requires that the self that one is to become 
already be what one is before one has become it. In other words, it seems that we are 
required to think of a self that somehow produces his own existence or, alternatively, that 
exists already before it comes into existence. It is the paradox of our having to be already 
that which we are trying to become. I think what we have said thus far provides the tools 
for dispelling this worry. Indeed, in my view, this is a worry that arises only if one is 
trying to hold on to a view of the self as a unity, that is, as a single entity that stands for 
each individual in all the different aspects of his life and in all different contexts. Since 
Nietzsche rejects this view in favor of a notion of the self as a multiplicity, this sort of 
preoccupation with the possibility of a self-positing self should be of no concern to him. 
If at every present moment all sorts of selves are operating or idling within myself, as it 
were, then it is not so paradoxical that at another stage of my life another self can come 
into being or be activated as a result of the operation and interaction of those prior selves 
that I am. Indeed, it seems that the self of becoming who one is requires the existence of 
at least another self one already is, namely, that self one is in virtue of one’s capacity to 
be the cause of one’s own behavior: an autonomous self, in the strictly technical, practical 
sense of that term. 
                                                 






So what is the process by which one becomes who one is? One place where 
Nietzsche gives us some clues for answering this question is the fourth untimely 
meditation, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth. In that work, Nietzsche describes a moment in 
which Wagner, driving back to Bayreuth with some of his friends, fell into a pensive 
state. He then tells us, 
 
he [Wagner] was silent and he seemed to be gazing into himself with a look not to 
be described in words … We know that at times of exceptional danger, or in 
general at any decisive turning point in their lives, men compress together all they 
have experienced in an infinitely accelerated inner panorama, and behold distant 
events as sharply as they do the most recent ones … What Wagner  beheld within 
him on that day, however – how he became what he is and what he will be – we 
who are closest to him can to a certain extent also see (UM IV, 1; emphasis 
added). 
 
This passage is significant because it provides a first indication of the type of process 
Nietzsche has in mind when he speaks of becoming who one is. Indeed, this type of 
process is here captured in terms of the image of gazing. In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche 
explicitly associates the type of gazing described here with Zarathustra’s distinctive 
gazing (EH, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, 4). What is important about this type of 
contemplation is that it does not correspond to a mere passive activity. Here Nietzsche is 
describing a process of introspection that consists in compressing, accelerating, 
sharpening, one’s own life, and which results in one becoming what one is. In order to 
elucidate further what is involved in this type of introspective process I will now turn to 






To my knowledge, no commentator has really engaged in a close analysis of the 
answer to the question of how one becomes what one is that is found in the work that 
bears that very question in its subtitle, namely, Ecce Homo.16 I find this somewhat 
surprising. If there is any place where one can hope to find some kind of sustained 
discussion of how one becomes who one is, this should be it. Let us see what we can find 
in this philosophical autobiography. 
 
I think that one good place to start approaching the text is from the epigraph with 
which Nietzsche opens the book. Epigraphs usually function as a sort of microcosm that 
prefigures and sets the stage for the story that is to follow. They do this not merely by 
suggesting the underlying theme of the narrative, but also by organizing and preparing 
the space in which and from which the story will develop. The epigraph introduces the 
dominant images of the text, those symbols that establish the general tone and the 
dynamics of the work. It is, I think, therefore worthwhile in this case to attempt to 
highlight some of the most salient images that are operating in the epigraph to Ecce 
Homo as a first approximation to the book, as a strategy for approaching and tackling its 
meaning, its aim and function. The text reads as follows: 
 
On this perfect day when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns 
brown, the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked forward, 
and never saw so many and such good things at once. It was not for nothing that I 
buried my forty-fourth year today; I had the right to bury it; whatever was life in 
it has been saved, is immortal. The Revaluation of All Values, the Dionysus 
Dithyrambs, and, for recreation, the Twilight of the Idols, – all presents of this 
year, indeed of its last quarter!  How could I fail to be grateful to my whole life? – 
and so I tell my life to myself (EH, ‘Epigraph’). 
                                                 
16 One exception is Leiter, but he engages more in a kind of cursory sweep of the arguments found in Ecce 
Homo than in a sustained and careful consideration of them. I shall have occasion to point out later my 






The first thing to notice is that the epigraph opens with an image of maturity. We are 
amidst a process that has been brought to perfection, something has ripened; it is now 
fully grown and developed. This something, of course, is Nietzsche himself: he has 
become the one he is. Nietzsche is going to tell us in this book how he came to maturity, 
how his life was brought to some sort of completion. This is significant because it links 
this text to our prior discussion on the nature of the “Who” that one is suppose to become. 
But the epigraph also points us in another direction. It remits us to the second essay of the 
Genealogy of Morals in which the image of maturity, of a ripening process, is used to 
refer to the notion of achieving independence or sovereignty. The essay begins with what 
Nietzsche characterizes as the authentic enigma with respect to man, namely, that in the 
case of man nature has set itself the paradoxical task of breeding an animal with the right 
to make promises (GM II, 1). Nietzsche then explains that this task amounts to the 
creation of a being that is capable of acting as guarantor of itself, a being who can to a 
certain extend ordain the course of its life and of its future, in a word, a being that is 
capable of responsibility. The important point here is that Nietzsche describes the 
attainment of this capacity as a late fruit that is the product of a long historical process. 
As he puts it: 
 
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last 
brings forth fruit … then we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign 
individual, like only to himself … in short, the man who has his own independent, 
protracted will and the right to make promises – and in him a proud 
consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved 
and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his own power and freedom, a 






Thus, we have here a characterization of the achievement of some sort of agential 
capacity, a capacity to act in an independent manner in accordance with one’s own will.  
This link between the two passages may suggest the notion that becoming the one that 
one is amounts to becoming independent in the sense outlined by the Genealogy. This 
link is further confirmed, I think, by the suggestion in both passages that the completion 
of maturity carries with it the attainment of a special power or privilege. This is evident 
from the use of the notion of a right: in the case of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche’s right to bury 
his forty-forth year, and in the case of the Genealogy, the sovereign individual’s right to 
make promises.  
 
 But, returning to our discussion of the epigraph, we find that it also gives us an 
indication of what is involved in this process of maturity. For Nietzsche deploys 
alongside the image of maturity the symbol of gazing. As we saw, Nietzsche had already 
used this notion of gazing to speak of the act of becoming what one is in Richard Wagner 
in Bayreuth. Here the metaphor is developed along the same lines. We are told that an 
eye of the sun has come down upon Nietzsche's life: he has examined his life with a 
resulting sense of affirmation and approval. This I take to mean that a sort of clarity has 
befallen him, a clarity that springs from a certain act of observation, namely, an act of 
self-scrutiny. Nietzsche has looked back and forward and in this movement of 
introspection he has become transparent to himself, he has been enlightened. Maturity is 






 This is, of course, a very vague approximation to the problem. In itself it tells us 
very little about the specific character of this process of self-observation. Fortunately, in 
the epigraph Nietzsche develops another set of metaphors that provide further content to 
this notion of maturity. These are the images of burial, death, life and immortality. 
Nietzsche claims to have buried his forty-fourth year and to have had a right to do so. 
And this suggests that the act of introspection does not consist in simply bearing one's 
past but in actively burying it. Hence, it is no mere passive process of self-contemplation 
that is involved in the notion of maturity. Instead, this peculiar sort of self-observation 
has a practical component that consists in an active engagement with oneself and with 
one's past. As a kind of grave-digging activity the introspection that is required to achieve 
maturity is a highly selective process, it entails the preservation of certain aspects of 
oneself and the negation of certain others. What remains becomes immortal; it continues 
living in and through oneself while the rest perishes. This image of immortality as 
something intimately bound to a dynamic relation between life and death will be invoked 
again through the course of the book. "One pays dearly for immortality" Nietzsche tells 
us at one point, "one has to die several times while still alive" (EH, ‘Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra’, 5; see also 4). 
  
 The duality of life and death is immediately echoed in the opening lines of the 
book, where Nietzsche writes: "the good fortune of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, 
lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, 
while as my mother I am still living and becoming old" (EH, ‘Why I am so Wise’, 1). 





will recur constantly throughout the work under different guises (Nietzsche speaks of 
sickness and health, of destruction and creation, of decadence and ascending life, of 
negation and affirmation, of self-forgetfulness and self-consciousness). It is, I think, a 
touchstone for a series of couplings that are key for understanding the sort of process that 
is involved in the achievement of maturity. Just as immortality, maturity too is achieved 
by a dynamic play of opposites. Indeed, as we shall see shortly, Nietzsche seems to 
believe, somewhat paradoxically, that becoming who one is occurs in the process of 
relinquishing and regaining one’s capacity for autonomous agency. Such process is 
prefigured in the epigraph itself. For the epigraph plays with a contrast between an active 
self that “looks” and “buries” and a passive self that receives presents and is grateful for 
the goods that are bestowed upon it. The self-understanding that signals the achievement 
of maturity somehow occurs in the movement between these two moments, between an 
active self that initiates action and a passive self that disables his will and lets things 
flow. 
 
 In order to explore this aspect of Nietzsche’s account I want to discuss three very 
important passages in Ecce Homo. The first takes place towards the end of the first 
section of the book. There, Nietzsche writes: 
 
Freedom from ressentiment, enlightenment about ressentiment – who knows how 
much I am indebted, in this respect also, to my protracted sickness! … If anything 
at all must be adduced against being sick and being weak, it is that man’s really 
remedial instinct, his fighting instinct wears out. One cannot get rid of anything, 
one cannot get over anything, one cannot repel anything – everything hurts … 
Against all this the sick person has only one great remedy: I call it Russian 
fatalism … no longer to accept anything at all, no longer to take anything, no 
longer to absorb anything – to cease reacting altogether …Because one would use 





more: this is the logic. Nothing burns one up faster than the affects of 
ressentiment … I displayed the “Russian fatalism” I mentioned by tenaciously 
clinging for years to all but intolerable situations, places, apartments, and society, 
merely because they happened to be given by accident: it was better than 
changing them, than feeling that they could be changed – than rebelling against 
them. Any attempt to disturb me in this fatalism, to awaken me by force, used to 
annoy me mortally – and it actually was mortally dangerous every time. 
Accepting oneself as fated, not wishing oneself “different” – that is in such cases 
great reason itself (EH, ‘Why I am so Wise’, 6). 
 
There are two things I wish to highlight about this passage. The first is that Nietzsche is 
here recommending a course of action that is of a peculiar sort: it consists in the 
suspension of the will, in the abandonment of one’s capacity to take initiatives. The 
second is that he is giving a special sort of rationale for this course of action. The 
rationale is that, when one is sick, exercising one’s will has damaging effects (indeed, 
even fatal effects). What is interesting is that the recommendation seems to presuppose 
the truth of autonomous agency as I have discussed it in this paper. It is precisely because 
the person is capable of contributing to his own behavior that Nietzsche thinks he must 
not do so whenever he is sick.17 To contribute to one’s own behavior when one is sick is 
to put oneself at peril. In particular, as Nietzsche suggests in that section, it is to put 
oneself in a situation that curtails one’s capacity to heal. The explanation for why this is 
so turns on the notion that every exertion of the will requires the expenditure of energy. 
But sickness is precisely the condition in which energy is scarce. Accordingly, Nietzsche 
thinks that exercising one’s will under such conditions would mean the continued 
                                                 
17 Though he does not cite it directly, in a footnote Leiter considers the implications of the last sentence in 
this passage. His discussion turns on a point about translation. He argues that Kaufmann mistranslates the 
passage rendering Nietzsche’s comment as “accepting oneself as if fated,” thereby suggesting that 
Nietzsche does not really believe in fatalism. Once the phrase is rendered in the appropriate way – Leiter 
argues – the problematic suggestion goes away and Nietzsche’s comment can be more easily 
accommodated to his philosophical outlook as Leiter understands it: one should accept oneself as fated 
because, after all, one really is fated (See Leiter, 2001: 286). However, it should be clear from our 
discussion that, even when rendered in the appropriate way, Nietzsche’s comment in this section raises the 
very difficulty that Leiter worries about. It is precisely because one is not fated that Nietzsche thinks one 





drainage of energy without the possibility of replenishment and, thus, the perpetuation of 
sickness. The proposed solution is to suppress one’s own contribution and to let one’s 
behavior take its course in the particular situation (places, apartments, society) one is in 
without one’s intervention. 
 
 This is one of the first indications Nietzsche gives us in Ecce Homo of his implicit 
belief in our capacity to be autonomous agents and his appreciation of its power. Not only 
does he seem to believe that people are capable of more than passive contemplation of 
their lives, he thinks their ability to be active contributors to it is so powerful it can, under 
certain circumstances, become a danger for them. Let us now look at another place where 
we get a similar indication of the need to counterbalance the power of agency. Nietzsche 
spends most of the section entitled “Why I am so Clever” discussing the effects of place, 
climate, nutrition and recreation in a person and, in particular, of course, in himself. After 
discussing his experiences with respect to these things Nietzsche avers: 
 
In all these matters – in the choice of nutrition, of place and climate, of recreation 
– an instinct of self-preservation issues its commandments, and it gains its most 
unambiguous expression as an instinct of self-defense. Not to see many things, not 
to hear many things, not to permit many things to come close – first imperative of 
prudence, first proof that one is no mere accident but a necessity. The usual word 
for this instinct of self-defense is taste. It commands us not only to say No when 
saying Yes would be “selfless” but also to say No as rarely as possible. To detach 
oneself, to separate oneself from anything that would make it necessary to keep 
saying No. The reason in this is that when defensive expenditures, be they ever so 
small, become the rule and a habit, they entail an extraordinary and entirely 
superfluous impoverishment… Merely through a constant need to ward off, one 
can become weak enough to be unable to defend oneself any longer… Another 
counsel of prudence and self-defense is to react as rarely as possible, and to 
avoid situations and relationships that would condemn one to suspend, as it were, 
one’s “freedom” and initiative and to become a mere reagent. As a parable I 
choose association with books. Scholars who at bottom do little nowadays but 





When they don’t thumb, they don’t think. They respond to a stimulus (a thought 
they have read) whenever they think – in the end they do nothing but react (EH, 
‘Why I am so Clever’, 8). 
  
In this passage, unlike the prior one, Nietzsche is not considering the case of a person 
who is already sick and needs to shut down his autonomous agency in order to heal. But 
in a manner that is reminiscent of the prior passage, here too there is the suggestion that a 
certain way of exercising autonomous agency may be detrimental, may lead to a type of 
sickness of the will, more precisely, to an exhaustion of the will. In this section Nietzsche 
is suggesting that our autonomy, our power to be contributors to our own behavior, 
requires the development of an instinct of self-defense, a discriminatory capacity, in order 
to keep working properly.18 The absence of such an instinct would mean not only the 
impoverishment of our will by the pursuit of purely negative ends, but also the 
transformation of our will into a merely negative faculty. The latter implication is 
suggested by the parable. The scholar is a person who exercises his will only in the 
manner of a reagent, someone whose capacity to take initiatives has been reduced to a 
capacity to respond to stimuli. That this is a sickness of the will is attested by Nietzsche 
insistence that scholars are decadents, and his association of decadence with sickness 
(Ibid.; EH, Why I am so Wise, 1). 
 
But the introduction of an instinct of self-defense as a means to ensure that our 
autonomy is not wasted and does not turn itself into a purely reactive capacity raises the 
                                                 
18 At other places Nietzsche seems to describe this instinct not as a discriminatory capacity, but as a 
capacity to shut down our autonomous agency: “To learn to see – to accustom the eye to composure, to 
patience, to letting things come to it; to put off judgment, to learn to walk around all sides of the individual 
case and comprehend it from all sides. That is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react to a 
stimulus right away, but to keep in check the instinct to restrict and exclude. Learning to see as I understand 
it, is almost what is unphilosophically termed will-power: what is essential is precisely not to ‘will,’ to be 





specter of passivity again. The way Nietzsche speaks in the passage not only gives the 
impression that there are two different faculties, one of choice and another of self-
protection, but also appears to relegate the first to the second. In our choices, Nietzsche 
seems to be telling us, there rules an instinct that issues its commands. Thus, this instinct 
enlists us as vehicles for its expression. Our role is that of passive spectators of forces 
that are beyond our control but that have their meeting place in us and that employ our 
bodies as means for their discharge and fulfillment. 
 
When we couple this passage with other things Nietzsche has to say, however, I 
think it becomes clear that this is not what is going on at all. Prior to this point, Nietzsche 
spends many pages reporting to his readers the absolutely dismal experiences he has had 
with respect to matters of climate, place, recreation and nutrition. He suggests that for a 
very long time his choices on these matters represented a senseless neglect on his part, a 
kind of thoughtlessness in questions having to do with the consumption and the 
replenishment of energy. As he explains at some point: “Any refined self-concern, any 
protection by some commanding instinct was lacking; I simply posited myself as equal to 
any nobody; it was a ‘selflessness,’ an oblivion of all distance between myself and others 
that I shall never forgive myself. When I was close to the end, because I was close to the 
end, I began to reflect on this fundamental unreason of my life – this ‘idealism.’ Only my 
sickness brought me to reason” (EH, ‘Why I am so Clever’, 2). The thing to notice here is 
that, according to Nietzsche, he acquired the aforementioned instinct of self-preservation 
after a process of reflection. Prior to his reflecting and understanding reason in reality the 





dependent on, or, at least, to be very much influenced by, the exercise of autonomous 
agency. It is not the instinct that enlists us as vehicles for its expression; it is we who 
enlist it to ensure the continued existence of our capacity to contribute to the workings of 
our own lives and our own behavior. More precisely, the very mechanisms through which 
we exercise autonomous agency, namely, reflection and self-understanding, recruit and 
develop the instinct for self-preservation in the service of their continued existence and 
their proper functioning. 
 
I have now introduced the elements required for spelling out the workings of our 
capacity to be autonomous agents in a way that is compatible and makes sense of what 
Nietzsche is saying here. My analysis has revealed that consciousness in the form of self-
reflection and self-understanding plays a significant role for Nietzsche in the exercise of 
autonomy. These moments of conscious awareness disrupt the flow of our life and 
change the course of events in that life and in that sense seem to act as causes of our own 
behavior.19 Here I must pause a moment to consider how they do that exactly. I think we 
can attribute to Nietzsche the implicit endorsement of something like the following 
                                                 
19 Some things Nietzsche says in the Genealogy also attest to his belief in the disruptive power of 
consciousness. In the Second Essay, for instance, he insists that the active faculty of forgetting is essential 
for leading a happy life precisely because it keeps consciousness clean; it helps preserve psychic order 
(GM, II 1). It is important to remark, however, that Nietzsche’s pronouncements with respect to the 
phenomenon of consciousness are as complex as they are varied. Here I am highlighting an aspect that I 
believe is clearly present in his account of “becoming who one is.” But this aspect is in tension with other 
things Nietzsche says about consciousness elsewhere. In particular, it seems to be in contradiction with 
certain passages in which Nietzsche appears to question the causal efficacy of consciousness altogether.  
See, for example, GS 11, 333 and BGE 17. It is certainly a worthwhile project to attempt to resolve the 
apparent contradictions in Nietzsche’s work. However, I do not take myself to be engaged in such project 
here. I wish only to examine a small but very significant part of Nietzsche’s writings that implicate 
consciousness in a way that appears to make it more than merely ephiphenomenal. The reader may no 
doubt find this profoundly disappointing. I can only hope to make my case for this horn of the dilemma 
compelling enough so that those who wish to engage in the project of dispelling apparent contradictions in 
Nietzsche’s work will find themselves seriously constraint to either interpret the problematic passages in a 
way that makes them consonant with the view that is expressed here or be force to bite the bullet and 





picture.20 When we reflect on what we are doing or on what is happening to us we are not 
simply detached observers of ourselves. The reason for this is that the conclusions we 
draw when we engage in such a reflection will affect the things that we do and that 
happen to us. They will do so by prompting us to form intentions that correspond to what 
we have understood about ourselves, intentions that will then commit us to engage in the 
sorts of movements that will bring them about. In this way, we end up doing what we 
have understood by formulating and endorsing some understanding of what we are 
doing.21 Our self-understanding introduces an additional link in the causal chain of our 
actions. But, because it is our self that is here understanding it-self, what our self does 
when it understands itself can be attributed to him. It is thus a way that he has of 
participating in his action. Once Nietzsche understood reason in reality he formed 
intentions that reflected such an understanding and, consequently, changed the course of 
his life. In the last of the three passages I wish to examine we find confirmation of this 
causal power of self-consciousness, as I have described it, and we learn about the relation 
it has to our ability to become what we are.22 
 
Towards the end of the section ‘Why I am so Clever,’ and following the previous 
excerpt, Nietzsche finally explains how it is that one becomes what one is. He writes: 
                                                 
20 As will become clear in a moment, I am indebted to David Velleman’s work for the ideas that drive the 
discussion that follows. See Velleman (2007). 
 
21 Velleman puts this point in the following terms: “The agent’s desire to understand what he’s doing 
inhibits him from acting until he has committed himself to the truth of some [act-description], whereupon it 
reinforces his antecedent motives for acting in accordance with that description, with the result that he does 
what he’s prepared to understand and understands what he’s doing” (Velleman, 2007: 18). 
 
22 In my view, this way of rendering our capacity to be autonomous is indifferent between an incompatiblist 
and a compatibilist conception of human agency (that is to say, it can be recruited by either camp). I think 
this makes it even more consonant with Nietzsche’s general philosophical outlook which, as I understand it, 
tends to accept, affirm and incorporate a kind of metaphysical opacity with respect to fundamental 






At this point the real answer to the question, how one becomes what one is, can no 
longer be avoided. And thus I touch on the masterpiece of the art of self-
preservation – of selfishness. For let us assume that the task, the destiny, the fate 
of the task transcends the average very significantly: in that case, nothing could be 
more dangerous than catching sight of oneself with this task. To become what one 
is, one must not have the faintest notion what one is. From this point of view even 
the blunders of life have their own meaning and value – the occasional side roads 
and wrong roads, the delays, “modesties,” seriousness wasted on tasks that are 
remote from the task. All this can express a great prudence, even the supreme 
prudence: where nosce te ipsum [Know thyself] would be the recipe for ruin, 
forgetting oneself, misunderstanding oneself, making oneself smaller, narrower, 
mediocre, become reason itself. Morally speaking: neighbor love, living for 
others, and other things can be a protective measure for preserving the hardest 
self-concern. This is the exception where, against my wont and conviction, I side 
with the “selfless” drives: here they work in the service of self-love, of self-
discipline. The whole surface of consciousness – consciousness is a surface – 
must be kept clear of all great imperatives. Beware even of every great word, 
every great pose! So many dangers that the instinct comes too soon to ‘understand 
itself’ – Meanwhile the organizing “idea” that is destined to rule keeps growing 
deep down – it begins to command; slowly it leads us back from side roads and 
wrong roads; it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that will one day prove to 
be indispensable as means toward a whole – one by one, it trains all subservient 
capacities before giving any hint of the dominant task, “goal,” “aim,” or 
“meaning” (EH, ‘Why I am so Clever’, 9). 
  
I want to approach the passage by first pointing out that it resonates strongly with some 
things Nietzsche says in the third essay of the Genealogy. There, Nietzsche argues that in 
the early stages of his development the philosopher was required to adopt the ascetic 
ideal in order to avoid becoming conscious of himself too quickly. This was necessary, 
according to Nietzsche, because otherwise the philosopher would not have become what 
he was in the process of becoming. Nietzsche argues that the various traits of the 
philosopher (his bent to doubt, to deny, to suspend judgment, etc.) were so novel when 
they first appeared on earth that they must have been seen as contrary to the demands of 
morality and conscience. Thus, in order to create the new type of life he embodied, the 





doing, of the various faculties that he was cultivating and that were growing in him (GM 
III, 9). It should be clear from this brief characterization that there is a strong parallel 
between that discussion and the passage we are considering here. Becoming who and 
what one is requires the exercise of self-forgetfulness; the suspension of one’s drive to 
know oneself, to understand what one is doing. The important thing to highlight is that 
the very injunction to suspend one’s drive to self-knowledge presupposes the causal 
power of consciousness we have been considering. Why would Nietzsche insist that 
consciousness be kept clear of all great imperatives if it is not because he believes that 
conscious endorsement of such imperatives would cause the person to alter his behavior 
in a way that would prevent him from becoming what he is. The lesson seems to be that 
one can never be merely a passive spectator of one’s life. To be a spectator is already to 
participate in the action that happens on stage, it is to influence what we observe and thus 
to contribute causally to what happens. 
 
I thus disagree with Leiter’s reading of this passage. Leiter interprets this passage 
as suggesting that one becomes what one is “by making no special effort directed 
towards that end, because one becomes what one is necessarily” (Leiter, 2001: 287). 
Leiter observes correctly that becoming what one is entails making no conscious effort to 
become what one is, but he misunderstands Nietzsche’s reasoning for why this is so and 
thereby misunderstands what this means. On Leiter’s view Nietzsche is making a 
descriptive claim to the effect that one’s life follows a necessary course, and using this 
claim to warrant the conclusion that a particular point in one’s life, the point at which one 





interpret the recommendation Nietzsche is making in the passage as being purely 
theoretical, a recommendation about how one should view one’s own life from a purely 
intellectual perspective: one must see it as following a necessary course and not as being 
subject to one’s own control.23 
 
In my interpretation, by contrast, Nietzsche is recommending, not the theoretical 
renunciation of our belief in autonomy, but the practical renunciation of our autonomy. 
One does not become what one is necessarily; one must keep oneself out of one’s own 
way in order to do so. This is what makes this passage so interesting for Nietzsche is 
suggesting that a certain type of contribution to one’s own life, the type of contribution 
that corresponds to a kind of consummation of one’s life, must be implemented in a 
delayed manner. The intentions, goals, aims or meanings that spring from who and what 
we are require time for their formulation because they are supposed to represent 
something like our fully mature self. What this means is that one’s capacity to understand 
oneself and thereby inject oneself in the causal stream of one’s own life must be kept in 
check until one is “ripe” enough to understand oneself properly. This is why Nietzsche 
warns us against understanding ourselves too soon and even tells us what sorts of signs 
we should look for in order to prevent such premature and hasty self-understanding: we 
should beware of great poses, great words, and great imperatives. Accordingly, becoming 
who and what one is requires a great deal of self-surveillance. The successful 
implementation of such self-scrutiny paves the way for the moment when the self can 
                                                 
23 Indeed, Leiter suggests that in the section Nietzsche is viewing his own life in the way an apple tree 
would view itself. So from the onset Leiter interprets the passage as conveying a purely speculative 






finally understand what he is (more properly, what or who he is in the process of 
becoming) and in that way can do what he understands.24 I take it that Nietzsche’s 
descriptions of Zarathustra’s and Wagner’s gaze, of which we spoke earlier, are meant to 
correspond precisely to that moment when the fully mature self finally “recollects” itself 
and understands itself in a manner that commits him to a certain way of life. 
 
 I end this essay with two question marks. I have argued that Nietzsche, in a way 
that I think sets him apart from the German philosophical tradition that preceded him, 
recognized in self-consciousness (and in its surrogate forms, self-understanding and self-
reflection) not only a positive power of tremendous significance, but also and for very 
much the same reasons a negative force of perhaps equal magnitude. The drive to know 
oneself is not always good; under certain circumstances it can represent a real danger. 
This means, to put in Nietzschean terms, that it is healthy, for organisms such as we are, 
to adopt a general policy of skepticism toward our own (and other’s) understanding of 
ourselves and of our environment.  In particular, for those who seek to become authentic, 
this type of skepticism should be directed toward the received values of society. 
Becoming who one is requires running those values through the sieve of critical 
reflection; what survives becomes truly one’s own and, in that way, it can be said that one 
lives according to one’s own laws and standards. 
 
But this raises the problem of just what is the nature of this type of skeptical 
attitude. In the Antichrist Nietzsche says that all great spirits of the likes of Zarathustra 
are skeptics, and in Beyond Good and Evil he distinguishes between two types of 
                                                 





skepticism: of weakness and of strength (A, 54; BGE, 208-209). What makes these 
skepticisms different? How does one know when one is in the grips of one or the other? 
Presumably, the skepticism of strength is what is operative in becoming who one is, but 
what are the standards of such skepticism? At one point in the Gay Science Nietzsche 
remarks that “one could conceive of a delight and power of self-determination, a freedom 
of the will, in which the spirit takes leave of all faith and every wish for certainty, 
practiced as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and dancing even 
beside abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence” (GS, 347). The 
image is forceful and inspiring, but it also underscores the problem. Even the most skilled 
funambulist needs the rope he stands on. What is that rope and why should relying on it 
impress the whole process of value questioning and value fashioning with the mark of 
authenticity? 
 
My analysis raises another puzzle in this connection that is worth exploring. It is 
not so difficult to appreciate why Nietzsche cautions against the use and acceptance of 
great words, great poses and great imperatives. The person who adopts such postures 
rings false. We tend to suspect that he does not know who he is and, with a kind of 
youthful enthusiasm, is embracing roles in which he can feel that he is somebody and, 
moreover, somebody important. Instead of becoming independent, the person becomes in 
this way the valet of someone or something else, be it a religion, a political party, an 






The admonition to beware of these postures is a call not to understand oneself in a 
particular way. But Nietzsche also recommends something different; he recommends a 
kind of misunderstanding of oneself, that is, the embracing of a false conception of what 
one is. In the passage from Ecce Homo he renders it in terms of the adoption of a kind of 
altruistic persona, the understanding of oneself as someone who lives for others and other 
things. Independently of the question of why such altruism should be understood as a 
form of self-deception, the fact that Nietzsche thinks of it as a misunderstanding of 
oneself raises a pressing problem: How is this type of falsity different from the one 
discussed previously? Why is it that it is not inimical to the project of becoming who one 
is but rather seems to contribute to it? In my view, this problem leads us in the direction 
of what Nietzsche calls the dangerous concept of the artist (GS, 361). For Nietzsche 
artists are creatures that take delight in falseness and pretense, beings that like to adopt 
masks and who long for appearance. To the extent that a kind of falseness seems to be 
implicated in the enterprise, one can, at least partly, characterize the process of becoming 
who one is as an exercise in a kind of artistry of sorts – an idea that seems to be 
insinuated in the passage from the Gay Science where Nietzsche speaks of the desire to 
become who one is as a desire to create oneself (GS, 335). And this raises the interesting, 












I. Introduction: The Puzzle 
 
A strange puzzle confronts the reader of Nietzsche’s second treatise of On the 
Genealogy of Morals. It is a puzzle that has to do with the relation between the discussion 
at the beginning of the treatise and the one that ensues shortly after. 
 
The treatise opens with a description of a problem Nietzsche calls the authentic 
problem of man. This consists in transforming the human creature into an animal that is 
not simply capable, but – in a much stronger sense – legitimately authorized to make 
promises.25 Nietzsche thinks this is a paradoxical problem, but one which for the most 
                                                 
25 Nietzsche himself stresses the expression in the text: “Ein Tier … das versprechen darf “(usually 
rendered: an animal that has the right to make promises). I believe this is meant to emphasize the 
distinction between the person who is merely capable of promise-making and the person who actually has 
the authority to do so. However, it is important to note here that this rendering has been criticized in recent 
literature, most notably by Christa Davis Acampora (Acampora, 2004). Acampora and others suggest that 
the traditional translation encourages readers to find more normative significance in the text than Nietzsche 
intends: it makes it sound as if promise-making is an entitlement of sorts. Readers are thus advised to make 
use of more accurate translations such as that of Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen, who render the 
phrase as “an animal that is permitted to promise” (Clark and Swensen, 1998). I do not want to ensnarl 
myself in a debate about translations, but I do want to point out that there may have been good reasons for 
traditional translators to render the text in the normatively laden way they did. In its most literal translation 
the German would read: “an animal that may make promises”. However, this would make uncertain 
whether the task of nature is to breed an animal that has the possibility of making promises, and in that 
sense is merely capable of promise-making, or an animal that has the authority to do so, in which case he is 
licensed to make promises. Nietzsche’s own stress in the original might be construed as an indication that 
he wants the reader to disambiguate the meaning in some specific direction. Contrary to Acampora and 





part nature has already solved. The solution is embodied in the person of the sovereign 
individual, for precisely this type of individual enjoys the extraordinary privilege of 
responsibility. He does so because he possess the power to exert his mastery over nature, 
over the circumstances, over all short-willed and unreliable creatures, and, most 
importantly, over himself (GM II, 2). The sovereign individual can act as guarantor of 
himself and is thus rightfully endowed with the requisite authority to make promises. 
Moreover, Nietzsche tells us that the sovereign individual is fully cognizant of this power 
and privilege, to the point that this cognition has become a dominant instinct in him. He 
calls this dominant instinct his conscience (Gewissen). The sovereign individual does not 
only rule his life in accordance with the proud consciousness he has of his own power 
and privilege, Nietzsche suggests that he also has his measure of value in this: he 
evaluates things from and through the conception he has of himself as a sovereign 
individual (Ibid). 
 
But – and here is the puzzle –, after only a few sections discussing these matters 
and, apparently, setting the stage for what promises to be a commentary and an 
exposition of how nature managed to accomplish this incredible transformation in man, 
the treatise takes a different and unexpected turn. Nietzsche starts telling us the story of 
how that other “somber thing” called the bad conscience came into the world. This 
remains his focus of attention for the remainder of the treatise, which – heralding the 
                                                                                                                                                 
of those who make promises without having the right or the authority to do so (welche versprechen, ohne es 
zu dürfen); he describes the sovereign individual as one who recognizes himself as endowed with the 
extraordinary privilege of responsibility (das ausserordentliche Privilegium der Verantwortlichkeit) and as 
having a power over himself and over fate ([eine] Macht über sich und das Geschick); see GM II, 2.  All 
this makes apparent that Nietzsche means to distinguish between a mere capacity to make promises and a 





discussion of the next treatise on the meaning of ascetic ideals – culminates with the 
ghastly description of the man of the bad conscience in its most gruesome expression: the 
man who, aided by religious presuppositions, carries his feeling of guilt to the most 
extreme and severe levels of self-torture and self-flagellation. 
 
The puzzle, then, is this: what is the relationship between that proud, scintillating 
conscience of the sovereign individual and that other shameful, gloomy thing called the 
bad conscience? Is the latter a stage in the history of the development of the sovereign 
conscience? If that is so, why is it that the history of this development has yielded the 
contrary fruit from the one that seemed to be promised in it? Or is it that this history 
yields two different and opposing fruits embodied in different individual types? Or, must 
the fruit first appear in its rotten form as a guilty conscience, in order to be overcome – to 
use one of Nietzsche’s favorite terms – in the final stage of this development? Then 
again, perhaps the bad conscience as the feeling of guilt is not a stage in the formation of 
the sovereign conscience, but an aberration, even if a very prevalent one, of what should 
otherwise have been a natural progression from a simpler form of the bad conscience to 
the proud conscience described in the opening sections of the second treatise. 
 
This is the line of inquiry I want to pursue in this essay.  My discussion of these 
matters will lead me to conclusions that differ in significant ways from some important 
recent studies of the second treatise of the Genealogy, most notably those of Brian Leiter 
and Mathias Risse, but also those of Christa Davis Acampora and Paul S. Loeb. For the 





margins, devoting footnote space for that purpose. Anticipating a bit, I will argue that, 
contrary to what these (and most) interpreters think, the feeling of guilt is a necessary 
component of the psychic structure of the sovereign individual as Nietzsche envisions 
him. 
 
II. The Genealogical Approach 
 
Before proceeding with the argument, a slight digression is in order here. Later 
on, this initial digression will prove helpful for understanding and solving many of the 
difficulties raised by Nietzsche’s account. I have said that in the Genealogy Nietzsche 
seeks to reproduce the history of a particular phenomenon – though it is somewhat 
unclear which phenomenon that is. But the word “history” is a bit misleading here. For, 
as is well known, Nietzsche meant his genealogical method to differ in novel and 
important ways from ordinary historical inquiry.26 Unfortunately, doing full justice to 
Nietzsche’s understanding and criticism of history as a discipline, would lead me too far 
afield. For the purpose of this essay it will suffice to simply mention a couple of 
important respects in which Nietzsche’s own approach to historical questions diverges 
from more traditional methods.  
 
To begin with, Nietzsche conceives of history as a fundamentally interpretative 
activity and not as a merely descriptive enterprise. He spares no words of contempt for 
                                                 
26 Nietzsche’s quarrel with and criticism of the historical method is patent from very early on in his career. 
See the Second Untimely Meditation: On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. For different accounts of 






modern historiography for its alleged “objectivity” and its desire to serve simply as a 
“mirror” and do nothing more than ascertain and present the facts (GM III, 26). It would 
be a mistake, however, to think that Nietzsche’s repudiation of modern historiography 
signals or foreshadows a kind of “postmodern” disdain for and suspicion of facts and 
factual language. Nietzsche’s point of contention with the practice of history is not that it 
naively believes in facts, but that it rests on the assumption that facts speak for 
themselves and that they can tell a history if one simply lays them down and reports them 
coolly. A genealogy of morality or of moral concepts must indeed begin, in Nietzsche’s 
words, “[with] what is documented, what can actually be confirmed and has actually 
existed, in short [with] the entire long hieroglyphic record, so hard to decipher, of the 
moral past of mankind”(GM Preface, 7). But this is just the starting point of the 
historian’s labor. Notice that Nietzsche equates here the historical or factual record with a 
hieroglyphic, that is, with a symbol that is in need of interpretation. The genealogist’s 
task is precisely to construct such an interpretation, on the knowledge that he must 
proceed cautiously and rigorously, since the historical record is very hard to decipher.27 
Such interpretations will invariably involve normative or evaluative judgments that 
attempt to reveal the hidden significance of the known facts.28  
 
                                                 
27 Throughout the Genealogy Nietzsche reminds his readers that it is hard to see what really lies behind or 
at the bottom of the historical events he is examining. See, GM II, 6. 
 
28 Here it is also worth nothing that in Nietzsche’s own case many of these interpretations aim to reveal 
aspects of the past for which there actually is no historical record left, but whose shape and significance can 
be guessed, nonetheless, from the historical facts that have been preserved. As we shall see later, this is 
especially true of the second treatise of the Genealogy in which we find Nietzsche, for the most part, trying 
to imagine on the basis of the historical record what the prehistoric past of mankind must have been like. I 
think this also makes Nietzsche’s account different from accounts, prevalent in much of early modern 
philosophy, that employ hypothetical state of nature scenarios. Unlike the latter, the hypothesis Nietzsche 
offers is not meant to be a merely fictional heuristic devise, but rather is meant to describe real historical 





We encounter this type of interpretative work throughout the Genealogy. I will 
take a simple and rather minor example to illustrate the point. In section 5 of the second 
treatise Nietzsche alludes to the Twelve Tables legislation of Rome (GM II, 5). He is 
discussing the primitive notion of compensation as a “right to cruelty” bestowed upon 
creditors, to be exercised in the case debtors failed to fulfill their contractual obligations. 
Nietzsche is interested in stressing the idea that such a “right to cruelty” consisted above 
all in a license to inflict bodily harm on the person of the debtor himself or perhaps on 
that of someone that still belonged to him (e.g. his wife, his children). In exercising this 
right, the creditor would engage in the most horrendous acts, like cutting from the body 
of the debtor as much as seemed commensurate with the size of the debt. Nietzsche 
claims that, from early on in the history of humanity, the “right to cruelty” was written 
into law with a shocking level of detail and minuteness concerning the exact procedures 
of such violent acts of compensation. This, of course, is a claim that is supposed to find 
confirmation in the historical record of ancient legal codes and, in part, Nietzsche cites 
the Twelve Tables of Rome as an example of such a legislature, one in which one can see 
the right to cruelty written into law. 
 
Presumably, a traditional historian of the type Nietzsche decries would have 
merely reported these things, as I have just done, in the interest of constructing a history 
of jurisprudence or some such project. But Nietzsche is interested in doing more than 
that: he also wants to read in these facts particular lessons, mostly psychological ones. 
The most important lesson in this case is that the “right to cruelty” betrays a human 





the predilection to do evil for the pleasure of doing it. Indeed, he argues that only if one 
assumes such a tendency can one make sense of the fact that, in place of a literal 
reparation (in terms of money, or possessions, or the like), the wronged party was 
afforded a compensation in terms of the opportunity to cause pain and suffering on his 
debtor. In the case of the Twelve Tables of Rome, Nietzsche further interprets the fact 
that the law decreed it a matter of indifference how much or how little a creditor was 
allowed to cut off from the body of his debtor, as a sign of a more advanced and a freer 
conception of the law (Ibid.). In this way, he continues to sound one of the major themes 
of the Genealogy: that the higher the degree of culture and civilization a human 
community exhibits, the more abstract, refined, crystallized and complex is the 
conceptual apparatus it employs; and, conversely, the more one goes back towards 
primeval humanity, the more coarse, literal, concrete and trite is the conceptual 
understanding one encounters.29 That the Roman legislature thought it was of no 
consequence how much a person could cut off from the offender, is a sign that the 
concept of legal compensation has become more abstract, less straightforward and simple 
and, thus, constitutes a step in the direction of that process through which such macabre 
methods of compensation end up being finally suppressed.30 
 
This may serve as a good segue to the other important sense that is worth 
highlighting here in which Nietzsche’s approach differs from traditional history. This 
                                                 
29 Already in section 6 of the first treatise Nietzsche writes: “all the concepts of ancient man were rather at 
first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and altogether unsymbolical in meaning 
to a degree that we can scarcely conceive” (GM I, 6). 
 






concerns the notion that a concept has no single undifferentiated history. One place where 
Nietzsche states this point succinctly is in an earlier work entitled The Wanderer and his 
Shadow which constituted the last of three installments of the book Human, All Too 
Human. There Nietzsche writes: 
 
The word ‘revenge’ is said so quickly it almost seems as if it could contain no 
more than one conceptual and perceptional root. And so one continues to strive to 
discover it: just as our economists have not yet wearied of scenting a similar unity 
in the word ‘value’ and of searching after the original root-concept of the word. 
As if every word were not a pocket into which now this, now that, now several 
things at once have been put! (HAH II, Wanderer, 33). 
 
Nietzsche repeats this idea in section 12 of the second treatise of the Genealogy within 
the context of a discussion about the origin of punishment. In a manner that resonates 
strongly with the pocket analogy used in the quotation above, Nietzsche describes the 
history of a “thing,” or an organ or a custom, as a series of independent processes that 
come together rather haphazardly and whose causes need not be connected with each 
other (GM II, 12). This means that the historian must assume the role of private eye and 
dissector in one, a person who looks for the clues left by the synthesizing process of 
history and attempts to pull apart or to follow the various strands that have become 
almost impossible to disentangle or even perceive in the present state of the thing. 
  
Part and parcel of this understanding of history is the recognition and adoption of 
certain principles of interpretation that, according to Nietzsche, have been largely ignored 
thus far by historians and even by natural scientists. Chief among them is the notion that 
a will to power operates in all events. This, of course, touches on a very contentious and 





famous. I do not pretend to come to terms with Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power or 
to contribute to that debate. I will merely rely on Nietzsche’s own characterization in the 
Genealogy and on my own and the reader’s intuitions about what it means. Simply put, 
the basic point is that life and history are fundamentally the activity of certain 
“spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and 
directions” (Ibid.; emphasis mine). Presumably, these forces can be all sorts of things, 
from individuals, to groups of people, to nations, to institutions, to drives, to ideals, to 
cultures, to instincts, and so on. 
 
One important consequence of thinking of life, and of history in particular, as the 
result of the interplay of such forces is that investigators will (or should) learn to 
distinguish the origin of a thing from its purpose. Obviously, the forces that gave rise to a 
thing in the past need not be the same forces that are in control of the thing in the present. 
Indeed, in all likelihood the original forces themselves will have been transformed or will 
have disappeared in the course of history, since they will have been actuated by other 
forces. This means that the original intention or purpose that was expressed at the 
inception of the thing will be quite different from the one contained in it afterwards. As 
Nietzsche puts it, “whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again 
reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power 
superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all 
subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through 
which any previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ are necessarily obscured” (Ibid.). This point 





Genealogy is supposed to have.31 Inquiring into the history of a thing is essential for a 
critical project because it reveals that, despite appearances to the contrary, things need 
not have the meaning or purpose that they currently have. Moreover, it may also reveal 
that, unbeknownst to us, there are still certain vestiges of purposes in things operating, as 
it were, in the shadows; purposes which on reflection we may want to purge or redirect in 
the hope of employing those things in healthier or more fruitful ways.  
 
Nietzsche illustrates the multifaceted aspect of history I have been discussing here 
by using the concept of punishment as a case study. Against the traditional genealogists 
of morality who naively imagine that the act of punishment must have been invented for 
the purpose of punishing, Nietzsche suggests that, prior to advancing any such 
conjectures, one must distinguish two different elements in the concept of punishment: 
“on the one hand, that in it which is relatively enduring, the custom, the act, the ‘drama,’ 
a certain strict sequence of procedures; on the other, that in it which is fluid, the meaning, 
the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures” (GM II, 
13). Viewed strictly as an act, punishment consists simply in the set of operations by 
means of which a human being inflicts harm on another creature, usually on another 
human being (or under certain circumstances on himself).32 One sense in which such a set 
                                                 
31 Indeed, this is an important issue that is often raised with respect to the Genealogy: how can something 
that is a historical work be of any consequence to a critical enterprise of the sort Nietzsche is interested in? 
Looming over this question is the worry that Nietzsche may be inadvertently falling prey to the genetic 
fallacy: the mistake of thinking that the questionable origins of something somehow demonstrate the 
shadiness of its value. Obviously my comments here are not meant as an answer to these problems. 
 
32 I thus disagree with Clark’s interpretation of what Nietzsche is calling here the enduring element of 
punishment. For Clark, this element consists in “the act of inflicting a harm or loss on a person based on a 
judgment that the person deserves this loss owing to something he or she has done” (Clark 1994: 21; my 
emphasis).  Judgments of desert belong not to the enduring element, but to the fluid element, that is, to the 





of operations is relatively enduring is that, once established, it tends to remain the same, 
though, of course, it is also subject to change and variation. Nietzsche, for instance, 
credits the Germans with the dubious honor of having used some of the most gruesome 
methods of punishment in history like stoning, breaking on the wheel, piercing with 
stakes, tearing apart or trampling by horses, boiling the person in oil or wine, flaying 
alive, cutting flesh from the chest, and smearing someone with honey and abandoning 
him to the flies under a burning sun (GM II, 3). There are probably few things human 
beings have been more creative at in history, than at conceiving and devising novel 
procedures for inflicting harm on each other. But these procedures are also enduring in a 
more important sense, namely, that, no matter how varied, they all have the same 
intended effect: they make their target suffer. This means that essentially the procedure 
remains the same throughout all variations; something which is not true of the fluid 
element of punishment, since the act of inflicting harm on another can be used for 
purposes that are essentially different and even opposed to each other (e.g. for 
pedagogical purposes or for revenge). 
                                                                                                                                                 
not have been understood as deserved. In the next paragraph I suggest a number of other ways in which 
such procedures might have been understood, none of which has the implication that their target deserves 
them. Of course, our modern understanding of punishment does include the idea of perceived desert: we do 
not think that a person who is harming another is punishing him, unless that person believes, even if 
mistakenly, that his actions are somehow warranted by something the other person has done or refrained 
from doing. But Nietzsche is precisely warning us against projecting such meanings back into the more 
primitive procedural notion of punishment. The procedure was not invented for the purpose of what 
nowadays we call punishing, just as the hand was not invented for the purpose of grasping (GM II, 13). I 
must say in fairness to Clark that she recognizes the reading I am suggesting here as the one that is most 
reasonable given what the text actually says. She, nonetheless, opts for her own interpretation because she 
finds it difficult to understand why Nietzsche would say that the procedural element of punishment is more 
enduring than the purpose, since there are at least as many procedures for inflicting punishment as there are 
purposes for punishing. I obviously do not share Clark’s concern.  As I suggest below, I think it makes 
sense for Nietzsche to say that the procedure is relatively enduring because no matter how varied the 
procedures may be, they all share something in common: they have the same effect, they make their target 
suffer. This means that the procedure remains fundamentally the same despite variations. The same is not 
true of the purposes of punishment since, as Nietzsche tells us, the same procedure can be used for 






Nietzsche claims that the enduring element is the older element of punishment. It 
comes before the actual use of the procedure for the intended purpose of punishing (GM 
II, 13). In other words, the suggestion here is that, in its inception, the practice of harming 
others was exercised in a very different sense (perhaps in a number of senses) from the 
sense it later acquired, namely, as a way of castigating the recipient of such practices for 
something he did. In section 13 Nietzsche provides some examples of different senses 
that the act of punishment can serve and has served in the past; though he does not claim 
that these correspond to the more primordial or prehistoric senses of the act – to the 
senses punishment had in its inception – the reader can nonetheless speculate on the basis 
of them what such more primordial uses might have been.33 Perhaps the practice of 
inflicting harm on others was a way of demonstrating one’s superiority over them; maybe 
it was used for recreation; or it could have been a way of satisfying some curiosity or 
other; possibly it was simply used as a means for venting a quantum of accumulated 
energy; or some such other alternative. What matters here is that none of these senses 
requires the executioner to engage in the act of harming another as a way of scolding 
him, that is, as a way of injuring him because of something he has done or refrained from 
doing. This comes at a later stage. As history progresses, the enduring element of 
punishment gets appropriated, interpreted and employed for new ends and purposes that 
may be fundamentally distinct. Until we arrive at the present stage where the concept of 
punishment, as Nietzsche tells us, “finally crystallizes into a unity that is hard to 
                                                 
33 Among the things Nietzsche mentions in that section are the use of punishment as a way of instilling fear 
in another; as a way of isolating a disturbance and preventing its further spread; as a way of celebrating; 
and so on (GM II, 13). None of these seem to me to require the idea of perceived desert in order to be 





disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasized especially, totally indefinable. 
(Today it is impossible to say for certain why people are really punished: all concepts in 
which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has 
no history is definable)” (Ibid.). 
 
III. Sovereign Conscience and Guilty Conscience: Some Affinities 
 
This much must suffice with respect to Nietzsche’s particular understanding of 
history and the method of genealogy which he favors. Let us now go back to the issue 
that concerns us here. What history is the second treatise suppose to recount? As I 
mentioned at the beginning, the treatise seems a bit misleading on this point.34 According 
to the opening lines we are led to believe it will be the history of how the conscience of 
the sovereign individual came into the world, but beginning on section 4 the treatise 
shifts into an investigation of the origin of the bad conscience as consciousness or feeling 
of guilt. 
 
Yet, though these seem to be distinct phenomena, Nietzsche clearly suggests that 
there are strong connections between them; at the very least historical connections.35 In 
section 2, he avers that the task of making the human creature into an animal capable of 
                                                 
34 Indeed, referring to the treatises of the Genealogy, Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo that every time the 
beginning “is calculated to mislead: cool, scientific, even ironic, deliberately foreground, deliberately 
holding off” EH, Genealogy of Morals. I will come back to this point in the last section of this essay. 
 
35 The title of the treatise could also be construed as suggesting, albeit subtly, a strong connection here. The 
treatise is entitled “Guilt,” “Bad Conscience,” and the Like. The German word that gets translated as “the 
Like” here is “Verwandtes” which stems from the word for “relative” (Verwandte), in the sense of family 
member. Since Nietzsche begins talking about the sovereign individual and then switches to the bad 
conscience, it is not too much of a stretch to think that the sovereign conscience is one of the “family 





responsibility, the task of making human beings into sovereign individuals, “presupposes 
as a preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, 
like among like, regular and consequently calculable”(GM II, 2; my emphasis). This 
preparatory task, according to Nietzsche, is performed by the morality of custom 
(Sittlichkeit der Sitte) which constitutes the prehistoric labor of man upon himself. This 
labor, according to Nietzsche, is extremely severe and tyrannical: in order to follow 
customs, in order to adjust himself to a rule of conduct, man must learn to remember, he 
must cultivate an active memory within himself. Nietzsche thinks this is extremely 
difficult because, like all animals, prehistoric man lived completely absorbed in the 
present; he lived in the grips of forgetfulness (die Vergeβlichkeit). This, Nietzsche insists, 
is not a passive, but an active power by means of which all lived experience is thoroughly 
digested and processed by the psyche of the animal organism (GM II, 1). Accordingly, 
Nietzsche asks: 
 
“How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress 
something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing 
moment, in such a way that it will stay there?” One can well believe that the 
answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle; 
perhaps indeed there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole 
prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. “If something is to stay in the memory 
it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in memory” – this 
is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on 
earth (GM II, 3). 
 
With the aid of this – from our modern perspective – sinister method of mnemonics the 
morality of custom achieves its objective: it makes man into a regular creature, one that 







It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche thinks this is a preparatory task which 
is simply not equivalent to the task of breeding an animal with the right to make 
promises. Many commentators miss this point.36 Leiter, for instance, claims that the 
sovereign individual has the right to make promises “because he can pull it off, i.e. his 
behavior is sufficiently regular and predictable so that he can be ‘answerable for his own 
future’ (GM II: 1), and he is able to remember what he has promised and honor that 
memory” (Leiter, 2002: 228). In doing so, Leiter conflates the individual who is 
necessary, regular and calculable (the product of the morality of custom) with the 
sovereign individual. To be sure, part of Leiter’s motivation here is that he thinks 
Nietzsche is a naturalist of a particular sort, namely, someone who believes that human 
beings have no free will and that their actions are thoroughly determined by essential 
traits over which they have no control. This makes Nietzsche’s description of the 
sovereign individual as “autonomous” somewhat problematic for Leiter. But he is able to 
solve the problem by insisting that Nietzsche is using familiar words in an unfamiliar 
sense: autonomy is simply equivalent to regularity and necessity of behavior (Leiter, 
2002: 227-228). 
 
I think Leiter is right in trying to recover and defend the naturalist element in 
Nietzsche work, but he is guilty of overemphasizing and sometimes even misconstruing 
this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In particular, Nietzsche’s use of autonomy and 
sovereignty in the Genealogy does not seem as unfamiliar as Leiter would have us 
                                                 
36 In what follows I discuss Leiter’s interpretation, but see also Hatab (1995), Risse (2001), Acampora 
(2004) and Loeb (2005). Despite their differences, all these commentators seem to share the assumption 
that once the morality of custom has made man into a calculable, regular being, it has also ipso facto made 





believe. In order to establish this point it is worth quoting extensively Nietzsche’s 
description of the sovereign individual. He writes: 
 
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the tree at last 
brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal what 
they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest fruit is the 
sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from morality of 
custom, autonomous and supramoral (for “autonomous” and “moral” are mutually 
exclusive), in short, the man who has his own independent, protracted will and the 
right to make promises …This emancipated individual, with the actual right to 
make promises, this master of a free will, this sovereign man – how should he not 
be aware of his superiority over all those who lack the right to make promises and 
stand as their own guarantors, of how much trust, how much fear, how much 
reverence he arouses – he “deserves” all three – and how his mastery over himself 
also necessarily gives him mastery over circumstances, over nature, and over all 
more short-willed and unreliable creatures? (GM II, 2). 
 
There are two things I want to highlight about this passage. First, at the onset, Nietzsche 
repeats the idea that the morality of custom serves a preparatory task: its results are a 
necessary means for the production of the sovereign individual but they are not sufficient. 
The point is further supported by Nietzsche’s insistence that the autonomous individual is 
supramoral (übersittliche) in the sense that he has liberated himself from the morality of 
custom (Nietzsche says that autonomous and moral are mutually exclusive. The adjective 
that is translated as moral here is the German word “sittlich” which can also mean ethical 
and which obviously is related by root to “Sitte” or custom, and is also operative in “die 
Sitlichkeit der Sitte,” the morality of custom or the ethics of custom. 
 
But, second, Nietzsche is describing the sovereign individual in terms that are 
quite familiar to the language of autonomy: the sovereign individual is a master over 
himself and, as a result of that, – indeed, as a necessary consequence of it – he is also a 





has the right to make promises because he is in control of his life, not because he is 
necessary and calculable. This is made even more explicit by Nietzsche’s claim, later on 
that same section, that sovereigns are people “who give their word as something that can 
be relied on because they know themselves strong enough to maintain it in the face of 
accidents, even ‘in the face of fate’” (Ibid.).37 Indeed, the language here resonates 
strongly with the very familiar and Kantian understanding of autonomy: sovereign 
individuals are such that they will fulfill their promises even if in the future they should 
find themselves strongly inclined to break them (because fate or circumstances tempt 
them to do so); as Kant would put it, sovereign individuals act from duty, they do not act 
heteronomously or from mere inclination. 
 
But let us return to the original point I intended to establish. If, according to 
Nietzsche, the morality of custom furnishes some of the elements that are necessary for 
the formation of a sovereign individual, the same seems to be true with regard to its role 
in the emergence of the individual of the guilty conscience. Here too, the prehistoric labor 
of the morality of custom turns out to be a necessary though not sufficient means. 
 
One of the earliest customs is the custom of incurring debts, of entering into the 
contractual relationship between creditor and debtor. Nietzsche thinks this is one of the 
most fundamental forms of association. As he puts it, “no grade of civilization, however, 
low, has yet been discovered in which something of this relationship has not been 
noticeable. Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging – 
                                                 
37Towards the end of the section Nietzsche again describes the rare freedom of the sovereign individual as a 





these preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent that in a certain sense 
they constitute thinking as such” (GM II, 8). The development of memory is of course 
crucial for the success of this type of relationships. The debtor must come to regard his 
debt as an obligation, something that binds him to act in a particular way in the future. 
This means that he must not only conceive of himself as someone who is required to 
repay a debt he incurred in the past he must actually remember to repay such a debt when 
the time comes. Consequently, the type of mnemonics that Nietzsche describes as part 
and parcel of the morality of custom will be especially prevalent in this type of 
associations, since it is here above all that a memory is urgently needed. 
 
Nietzsche singles out this type of prehistoric custom because he thinks that it 
played a very important role in the formation of the guilty conscience. “It was in this 
sphere,” he tells us, “the sphere of legal obligations, that the moral conceptual world of 
‘guilt,’ ‘conscience,’ ‘duty,’ ‘sacredness of duty’ had its origin: its beginnings were, like 
the beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long 
time” (GM II, 6). Nietzsche is here partly following etymological clues and, in the spirit 
of the historical method discussed earlier, arguing that the principal moral concept of 
guilt [Schuld] had its origins in the very straightforward, unsymbolic and coarse juridical 
concept of having debts [Schulden]; a concept that originally was not entangled with any 
moral emotions whatsoever. Only when this juridical notion gets co-opted by the forces 
that are trying to give new interpretations and directions, the forces that work in the 
interest of erecting a moral world, does the concept of being indebted transfigure and 





the instinct for freedom that has turned back on its possessor and generated the bad 
conscience. I will discuss this element of Nietzsche’s story later. Here it is important to 
note that Nietzsche’s strategy introduces a slight difficulty for the reader of the 
Genealogy, since it is not always immediately clear whether Nietzsche’s use of “Schuld” 
in a given context refers to a moral concept or to a proto-moral concept that is related to 
the notion of having debts. Thus, for example, in section 20 Nietzsche refers to a 
“Shuldgefühl” felt by primitive men towards the divinity, and the question emerges 
whether he thinks this amounts to a moral feeling of guilt or whether he means to indicate 
a proto-moral feeling related to indebtedness towards the divinity.38 
 
The domain of contractual obligations fulfills an indispensable locating function 
for Nietzsche: it serves as the locus on which the moral concept of guilt emerges. In other 
words, the sphere of legal obligations prepares the terrain out of which the tree of 
concepts that will be recruited in the service of constructing a guilty conscience will 
grow.39 Much of the agricultural labor that takes place within this terrain consists in 
irrigating the soil with blood. It is precisely in this labor that the morality of custom finds 
its justification and reveals itself as an essential means. It achieves what Nietzsche calls 
the uncanny and possibly inextricable meshing of the ideas of ‘guilt’ and ‘suffering’ (GM 
II, 6). When the debtor for whatever reason forgot to repay his debt, the full force of the 
mnemonic method of the morality of custom would fall on him in order to remind him of 
                                                 
38 The ambiguity and uncertainty in meaning here is evidenced by the differences in translation of the 
relevant sentence. Clark and Swensen, for instance, have it as “the feeling of guilt toward the deity” 
whereas Kaufmann and Hollingdale try to disambiguate by rendering it as “the guilty feeling of 
indebtedness to the divinity”. 
 
39 It is important to stress here that Nietzsche’s claim is that the concept of guilt has its origin in this terrain 





the fact that he was supposed to repay and thus to reiterate the importance of 
remembering to repay debts in the future. But the more it did so, the more the very idea 
of repaying a debt became associated with the notion of having to endure punishment and 
hence with the notion of having to suffer in order to expiate the debt. The intertwining of 
debt and suffering later becomes an essential part of the guilty conscience which 
experiences the feeling of guilt as a kind of pain or affliction. 
 
I have said that one of the key functions of the morality of custom is to furnish the 
conceptual materials that will be transformed and enlisted in the service of the guilty 
conscience. It is crucial to stress that Nietzsche does not claim that the legal associations 
between creditors and debtors by themselves produce the moral concept of guilt. Nor 
does he think that the punitive methods employed within these associations produce the 
feeling of guilt itself. Nietzsche is emphatic on this point. He claims that, contrary to 
popular thinking, punishment does not possess the power of awakening the feeling of 
guilt in a person culpable of wrong doing (GM II, 14). Nietzsche considers this a 
psychological fact about contemporary man, but he thinks it is even truer of prehistoric 
man. Indeed, he suggests that during the millennia before the history of man, punishment 
actually served to hinder the development of the feeling of guilt in the victim of the 
punitive force. The very procedures employed by the judicial and disciplinary apparatus 
prevented the criminal from considering his actions reprehensible as such, since he saw 
those same actions used systematically and with an untroubled conscience in the service 
of justice.40 
                                                 
40 Nietzsche mentions things like entrapment, spying, bribery, deception, and in general the whole cunning 






In the same vein, Nietzsche argues that repeated punishment did not produce the 
feeling of guilt in the criminal because neither he nor the judges and executors conceived 
the act as authored by a morally accountable person. As Nietzsche explains: 
 
during the greater part of the past the judges and punishers themselves were not at 
all conscious of dealing with a ‘guilty person.’ But with an instigator of harm, 
with an irresponsible piece of fate. And the person upon whom punishment 
subsequently descended, again like a piece of fate, suffered no ‘inward pain’ other 
than that induced by the sudden appearance of something unforeseen, a dreadful 
natural event, a plunging, crushing rock that one cannot fight (Ibid.). 
 
The principal effect of punishment is to intensify intelligence, to lengthen memory, to 
make the person more cautious, more secretive, more prudent and mistrustful. The lesson 
for the criminal, then, was not that he acted in a blameworthy way or that he should not 
have done what he did, but only that something had gone unexpectedly wrong in the 
execution of his deed, that he should have been more careful, that he was not as powerful 
as he thought he was (GM II, 15). In order for the person to feel the bite of conscience 
and come to regard his act as something he should not have done he must first acquire a 
conception of himself as a responsible agent and not just as an effective agent. In other 
words, the instigator of harm must come to understand himself not only as a person who 
as a matter of fact performs certain acts, but as a person who is the liable author of his 
own actions. According to Nietzsche, this change in self-understanding is a historical 
event for which the morality of custom is not directly responsible, though it is an event 
for which, as we shall see shortly, the methods and results of the morality of custom are 
indeed essential. 
                                                                                                                                                 
all practiced systematically and without the excuse of being the result of blind passion or any such emotion. 
All these actions were not condemned as such by the judicial system; they were only condemned when 






I think this begins to suggest some closer affinities between the sovereign and the 
guilty conscience than might have been expected. As has been argued above, in both 
cases Nietzsche seems committed to the idea that the morality of custom serves a 
preparatory task and in this sense both forms of conscience seem to possess a shared 
history (they share a kind of kinship). But, on top of this, we can now begin to appreciate 
even stronger family ties between them: both very much seem to require that the person 
come to know or understand himself in a particular way, namely, as the responsible 
author of his own actions. In order to fully grasp this connection it is necessary to discuss 
the emergence of the guilty conscience out of a more primitive form of the bad 
conscience. It is to this task that I now turn. 
 
IV. A Special Type of Self-Conception: The Bad Conscience 
 
In his important study of the Genealogy, Aaron Ridley suggests that Nietzsche’s 
account of the emergence of the bad conscience is very confused (Ridley, 1998; 
especially chapter 1). Ridley finds Nietzsche at times equating the bad conscience with 
the feeling of guilt (GM II, 4); at times claiming that bad conscience in its beginnings is 
no more than the internalization of man (GM II, 17); at times arguing that punishment 
does not produce the bad conscience (GM II, 14); at times contradicting this very claim 
and suggesting that the bad conscience results from the repression of instincts by means 
of punishment (GM II, 16); at times displaying a neutral attitude toward the bad 





condemning it as definitely bad (GM II, 11, GM II, 22). Ridley thinks these confusions 
partly spring from Nietzsche’s own need to protect the noble type of the first treatise, 
from the taint of the bad conscience. Something that proves notoriously difficult for 
Nietzsche, since, according to Ridley, the nobles require a bad conscience in order to 
fulfill the functions Nietzsche wants to assign to them in the second treatise. 
 
I believe many of the confusions Ridley identifies disappear once we bear in mind 
some of the things that were mentioned earlier with respect to Nietzsche’s method of 
history. There are a number of more or less independent strands at work in the emergence 
of any phenomenon Nietzsche discusses. Accordingly, we should expect the bad 
conscience to be subject to transformations and redirections by different forces, both in 
its inception and in its subsequent development throughout history. This explains why 
Nietzsche sometimes does, and other times does not, speak of the bad conscience as the 
feeling of guilt. The latter develops in stages and requires the coming together of several 
processes. In this respect I am in agreement with Risse and Leiter who also recognize the 
gradual and developmental element of Nietzsche’s account of the guilty conscience. 
 
Yet, Ridley’s study does touch on an important aspect of the discussion in the 
Genealogy which often goes unnoticed by many commentators. This consists in the fact 
that the second treatise actually exhibits a somewhat bewildering proliferation of 
consciences. We have the sovereign conscience of the beginning sections, and then the 
bad conscience and the guilty conscience of the ensuing sections. But the attentive reader 





where Nietzsche discusses the aforementioned contractual relationship between creditor 
and debtor, we read that the debtor made a contract with the creditor in part to “impress 
repayment as a duty, an obligation upon his own conscience (Gewissen)” (GM II, 5; my 
emphasis). Recall that these contractual relationships do not require the existence of a bad 
conscience nor do they give rise to it. This means that the type of conscience Nietzsche is 
accrediting to the debtor here must be something prior to and hence different from the 
three forms of conscience mentioned above. In the next section we find Nietzsche 
describing ancient human beings as possessed by an innocent thirst for cruelty. He tells 
us that “they posited ‘disinterested malice’… as a normal quality of man – and thus as 
something to which the conscience cordially says Yes!” (GM II, 6). Once more we find 
here the claim that primitive human beings have a conscience, one which is again prior 
and therefore distinct from the one (or ones – given the ambiguity mentioned at the 
beginning of this essay) whose history Nietzsche is trying to unravel. 
 
Finally, to give a sense of just how widespread and problematic this proliferation 
of consciences is, let us mention another important case. In section 11 of the first treatise, 
Nietzsche introduces the infamous image of the primitive noble men as creatures that are 
often nothing more than mere beasts of prey. As we shall see shortly these beasts of prey 
are instrumental in the emergence of the bad conscience. But the point I wish to highlight 
here is that Nietzsche describes these beasts as creatures possessing a type of conscience 
themselves. He writes: 
 
[These noble men] …the same men who are held so sternly in check inter pares 
by custom, respect, usage, gratitude, and even more by mutual suspicion and 





are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey. There they savor a freedom from 
all social constraints, they compensate themselves in the wilderness for the 
tension engendered by protracted confinement and enclosure within the peace of 
society, they go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey (GM I, 11).41  
 
Ridley finds this passage problematic because he thinks that what distinguishes man from 
the beast is conscience, and he understands this to be the power to make promises. But he 
reads Nietzsche as suggesting that this power is the result of the internalization of man 
that takes place when man starts to live under customs.42 So he finds the suggestion that a 
human beast living in the wilderness has a conscience incoherent. The nobles cannot 
really go back to such a form of conscience because prior to socialization there is simply 
no conscience to be had (Ridley, 1998: 20). 
 
I think Ridley misreads this passage because he is too focused on understanding 
Nietzsche’s use of the notion of conscience as a faculty of self-reflection that emerges 
when the bad conscience in, what he calls, its “raw state” (the internalization of man) first 
appears. This leads him either to disregard or to dismiss as incoherent the subtle 
proliferation of consciences I mentioned above. I think that a more profitable approach 
here would be to think of Nietzsche’s treatment of conscience along the same lines as his 
treatment of punishment. Perhaps we should distinguish two different elements in the 
                                                 
41 Undoubtedly there is a touch of irony and humor in Nietzsche’s characterization of the nobles as “[going] 
back to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey”, but that does not curtail the possibility that there is 
also a touch of seriousness; in this connection one does well to remember Nietzsche’s own dictum: ridendo 
decire severum (to say serious things laughing). One of the serious points Nietzsche is making here is that 
the beast of prey man is innocent (Unschuld) because he is “free” in a very literal non-symbolic sense: he is 
incapable of acting in a faulty manner because he is under no constraints whatsoever, he is unbounded. I 
say a little bit more about this below. Something close to the characterization offered in this quote from the 
first treatise is also found in the second treatise. In section 11, for instance, Nietzsche claims that “the 
aggressive man, as the stronger, nobler, more courageous, has in fact also had in all times a freer eye, a 
better conscience on his side: conversely, one can see who has the invention of the ‘bad conscience’ on his 
conscience – the man of ressentiment!” (GM II, 11). 
 






concept of conscience: a relatively enduring element and a more fluid one. We can then 
understand these different consciences as so many different expressions of the enduring 
element, as fluid forms that constitute appropriations of the enduring element into new 
directions and uses. 
 
The question, then, is what is the relatively enduring element in all these different 
forms of conscience? Sticking to the analogy with punishment, I submit that it must be 
some procedural aspect that they all share in common, something that all forms of 
conscience essentially do or are engaged in doing despite their different ways of doing it. 
I suggest that this element consists in man’s ability to produce a conception for himself of 
the type of creature he is.43 
 
This would explain why, for Nietzsche, the noble “beast of prey” can indeed have 
a conscience and, moreover, an innocent conscience. The “beast of prey” conceives of 
itself as a being that is under no constraints whatsoever. As Ridley correctly notes, it 
exists outside the morality of custom, hence it must think of itself as a creature that, 
                                                 
43 It is important to point out that nowhere in the Genealogy does Nietzsche use the word Selbstvorstellung 
(self-conception) or Selbstverständnis (self-understanding) or even Selbstbewusstein (self-consciousness). I 
have arrived at this characterization of the generic term “conscience” because of the puzzle I have 
identified above: namely, the problem of what is it that makes all the very different occurrences of the word 
“conscience” in the Genealogy fall under one general concept (or belong to the same family)? The answer I 
give to this question is not arbitrary or unsupported, however, since I take my cues from a similar strategy 
Nietzsche has employed to explain the history of another general concept, namely, “punishment”. My 
solution is compatible with all the places Nietzsche uses the term conscience in the Genealogy. In those 
places one can read self-conception or self-understanding without a loss in meaning. Moreover, my 
solution is broad enough to include even our ordinary use of the notion of a conscience. In our everyday 
usage a conscience refers to a kind of internal voice that tells us what is right or wrong in a given situation 
and that exhorts us to do what is right. This is compatible with the characterization of such a voice as a type 
of self-conception or self-understanding since, in effect, what a conscience does is produce for the person a 
conception of himself as standing under certain constraints and obligations that must be met whenever he 
acts. Finally, as shall become clear shortly, this solution has enormous explanatory power and allows us to 





among other things, has no debts (Schulden) to repay and thus no obligations. This is 
why it can commit the most heinous acts unperturbed and with the impression of being 
perfectly innocent (Unschuld). This also explains why Nietzsche claims that the debtor, 
who initially does not conceive of himself as someone who is under constraints or 
obligations, has to impress the notion of repayment as a duty on his own conscience by 
means of a contract with the creditor, a contract that allows the latter to inflict any kind of 
mortification and torture upon the body of the debtor in case he fails to repay his debt. 
 
What all this means is that Nietzsche must be operating under the assumption that 
very primitive man, the man who is closest to the natural beast, was the possessor of 
concepts even if to a very limited and rudimentary degree. Of course, this in turn means 
that he not only had a mind, but, more importantly, a conscious mind.44 Once again, I 
touch on a very contentious and, in my judgment, somewhat understudied aspect of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, namely, that which deals with his views on consciousness and 
conscious thinking. And, yet again – in a manner that might have become somewhat 
frustrating for the reader by now – I must dodge the issue of what exactly Nietzsche 
understood by consciousness.45 Here it suffices to note that, at least in certain places, 
Nietzsche thinks conscious thinking occurs in words and thus requires the employment of 
concepts (GS, 354). In the Genealogy Nietzsche is not concerned with the task of 
explaining the emergence of consciousness. Instead, as I have said and as we shall see 
                                                 
44 This is evident by Nietzsche’s insistence in GM II, 16 (see below) that when the human animal was first 
imprisoned under the rule of society (with the aid of its principal instrument the morality of custom) it was 
reduced to relying on its most feeble organ: consciousness. Thus, prehistoric men (the beast-of-prey-men) 
who predate society have consciousness and therefore, as mentioned before, the conceptual tools to furnish 
self-conceptions (in particular the conception of being Unschuld [innocent], i.e. of being incapable of fault 
because of their freedom from societal obligations). 
 





below, he presupposes that prehistoric man already comes equipped with this special 
power.46 
 
But let us return to our problem. How does the bad conscience come into the 
world? Nietzsche’s answer to this question begins in section 16 where he asserts that the 
bad conscience was the illness man was bound to contract once he found himself 
enclosed within the walls of society and peace (GM II, 16). Nietzsche thinks this was one 
of the most momentous and fundamental changes human beings ever experienced. 
However, it is crucial to stress that the claim is not that the bad conscience is created by 
this change; the claim instead is that this change generates the conditions under which 
man is bound to acquire a bad conscience. As I will show shortly, this dissolves the 
contradiction remarked by some commentators that Nietzsche seems to both deny and 
assert a primary role to punishment in the explanation of the emergence of the bad 
conscience. 
 
Part of the reason Nietzsche thinks this was such a crucial transformation is that it 
marks the beginning of man’s genuine detachment from animal nature; it inaugurates the 
real separation of man from the rest of nature.47 Unlike other creatures, the semi-animals 
that become incarcerated in the walls of society can no longer roam free, they must now 
                                                 
46 I think this sheds an interesting light on Nietzsche’s claim at the beginning of the treatise. Contrary to 
what one might perhaps expect, Nietzsche does not think that the paradoxical task of nature is to breed an 
animal with the capacity for self-conscious thinking. Instead, the paradoxical task is to breed an animal that 
has truly emancipated itself from nature, an animal that is autonomous. 
 
47 It should be clear that this separation is something that is the result of natural processes. Thus, it does not 
signal any kind of metaphysical splitting up of humans and nature. Part of the task of the Genealogy is 
precisely to recover a true sense of pride for humans (this is especially true in the third treatise), one that 





learn to adjust themselves to rules of conduct; they become constrained by societal 
norms. As Nietzsche tells us, in this process “they were reduced to thinking, inferring, 
reckoning, coordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced 
to their ‘consciousness,’ their weakest and most fallible organ!”(Ibid.). Notice again that 
Nietzsche is assuming that consciousness and conscious thinking is already in place when 
this happens. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly, Nietzsche seems to be suggesting that 
what actually separates us from nature is not consciousness but something for which 
consciousness is necessary, something that begins almost at the same time that primitive 
societies are created and that acts as the engine of civilization, namely, culture. Though 
not supported at this point, this last claim will be vindicated a bit later when we discuss in 
more detail how the bad conscience makes culture possible by permitting conscious 
imagining and idealization. 
 
The creation of the first “state” is the result of the oppression and coercion exerted 
by “some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and master race, which … lays its 
terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still 
formless and nomad” (GM II, 17). In doing this, the beasts of prey expel a tremendous 
quantity of freedom from nature: the freedom of those creatures that must now conform 
to the rules of society. Through punishment and through the whole apparatus of the 
morality of custom, the oppressed are prevented from giving free reign to their animal 
nature and this means that they are no longer able to vent their aggressive instincts 
externally, instincts like cruelty, joy in persecuting, in change, in destruction (GM II, 16). 





possessors. They discharge themselves in and against the person whose instincts they are. 
Nietzsche calls this process the internalization of man and claims that it was in this way 
that man first developed what was later called the “soul” (Ibid.). As we learn in the first 
treatise, this concept of the soul is intimately bound up with the notion of a subject, that 
is, with the notion of a thing that underlies all actions and events (GM I, 13). The 
connection between the bad conscience and the idea of a subject will become clear in a 
moment when we explain in greater detail the essential feature of this form of conscience. 
 
The internalization of the aggressive instinct in man is, according to Nietzsche, 
the origin of bad conscience. As he states it, “this instinct for freedom forcibly made 
latent … pushed back and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and 
vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience is in its 
beginnings” (GM II, 17). The key point to stress here is that it is not the incarceration 
itself, and hence not punishment itself, that originates the bad conscience.48 What 
originates the bad conscience is the instinct for freedom discharging itself on its 
possessor, something for which the incarceration is a mere means. Thus, there is no 
inconsistency in Nietzsche’s statement that punishment itself cannot generate the bad 
conscience and his insistence that the bad conscience originates when man is incarcerated 
by means of punishment. For the role Nietzsche is assigning to punishment here is not 
that of genitive cause, but merely that of instrumental means. Punishment is the 
                                                 
48 Strictly speaking, given what Nietzsche says in section 16, on this hypothesis it would be the fearful 
bulwarks of the political organization that would be responsible for originating the bad conscience; 
punishment is just the principal of these bulwarks. This subtle point will be important for explaining how 
the bad conscience can spread to the noble caste, since in effect it leaves room in Nietzsche’s account for 
other ways in which the political organization can eventually incarcerate all people and, in particular, the 






mechanism by which the instinct for freedom changes orientation and is redirected 
inward toward the possessor of the instinct. The actual creator of the bad conscience is 
this instinct for freedom itself.49 
 
This becomes even clearer once we ask the question: what exactly has emerged 
here? What is a bad conscience? Following the principle I laid down above, the answer to 
this question must be: a new type of conception of oneself. What conception is that? 
Nietzsche’s answer is contained in a passage that is worth quoting at length. He claims 
that the instinct for freedom at work here is: 
 
The same active force that is at work on a grander scale in those artists of violence 
and organizers who build states … only here the material upon which the form-
giving and ravishing nature of this force vents itself is man himself, his whole 
ancient animal self – and not, as in that greater and more obvious phenomenon, 
some other man, other men. This secret self-ravishment, this artists’ cruelty, this 
delight in imposing a form upon oneself as a hard, recalcitrant, suffering material 
and in burning a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a No into it, this 
uncanny, dreadfully joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself that 
makes itself suffer out of joy in making suffer – eventually this entire active ‘bad 
conscience’ … as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought 
to light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty 
itself. – After all, what would be ‘beautiful’ if the contradiction had not first 
                                                 
49 There is a more direct way of solving this apparent contradiction. This consists in noting that what 
Nietzsche actually denies in the text is that punishment creates the bad conscience understood as a feeling 
of guilt and not that punishment creates the bad conscience simpliciter. If one adopts the view that the 
guilty conscience develops in stages, as I and others have suggested we should do, one can understand the 
apparently contradictory claims as applying to two different moments in the development of this 
conscience and hence as not being really contradictory. In other words, under this option punishment would 
be responsible for producing the bad conscience that is devoid of feelings of guilt, but it would not be 
responsible for producing a later form of the bad conscience which actually includes those feelings. 
However, I have chosen this approach instead because I think it is important to realize that Nietzsche never 
assigns the function of producing the bad conscience (plain or otherwise) to punishment. This is a point that 
is often left in the dark by those who adopt the developmental strategy. Risse, for example, claims that 
“Nietzsche denies that punishment causes the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt. But punishment had its 
impact on the bad conscience at an earlier stage, when the latter was still detached from guilt.” (Risse, 
2001: 58). This statement leaves ambiguous what kind of impact punishment is supposed to have had at the 
earlier stage. I think it should be clear from what I have said before that this impact cannot be that of acting 






become conscious of itself, if the ugly had not first said to itself: ‘I am ugly’?” 
(GM II, 18). 
 
The important point in this passage is the one that describes the type of labor that the 
instinct for freedom performs in and against its possessor. This labor consists in 
impressing in the person (and, as I am suggesting, more properly in his conception of 
himself) a critique, a contradiction and contempt, a No. What this means is that the 
instinct for freedom creates or instigates in the person a view of himself as contemptible 
in the sense of abject, vulgar, ordinary or low; it generates in the person a conception of 
himself as, above all, situated below what he could or should be. In other words, the 
instinct for freedom brings to life a conscience that is bad very much in the sense initially 
introduced by Nietzsche in the first treatise of the Genealogy: it produces a conception of 
a person that is imperfect or incomplete, someone who is not well-formed, a being that is 
unexceptional and therefore worthy of disapproval and dislike (GM I, 4-5).50 To be sure, 
echoing the arguments of the first treatise, the disapproval at stake here must not be 
understood as being moral in nature; at least not in its inception; not until the bad 
conscience transforms into the guilty conscience. (This will be the subject of section V of 
this essay). 
 
I think this clarifies Nietzsche’s somewhat strange claim that the bad conscience 
is the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, that it provides the condition for 
ideals like beauty or even moral ideals like selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice 
(GM II, 18). An ideal is something one either adopts or aspires to realize; it provides an 
image of what one could be or of what one could become. To have an ideal, then, (to 
                                                 
50 In this respect my account stands on the side of Ridley and opposed to Risse who tries to argue against 





adopt one or to aspire to one) one must have a conception of what one is not – at least not 
yet. That is, one must have a conception of oneself as incomplete or imperfect. But that 
just is the conception that the bad conscience affords. It is on the basis of this conception 
that one can then see oneself as capable of changing, as capable of being other than one 
is.51 This further explains why Nietzsche claims that with the bad conscience the inner 
world of man, which was “originally thin as if inserted between two skins,” spreads and 
grows in depth, breath and height (GM II, 16). For the instinct for freedom that has 
reverted upon itself, by necessity, makes its possessor conceive of himself as a piece of 
matter to be shaped and formed, as something upon which he can exercise the full force 
of his artistry: his own inner world becomes for him a frontier to be explored, expanded, 
conquered and colonized. In turn, this means that the person will start to understand 
himself as something that stands over and above the possible and actual conceptions that 
he has of himself. Those conceptions, after all, are something that he now understands as 
being subject to change and manipulation by him; which means that, in his mind, he 
himself must therefore be something distinct from all of them. Hence Nietzsche’s claim 
that the emergence of the bad conscience is intimately bound with the development of the 
concept of a “soul,” that is, with the notion of a subject that underlies all actions and 
events. 
                                                 
51 To be sure, it is compatible with our having a conception of ourselves as incomplete or imperfect that we 
think ourselves condemned to such a status. In that case, we would adopt a fatalistic attitude and need not 
think that we can change ourselves. However, as I try to stress below, Nietzsche’s characterization of the 
instinct for freedom as an active, creative force and a harbinger of change and transformation means that 
the person in whom this instinct has reverted must come to see himself not only as incomplete or imperfect, 
but, more importantly, as capable of changing (as a sort of canvas that can be painted over and 
transformed) and as capable of executing such a change himself (by way of the instinct for freedom 
operating in him). I think such a conception is the natural result of the instinct’s own drive as Nietzsche has 
described it. If in the end the person still ends up adopting a fatalistic attitude, then we must understand this 
as resulting from other psychic forces operating in him or as the result of a general weakening of his 






Similarly, this also allows us to appreciate more clearly why Nietzsche does not 
think that this new conception is generated by punishment. At most, punishment can 
make a person reassess the perception he has of his own power; it can teach the person 
that he was not as strong as he thought he was. But this is not equivalent to making him 
think of himself as something that is incomplete or worthy of disapprobation, something 
that needs to be reshaped or changed. This type of self-loathing results only from an 
internal kind of rearrangement and self-configuration that is not imposed from the 
outside. It is possible only on the assumption that man is conceiving of himself as a target 
for his own creative activity, which is just the type of conception that the bad conscience 
inaugurates. 
 
Finally, this also explains why the noble warriors for some time must not have 
been affected by the bad conscience even though, once they formed the state, they 
themselves were subject to societal constraints and were kept in check by the punitive 
force of the morality of custom. The difference between them and the rest of the 
subjugated populace was that, every time the pressure created by prolonged confinement 
within the state had become unbearable, they could always return to the wilderness and 
discharge their instinct for freedom outside of society. After all, they were the ones who 
were in charge, the ones who had the power to go and conquer new worlds, to subjugate 
other people, and so on. Thus, for the primitive noble type, the instinct for freedom must 
not have reverted itself against its possessor as quickly as it did for the rest of the 





consonance with what Nietzsche says about the primitive nobles in the first treatise. As 
mentioned earlier, there they are described as often nothing more than mere beasts of 
prey. But the beast of prey is precisely the type of creature that has no ideals, no 
aspirations, a creature that does not conceive of itself as lacking anything and, hence, 
does not think of itself as needing to become something other than it already is. Because 
the prehistoric nobles remained so close to the beast, for a long time they must have 
conceived of themselves as more complete animals, as psychically “wholer men (ganzare 
Menschen)”52 who do not suffer from the inner conflict and turmoil associated with the 
bad conscience. 
 
But this presents a problem for Nietzsche’s account; one which he does not take 
on directly, yet one whose solution, I think, lies within the elements afforded by his own 
analysis in the Genealogy. I shall take a moment to discuss it and outline its solution. The 
problem is this: how did the prehistoric noble men acquire a bad conscience? That they 
must at some point have acquired it is made plain by the fact that Nietzsche claims that 
the instincts of reaction and ressentiment are the instruments of culture, through which 
the beast of prey, the barbarian, was finally civilized (GM I, 11).53 It seems clear that part 
of what it must have meant for the beasts of prey to become “civilized” is that at some 
point they started to disapprove of their own aggressive nature. Of course, this need not 
imply that they suspended their aggressive behavior completely, but rather that they must 
have eventually acquired a conception of themselves as creatures that needed a 
                                                 
52 Nietzsche uses this expression in BGE, 257 again within the context of a characterization of the primitive 
aristocracy, the barbarian cast. 
 
53 In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche avers that the people of his time that are capable of commanding 





justification, a conscious reason, for engaging in acts of violence outside of society.54 In 
other words, they must have gone from being unconscious artists to being more conscious 
and conscientious ones. Indeed, in the section I am referring to, Nietzsche claims that the 
bearers of the reactive instincts are not the representatives of culture, even though their 
instincts are the instruments of culture. This must mean that the active, aggressive, noble 
men are the actual agents of culture who use the reactive instincts to create works of art. 
Since advancing culture in this way requires conscious imagining and idealization, the 
noble men must somehow have been infected with a bad conscience. 
 
 Ex hypothesi, the primitive noble men, the warriors, could not have acquired a bad 
conscience by direct enslavement since they are the ones who wield power, who are in 
control of the punitive force, and who can escape the confines of society. So their instinct 
for freedom must have been persuaded to change direction, to revert itself against its 
possessor, by some other means. Who could have yielded this type of influence and how 
could he have yielded it? It must have been someone who was very powerful, but who 
exerted power in a different way from the way in which the noble warriors did. What 
Nietzsche seems to require here, is a human being that can act as a sort of bridge between 
the noble warriors and the slaves, someone who can exert influence over the warriors in 
virtue of having traits belonging to both classes. More specifically, Nietzsche needs a 
person that belongs to the noble caste, but is not in the habit of externalizing his 
aggressive instincts outside of society; someone who is not a slave, yet shares with the 
                                                 
54 Again, it is important to bear in mind that the type of disapproval at stake here is not necessarily moral in 
nature, and therefore neither is the justification I am claiming the noble men must think of themselves as 
needing. Instead of remorse, a prudential fear (of perceived repercussions) or a similar feeling may be 





slave an incapacity for external action, for aggression, that makes him susceptible to 
acquiring a bad conscience. If there were such a person, he could still be powerful 
enough to “convince” the other noble men to acquire bad consciences of their own.55 
Fortunately, Nietzsche’s account does have someone that fits this characterization: the 
priest.  
 
 In the first treatise, Nietzsche claims that the priestly aristocracy constituted the 
highest caste in primitive societies. But he suggests that this segment of the aristocracy 
was very different from its counterpart, the warriors. As he puts it, “there is from the first 
something unhealthy in such priestly aristocracies and in the habits ruling in them which 
turn them away from action and alternate between brooding and emotional explosions” 
(GM I, 6). This aspect of the priestly aristocracies, their peculiar aversion to action, must 
have made them very susceptible to the contagion of the bad conscience, since it is 
precisely the lack of an outlet for aggressive action that makes the instinct for freedom 
revert itself against its possessor. Of course, in this case the way in which the person is 
denied such an outlet is not so much through repeated punishment, as it is by virtue of the 
very dynamics inherent to the practices of the institution to which he belongs. It is the 
priestly institution itself that in this case acts as bulwark of the societal organization and 
drives its members away from the type of behavior characteristic of the warriors.56 
 
                                                 
55 I say convince, but it should be obvious that this need not mean convince by way of argument. Indeed, 
the “persuasion” at stake here was likely effected by the impact of the particular practices proper to this 
type of person and the forces at work in them, as will become clear shortly. 
 
56 In this connection, recall that Nietzsche had left room for other things to act as bulwarks not just the 





 Possessed with a bad conscience himself, the priest can become one of the fiercest 
and most effective forces in the process of civilizing the beasts of prey.  In a telling 
passage of the third treatise, Nietzsche describes the type of war the priest will wage 
against the beasts of prey as a war of cunning, that is, a war of the spirit rather than of 
force. To fight this war, Nietzsche tells us, “[the priest] will under certain circumstances 
need to evolve a virtually new type of preying animal out of himself, or at least he will 
need to represent it – a new kind of animal ferocity in which the polar bear, the supple, 
cold, and patient tiger, and not least the fox seem to be joined in a unity at once enticing 
and terrifying” (GM III, 15). The most important trait of this new type of preying beast, 
its peculiar art, consists in being the herald and mouthpiece of obscure and mysterious 
powers, precisely the type of powers that can seek out and pursue the beasts of prey 
beyond the confines of society, even beyond life. If such powers were to disapprove and 
chastise the warriors for their aggressive nature, they would contribute enormously to the 
eventual development of a bad conscience in the warriors themselves. My aim in this 
brief detour has not been to construct a complete and coherent explanation of this 
process, but to show that the elements for such an explanation are available in 
Nietzsche’s story. I think what I have said so far goes a long way towards that goal. It 
also allows us to transition to the next section, for it is precisely with the aid of religion 
and its moralizing forces that the bad conscience transforms into a guilty conscience. 
 






 At the end of section 16 Nietzsche seems to suggest that the advent of the bad 
conscience had something to do with, if not the inception, at least the development of 
religion and religious dogmas. The appearance on earth of an animal soul that had turned 
against itself, that suffered because of itself, was something so extraordinary, Nietzsche 
tells us there, “[that] divine spectators were needed to do justice to the spectacle that thus 
began and the end of which is not yet in sight” (GM II, 16). Nietzsche had expressed a 
similar idea earlier in section 7 where he advanced the hypothesis that the gods were 
created to justify evil and suffering. There he claims that the chief function of the gods 
was to act as spectators of human suffering, to take pleasure in the ills that befell 
mankind and, on occasion, to affect what happened “on stage” by becoming the actual 
causes of some of those ills. Nietzsche maintains that, in a very fundamental and vital 
sense, human beings need to explain away their suffering, and the system of divine 
purposes and religious interpretations furnished reasons that provided a way for them to 
do so. 
 
 In section 19, however, Nietzsche proposes a different hypothesis about the origin 
of the gods. He suggests that the gods emerged out of a modified interpretation of the 
relationship between creditors and debtors: namely, the relationship between the current 
generation and its ancestors. Nietzsche thinks that, from the historical point of view, this 
reinterpretation of the relationship between creditors and debtors is strange and even 
somewhat problematic. Nonetheless, he insists that in prehistoric times, the living 
generation felt indebted to the prior generation, and especially to the founders of the tribe. 





living generations to the conviction that the more prosperous and powerful their tribe 
became, the more acute and cumbersome was their indebtedness to their ancestors, and 
vice versa. Nietzsche suggests that, bound by this kind of reasoning, the most successful 
tribes eventually ended up transfiguring their ancestors into gods (GM II, 19). 
 
 I do not think these two hypotheses about the origin of the gods are necessarily at 
odds with each other. In this connection it is important to recall, once more, that for 
Nietzsche the emergence of any thing, any concept, any institution, any organ, is the 
result of the confluence of various influences and various motivations that can be 
radically distinct from each other. Thus, it is perfectly consistent on his part to mention 
and inspect different aspects of the history of the formation of the concept of god on 
earth. The discussion of the link between the two aforementioned aspects of this history 
does not belong to this essay. What interests me here is the connection Nietzsche 
establishes between the concept of god and the primitive form of the bad conscience. 
 
 In his essay on the second treatise of the Genealogy, Mathias Risse argues that 
Christianity plays a unique and crucial role in Nietzsche’s story of the transformation of 
the bad conscience into a guilty conscience. He focuses a great part of his analysis on 
what he deems the pivotal section of the second treatise, namely, section 21. In that 
section, Nietzsche asserts that the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt emerges as the 
result of the moralization of the material concepts of “guilt” (Schuld) and “duty.” 
According to Nietzsche, this moralization is brought about by pushing back these 





involvement of the bad conscience with the concept of god” (GM II, 21). Risse construes 
this last claim as indicating the entanglement of the primitive form of the bad conscience 
with the idea of the Christian God. He takes many of his cues from Nietzsche’s rhetoric 
in the section, which focuses mostly on Christian concepts like original sin and eternal 
punishment.57 For Risse this means that the moralization at stake here is one that very 
much follows the pattern of what Leiter has called elsewhere a “morality in the pejorative 
sense” (Leiter, 1995). That is to say that Nietzsche’s attitude towards the moral concept 
of guilt is one of wholehearted condemnation and disdain.58 Leiter himself agrees in this 
respect with Risse, though for him what turns the bad conscience into guilt is not its 
connection to Christianity per se, but rather its attachment to the ascetic ideal: 
Christianity is one of the most notable exponents of this ideal, but the ideal itself is much 
broader in scope including other religions like Buddhism and sometimes even non-
religious disciplines like modern science (Leiter, 2002: 244). 
 
 I disagree with the assessment of these interpreters. In my judgment, both Risse 
and Leiter miss important nuances in Nietzsche’s treatment of the moral concept of guilt. 
In particular, they fail to notice the positive regard Nietzsche has for this concept, which 
goes as far as to assign to moral guilt a crucial role in the process of ennoblement of other 
                                                 
57 However, it should be noted that Christianity is not the only force mentioned in that section; Nietzsche 
also speaks of a nihilistic withdrawal from existence in general, which he directly associates with 
Buddhism and the like religions (GM II, 21). 
 
58 Leiter and Risse are not alone in this respect. Indeed there seems to be almost unanimous agreement 
among most commentators that a substantial part of Nietzsche attack on morality is focused on the moral 
notion of guilt. A good example of this position is Bernard Williams (1993). See also Clark (2001), for a 
nice and concise discussion of the view. Not even those who defend positive Nietzschean notions of free 
will and responsibility, like Ken Gemes and Christopher Janaway, go as far as to question this assumption. 





things. In order to appreciate this point we need to look closely at the main arguments of 
sections 20 to 23. 
 
 In section 20, Nietzsche claims that (once the ancestors were transfigured into 
gods) for several millennia, the feeling of having unpaid debts toward the deity or deities 
increased in the same measure as the concept of god grew on earth. This process, we are 
told, reached its pinnacle with the arrival of the Christian God, which marked the advent 
of the greatest feeling of “guilty indebtedness” ever felt.59 However, Nietzsche concludes 
the section expressing his hope that the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God 
will also mark the decline in mankind’s feeling of debt; specifically, the decline in 
mankind’s feeling of debt toward its origin. Thus, the progress and development of 
atheism constitutes, for him, a historical process that flows counter to the movement of 
ever increasing indebtedness. 
 
 But at the beginning of the next section (the pivotal section for Risse) we are told 
that the description of this process has been one-sided: Nietzsche has spoken of one 
historical strand in isolation (the progressive formation of more abstract and more 
universal deities and the feeling of “guilty indebtedness” that accompanies it), he has 
neglected to mention other strands that also belong and get entangled in this history of the 
relationship between the concept of god and the material concept of “guilt”. In particular, 
he has omitted the moralization of the concepts of “guilt” and “duty.” As was mentioned 
earlier this moralization is what turns the purely material concept of “guilt” into a moral 
                                                 
59 Again, it is crucial to keep in mind that, at this stage, this feeling of “guilt” or of being at “fault” refers to 





concept. Nietzsche is interested in discussing this aspect of the story because he considers 
that the ensnarement of the moral concept of guilt in the process of ever growing 
indebtedness toward the divinity significantly alters, in a negative way, the impact of the 
whole atheistic movement and its promise of emancipation. Since what this movement 
promises is to redeem us from the maximal feeling of indebtedness ever experienced on 
this planet, Nietzsche is principally interested in discussing how this maximal feeling of 
indebtedness is affected by the appearance of the moral concept of guilt. This is why he 
focuses most of the discussion in section 21 and section 22 on Christianity since, as he 
had announced in section 20, it is with the arrival of the Christian God that we reach the 
maximum feeling of indebtedness ever experienced on earth, and thus also the maximum 
feeling of guilt. 
 
Told in this way, and contrary to what Risse claims, it seems clear that for 
Nietzsche the moralization of the material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” must have 
happened very early on in the course of the story he is recounting, especially if we 
consider that the prehistoric form of the bad conscience is an essential element in this 
transformation. I realize that this claim is mere gesturing at this point and that I have 
provided insufficient evidence against Risse’s reading. Fortunately, there is another place 
where one can find support for the thesis I am defending here. Nietzsche cannot think that 
the moralization of the material concept of “guilt” happens with the arrival of Christianity 
because in section 23 he attributes to the Greeks the use of the moral concept of guilt for 
the ennoblement of their gods. This, I think, is evidence that weighs more decisively in 





interpretation of the admittedly strange claim that the moral concept of guilt emerges 
with the pushing back of the material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” into the conscience 
or, more accurately, with the entanglement (Verwicklung) of the bad conscience with the 
concept of god. 
 
To begin with, note that by claiming that the concepts must be subjected to a 
“pushing back” (Zurückschiebung) Nietzsche gives the impression that those concepts 
are to be shoved toward a location they formerly occupied, as if they were somehow 
standing outside of the place they once resided in. I interpret this as an indication that the 
pushing of those concepts had already happened but must now happen again, or that the 
concepts must be placed again in the space they occupied once before, but under a 
different guise. Hence, what Nietzsche is trying to say here is that the moralization of the 
material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” occurs when those concepts get reinserted into 
the conscience. What can that mean? As was argued earlier, the initial insertion of these 
concepts into the conscience was carried out by the morality of custom. It was through 
the methods of the morality of custom that the person learned to conceive of himself as a 
debtor, that is, as someone who must repay – someone who has the “duty” to repay and 
can be at “fault” (Schuld) for not repaying – a debt he incurred in the past. If the concepts 
of “guilt” and “duty” are now to be re-appropriated by the person or, better still, 
introduced back into his conception of himself, then they must do so under a new 
meaning. Nietzsche himself gives us the key to unlock this new meaning by declaring in 
section 21 that the pushing back consists more precisely in “the involvement of the bad 





that the moralization of the concepts in question is equivalent to “their being pushed back 
into the bad conscience” (Ibid.). 
 
 Recall that the bad conscience is the conception the person has of himself as 
incomplete, imperfect, ordinary or low. This conception, which is also equivalent to the 
thought that one is situated below what one could (potentially) be, is concomitant with an 
understanding of oneself as material for change, as capable of transforming into someone 
other than one already is. If the concepts of “guilt” and “duty” are to be inserted into this 
conception of oneself, then the result must be a mixture of two conceptions of oneself and 
their corresponding feelings: the feeling of being at fault for not paying one’s debt (the 
feeling of being still indebted) and the feeling of dislike (non-moral) for who one is. 
What I take this mixture to involve is a new conception of oneself according to which 
one’s “guilt” for an unpaid debt and one’s “duty” to repay it, directly affect one’s sense 
of self: adversely, should one indeed fail to repay the debt, or favorably, in case one 
fulfills one’s duties and pays it. Both possibilities are felt as self-chosen since, as was 
said before, the bad conscience entails, even if in a still incipient manner, the thought that 
one is the author of one’s own self (one’s self is a material upon which to exercise the full 
force of one’s artistry). In other words, through the re-conceptualization of “guilt” and 
“duty”, through their reinsertion into the bad conscience, we get a new understanding of 
ourselves as entrusted with actions upon which hangs our own sense of self-worth. But 
this means that our transgressions, our failure to return the thing entrusted or lent, are 





dignity and our worth as a person, and the resulting conscience can thus be properly 
called, no longer simply a bad conscience, but a guilty one. 
 
I have claimed above that the contempt that the person feels is moral in nature. 
But, how did we get this moral sense of disapproval? I seem to have pulled a rabbit out of 
an empty hat. After all, by my own account, the primitive form of the bad conscience 
involves a feeling of disapproval that is not moral. Why should the involvement of the 
material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” with the bad conscience yield a feeling of self-
contempt that is? To answer this question notice that what causes the feeling of 
diminished self-worth characteristic of the primitive form of the bad conscience is the 
instinct for freedom that has changed directions and turned inward toward the person 
whose instinct it is. Thus, the feeling of contempt or disapprobation at stake here is 
equivalent to the thought that one could or should be other than one currently is. This 
feeling is not moral in nature because it is not accompanied by the thought that one’s 
character is reprehensible as such or that one’s actions are those of a morally 
blameworthy person (of a wrong-doer). Indeed, it is compatible with seeing oneself as 
someone worthy of disapprobation that one does not necessarily think this is the result of 
something one did or something one is responsible for. The bad conscience simply brands 
this self-contempt into the person and impels him to change so as to get rid of it, but it in 
no way specifies why it is present or connects its presence with the person’s will and 
choices.  In the guilty conscience, by contrast, what triggers the contempt the person feels 
for himself is his failure to fulfill certain “contractual” obligations. Because it is so 





self-worth is in this case equivalent to the thought that one ought to have been someone 
different (someone more decent) by actually doing something other than what one ended 
up doing, that is, that one could or should have done otherwise. This feeling is, therefore, 
moral in nature because it involves the sensation of polluting oneself through one’s own – 
now questionable – actions, through one’s own wrong doings. 
 
 The preceding couple of paragraphs explain how the consciousness of moral guilt 
emerges from the reinsertion of the material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” into the bad 
conscience. The question I have not answered yet is how this reinsertion happens? Why 
should all these things mix in the way Nietzsche suggests and I have described? After all, 
the mere coexistence of the material concepts of “guilt” and “duty” and the bad 
conscience within one psyche does not necessitate their entanglement.  It is perhaps to 
answer this problem that Nietzsche asserts that the moralization of the concepts of “guilt” 
and “duty” consists more precisely in the involvement of the bad conscience with the 
concept of god. 
 
We know from our discussion earlier that it is very unlikely that the judicial 
sphere would produce the moralization we are looking for, since the procedures 
employed by the judiciary prevented the wrong doer from considering his acts 
reprehensible as such. Here we can add another consideration that makes this possibility 
improbable. This consists in the fact that Nietzsche believes that the history of justice 
essentially amounts to the struggle against the reactive feelings on the part of the active 





reactive passions, to impose restraint, and to end the senseless raging of rancor and 
resentment (GM II, 11).60 According to Nietzsche, the principal method for achieving all 
this is precisely the institution of the law, whose function is to remove its subjects from 
the injuries caused to them by others, by interpreting those injuries as offenses against the 
law itself and not as transgressions directed against particular individuals or groups of 
people. Historically, then, the essential thrust of the judicial institution, as Nietzsche 
understands it, is to train the conscience of its subjects to evaluate all wrong doings in an 
increasingly impersonal manner. It is no wonder that Nietzsche does not claim that the 
moralization of “guilt” and “duty” occurs when the bad conscience gets entangled with 
the concept of law. For the basic trend of justice is not to instigate feelings of remorse or 
of diminished self-worth in the violators of the law, but to redress in an impartial and 
objective manner the wrong perpetrated by them, to balance once again with a good will 
the momentary disturbance of forces, to reach a mutual understanding or to compel those 
involved to accept a compromise (Ibid.).61 
 
 Where, then, can we find in primitive societies an institution that will transform 
the conscience of its subjects so as to instigate in them feelings of diminished self-worth 
whenever they contravene the mandates of the institution itself, an institution in which 
                                                 
60 Nietzsche’s target in the section is Eugen Dühring who claims that justice arises from the sphere of the 
reactive feelings itself as an extension of the feeling of being aggrieved. 
 
61 It should be clear by now that Nietzsche need not be committed to the claim that modern judicial systems 
are necessarily closer to the realization of the goals contained in the basic historical trend of justice than 
prior forms of judicial organization. Supposing Nietzsche is correct about the basic historical orientation of 
justice, his understanding of historical processes still allows for the possibility of arresting the progress of 
judicial development during the course of history. Though he does not discuss this directly, given his 
overall critical posture towards modernity, Nietzsche’s own view might well have been that the modern 
judiciary constitutes an obstruction, perhaps even a regression, in the historical advancement of justice. If 
such were the case it would mean, according to his account, that the reactive powers have won (if perhaps 
only momentarily) the battle against the aggressive forces (the promoters of justice), and have gained 





one can find an vested interest in mixing the bad conscience with the material concepts of 
“guilt” and “duty”? According to Nietzsche we can find this type of institution in the 
religious organizations of primitive societies. As was argued earlier, because of its 
historical origin the concept of god is already intertwined with the material concept of 
“guilt” (by way of the debt one has towards the divinity) and, by extension, with that of 
“duty”. Because those concepts have been incorporated into the religious institution from 
its inception, all that is needed to effect the moralization described previously is to mix 
the concept of god with the bad conscience. The normal result of this intertwining of 
concepts will be a guilty conscience: a conscience in which feelings of diminished self-
worth are triggered any time the person fails to live up to the standards and contractual 
obligations imposed by the deity or deities. Later, partly as a result of the natural 
progression of this new conscience, the feeling will encompass all transgressions, to the 
point of being likely to extend beyond the confines of moral actions altogether (today it is 
not uncommon for people to feel guilty for things for which they are not really at fault as 
in the case of survivor’s guilt). 
 
Furthermore, according to Nietzsche, the primary function of all religious 
institutions consists in handling human suffering and human sickness in a very peculiar 
way, namely, by interpreting the causes of all human maladies in psychological-moral 
terms and by prescribing cures of the same sort (GM III, 17). This means that religions 





after. For this purpose they also count with the aid of one of the most cunning, serious, 
shrewd and commanding forces in the Nietzschean panoply of characters: the priest.62 
 
Nietzsche consistently describes the priest as someone who is bent on domination, 
not only of those situated below him (the herd) but also of those he considers his equals, 
the noble warriors (GM III, 15-16). In order to manifest his will to power in this way the 
priest has all sorts of devices and resources at his disposal. Chief among them is the pool 
of reactive passions that brew in the soul of all individuals both low and high, and that are 
specially recalcitrant and damaging in the souls of the base and the sick.63 Nietzsche 
claims that the priest is particularly adept at turning these passions – the feelings of 
resentment and rancor, as well as the lust for revenge – back against the possessor of 
those feelings. Releasing these emotions against their possessor has the effect of 
temporally alleviating the person’s misery and depression (his sickness) by relieving and 
deadening the displeasure that accompanies these states. This unbridling of passions, 
however, comes at the cost of making the sick sicker and is thus not really a cure (GM 
III, 15, 17, 20). For this reason Nietzsche calls this kind of priestly medication (and 
method of domination) “guilty” by modern standards. But, more important for our 
account, is to notice that this method also shapes in a very specific way the whole tenor 
of religious organizations. For, contrary to what happens in the judicial institution where 
the aim is to simply put an end to the violence of the reactive passions, in the case of 
                                                 
62 Nietzsche is particularly interested in the Christian priest. But it is clear that throughout most of the 
sections in the three treatises of the Genealogy he is discussing the particular features, role, and character of 
the ascetic priest who, according to Nietzsche, appears everywhere in almost every age, emerges from all 
social classes, and does not belong to any one particular race (GM III, 11). 
 
63 In the noble man the reactive passions are discharged in action the moment they arise so they do not 
consume him. The weak and the sick cannot do this because they are united by a general incapacity for or 





religious institutions the aim is often to exploit those reactive passions and to give them 
full reign, albeit in controlled and modified directions. Thus, in the same way as the 
unhampered development of justice will foment consciences trained to appreciate actions 
in a progressively more impersonal manner, the development of religious institutions will 
tend to encourage their subjects to assess all actions (especially those implicated with the 
reactive passions) in an increasingly personal way. 
 
 Indeed, in section 20 of the third treatise, Nietzsche speaks in more detail about 
the particular form that the moralization process we have been discussing acquires when 
it is taken a step further, and this priestly strategy of unleashing the reactive passions 
within a person’s soul is allowed to develop in its most frightful and damaging way. This 
new development in the moralization process consists in exploiting the feeling of moral 
guilt to the point of transforming the person into a sinner. As Nietzsche puts it, “it was 
only in the hands of the priest, that artist in guilty feelings that [the feeling of guilt] 
achieved form – oh, what a form! ‘Sin’ – for this is the priestly name for the animal’s 
‘bad conscience’ (cruelty directed backward) – has been the greatest event so far in the 
history of the sick soul: we possess in it the most dangerous and fateful artifice of 
religious interpretation” (GM III, 20).64 To understand why Nietzsche believes this is so 
calamitous we need to look more carefully at how the priest achieves this transformation. 
                                                 
64 The reader should bear in mind that the ambiguity in Nietzsche’s use of the word Schuld that was 
mentioned earlier is perhaps specially conspicuous and difficult to solve in this section of the Genealogy. 
Nietzsche claims that the origin of the Schuldgefühl (moral feeling of guilt? or material guilty feeling of 
being indebted?) had been briefly suggested in the second treatise, as no more than a piece of animal 
psychology. This coupled with his parenthetical characterization of the bad conscience as cruelty directed 
backwards, could suggest that he is speaking of a feeling that is implicated with the primitive form of the 
bad conscience, with the bad conscience in its state prior to the moralization process discussed above. If 
that is so, then Schuldgefühl must be construed as a material “guilty feeling of having debts” and not as 






 The priest introduces the concept of sin as a device to explain the general sense of 
malaise that is the natural by-product of having a bad conscience. Recall that the 
possessor of a bad conscience is someone who is constantly discharging his own instinct 
for freedom (his own artistic cruelty) against himself. One natural outcome of this 
relentless exercise in psychological cruelty is a general sense of physical and emotional 
pain that permeates the person’s whole being.65 Because it is so pervasive, the person that 
suffers from this kind of pain finds in it no recognizable origin, and this uncertainty, 
Nietzsche tells us, makes him thirst for reasons and remedies for his general condition. 
Nietzsche continues: “at last [man] takes counsel with one who knows hidden things, too 
– and behold! he receives a hint, he receives from his sorcerer, the ascetic priest, the first 
hint as to the ‘cause’ of his suffering: he must seek it in himself, in some guilt, in a piece 
of the past, he must understand his suffering as a punishment” (Ibid.). From then on the 
person learns to conceive of himself as a “sinner,” as someone who is essentially corrupt, 
someone who is “guilty and reprehensible to a degree that can never be atoned for” (GM 
II, 22), someone for whom existence as such is worthless, a being that is nothing other 
                                                                                                                                                 
However, in my judgment this raises the problem of explaining Nietzsche’s claim that the priest is an artist 
in material guilty feelings of being indebted, or that he exploits the material guilty feeling of having debts 
and gives it the form of sin. If we construe Schuldgefühl as a moral feeling of guilt, these problems can be 
accounted for more easily. What Nietzsche is suggesting is that the priest takes advantage of the 
moralization of the concepts of “guilt” and “duty” that, being in the moralizing business of religion, he had 
already helped to bring about (this is why Nietzsche claims that the priest is an artist in guilty feelings). The 
priest gives the moral feeling of guilt the form of sin, a molding job that results in the transformation of the 
moral concept of guilt which, as was argued earlier, applies to the person’s particular trespasses, into the 
concept of sin which applies to the person as a whole, to his full character, to the entire state of his human 
nature. I think this reading not only makes more sense of the text, but is supported by Nietzsche’s use of 
Schuld throughout this section, where for the most part it seems clear that he means the moral concept of 
“guilt” and not a material concept. 
 
65 This general feeling is probably made even more acute once the bad conscience is transformed into a 
guilty conscience, since the person can then experience all sorts of mental states like remorse, 
compunction, contrition and the like, that are bound to shake in profound ways his whole psychic structure 





than an evil piece of an equally evil nature (GM II, 21). For the most part, Nietzsche 
appears to clearly privilege Christianity as the unique inventor of this type of conception 
of oneself. However, it is important to point out, that the discussion in the Genealogy 
seems to suggest that something of this conception is also found in other religions as 
well, specifically in Buddhism and the like. In Nietzsche’s view, these religions share 
with Christianity a general nihilistic longing for nothingness and a condemnatory 
appreciation of existence in general, and the self in particular; they also share with it the 
fact that they arrive at these forms of valuation via the moralization of the material 
concept of “guilt”, via its transformation into the moral concept of guilt (Ibid.).66 This 
similarity notwithstanding, as was argued earlier, Nietzsche thinks that Christianity 
represents a pinnacle in the creative use of the moral concepts of guilt and sin, and that it 
is without a doubt the most fateful exponent of the type of self-crucifixion and self-
violation of man that can be achieved by means of them. 
 
 The concept of “sin” is the most dangerous artifice of religious interpretation 
because it embodies a frenzied will to ruin everything that is worth something in life: a 
will to destroy physical and emotional health, to corrupt taste in culture and the arts, to 
                                                 
66 Throughout the Genealogy Nietzsche establishes a very strong affinity between Buddhism and 
Christianity. In the preface, for example, he suggests that under the influence of the morality of pity 
(Christianity) the European culture is now on the verge of a new Buddhism, a Buddhism for Europeans 
(GM Preface, 5; see also GM III, 27, where Nietzsche suggests that Christian morality follows an 
evolutionary process that parallels the one experienced much earlier in the East). In the Antichrist, written a 
year after the Genealogy, both religions are still described as belonging together, insofar as they are both 
nihilistic religions (religions of decadence), but Nietzsche now clearly states that the difference between 
them is considerable. In particular, he argues that Buddhism “is a hundred times more realistic than 
Christianity” (A, 20). Unlike the latter, Nietzsche tells us, Buddhism respects reality because it speaks a 
language that has been purged of moral concepts. Thus, it does not fight against sin, but against suffering 
(Ibid.; see also A, 22-23). Still, even here Nietzsche seems to adhere to the view that these religions follow 
a similar evolutionary process: what distinguishes Buddhism from Christianity is that the former comes at 
the end of this evolutionary process, it has already situated itself beyond good and evil, while Christianity, 





castrate the intellect, to distort happiness and beauty, and, in general, to poison once and 
for all the very essence of existence and the whole of nature through a deplorable tyranny 
of concepts like “guilt,” “suffering,” “eternal damnation,” “punishment,” and so forth 
(GM III, 20, 22). According to Nietzsche, after two millennia of exposure to this type of 
training in the vilification of life, and in self-desecration and abuse, today we find 
ourselves under siege: “everywhere one looks there is the hypnotic gaze of the sinner, 
always fixed on the same object (on ‘guilt’ as the sole cause of suffering); everywhere the 
bad conscience … everywhere the past regurgitated, the fact distorted, the ‘jaundiced 
eye’ for all action; everywhere the will to misunderstand suffering made the content of 
life, the reinterpretation of suffering as feelings of guilt, fear, and punishment” (GM III, 
20). Just how ubiquitous is this type of understanding of oneself and of life, in 
Nietzsche’s view, is made evident by the last sections of the third treatise of the 
Genealogy, where he describes in more detail the widespread influence of the ascetic 
ideal. Indeed, Nietzsche avers that this ideal – which lies at the bottom of the priest’s 
moralizing efforts and provides the impetus for the transformation of the bad conscience 
(in its guilty form) into the sinful conscience67 – infects with its poisonous values even 
those who think themselves immune to it, like academic scholars and modern scientists 
(Nietzsche argues that science only combats the external appearance of the ascetic ideal, 
but in reality constitutes its latest and noblest manifestation as well as its strongest ally) 
(GM III, 23-25). 
 
                                                 
67 Explaining in more detail the function of the ascetic ideal in the priest’s moralizing efforts requires a 
more careful analysis of the third treatise than I can give in this essay. In particular, it requires explaining 
what exactly Nietzsche means by the ascetic ideal. Here I can only remark that, for Nietzsche, the ascetic 
ideal is the ideal in which the ascetic priest has “not only his faith but also his will, his power, his interest” 





 It is not my intention in this essay to evaluate Nietzsche’s characterization of the 
modern human condition and the predicaments of Western culture. Instead, I will now 
wrap up our discussion of the transformations of the bad conscience by turning to a 
“healthier” form of moralization that Nietzsche considers towards the end of the second 
treatise. He attributes this alternative form of moralization to the ancient Greeks, who 
“for the longest time … used their gods precisely so as to ward off the ‘bad conscience,’ 
so as to be able to rejoice in their freedom of soul – the very opposite of the use to which 
Christianity put its God” (GM II, 23).  Nietzsche had already announced his discussion of 
this topic in section 19, referring to it as the process of “aristocratization” (Veradligung) 
and “ennoblement” (Veredelung) of the gods. In order to discuss this issue let us briefly 
return to a previous point. 
 
 Throughout his analysis, particularly in the third treatise, Nietzsche seems to 
suggest that whenever the moralization process is left largely in the hands of the ascetic 
priest, the development of the guilty conscience will move inexorably in the direction of 
sin or any of its nihilistic counterparts.68 What level of virulence the sinful (or nihilistic) 
conscience reaches as a result of this process will depend in large measure on a series of 
factors that have to do with the idiosyncrasies of each culture. Though, according to 
Nietzsche, it is Western culture that has excelled the most in this area, as a general rule, 
no culture escapes the drive towards some form or other of this type of conscience and 
life-evaluation. After all, as Nietzsche eloquently puts it, “read from a distant star, the 
majuscule script of our earthly existence would perhaps lead to the conclusion that the 
                                                 
68 Properly speaking, what Nietzsche suggests is that the evolutionary process of the ascetic ideal is the 






earth was the distinctively ascetic planet, a nook of disgruntled, arrogant, and offensive 
creatures filled with a profound disgust at the themselves, at the earth, at all life, who 
inflict as much pain on themselves as they possibly can out of pleasure in inflicting pain – 
which is probably their only pleasure” (GM III, 11). Still, like most general rules, this one 
too admits of exceptions; in Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality, the ancient Greeks 
constitute precisely one such exception. 
 
 Why the ancient Greeks were so lucky, is a question that Nietzsche never really 
answers. He only suggests that they were healthier men, by which he presumably means 
in part that they were especially resistant to pain and suffering. Their overall healthier 
constitution, their adaptability and resilience in the face of suffering, must have made the 
Greeks less susceptible to the pernicious influence of the ascetic ideal and of its 
mouthpiece, the ascetic priest. However, Nietzsche clearly indicates that this stroke of 
fortune did not exempt the Greeks from going through a moralization process of their 
own, albeit one that took on a different form and led them in a very different direction. 
The originality of the Greeks in this area consisted mainly in taking the concept of guilt 
along a path that allowed them in the end to understand themselves in terms of 
“foolishness” and not in terms of “sinfulness” (or the like).  Nietzsche invokes the 
authority of the Homeric Zeus of the Odyssey to support this interpretation. In the 
passage he cites, Zeus is marveling at how the mortals blame the gods for the evils that 
befall them, when it is clear that they are the ones that bring those evils on themselves 
because of their “folly” (GM II, 23). After citing this passage, Nietzsche suggests that the 





“foolishness” was the reason for much that was bad and calamitous in their lives. Yet, he 
claims that this admission was not without difficulties. The text at this point is worth 
quoting extensively. Nietzsche writes: 
 
Even this disturbance in the head, however, presented a problem: “how is it 
possible? How could it actually have happened to heads such as we have, we men 
of aristocratic descent, of the best society, happy, well-constituted, noble, and 
virtuous?” – thus noble Greeks asked themselves for centuries in the face of every 
incomprehensible atrocity or wantonness with which one of their kind had 
polluted himself. “He must have been deluded by a god,” they concluded finally, 
shaking their heads … This expedient is typical of the Greeks … In this way the 
gods served in those days to justify man to a certain extent even in his wickedness, 
they served as the originators of evil – in those days they took upon themselves, 
not the punishment but, what is nobler, the guilt (Ibid.; my emphasis). 
 
I want to draw attention to two things in this passage. The first is that the type of Greek 
Nietzsche is imagining here is not someone who thinks his acts have gone unexpectedly 
wrong. Instead, he is envisioning someone who thinks that his acts are such that he ought 
not to have done them. This means that the Greeks Nietzsche is describing in this section 
have already moralized the material concept of “guilt” and are, thus, in full possession of 
a moral concept. These Greeks were conscious of being culpable of wrong doing and of 
treading through very shaky moral grounds. The prospect of being consumed by their 
guilty conscience was so overwhelming, that not even the maneuver of reinterpreting 
their immoral acts as being caused by their own stupidity or foolishness seemed to suffice 
in order to ward it off. A more decisive expedient was needed here. Fortunately for them, 
the Greeks managed to find a way out of this labyrinth of guilt by laying the blame for 
their own “foolishness” on their gods. This allowed the Greeks to keep their guilty 
feelings at bay (or at arm’s length), that is, it allowed them to ban those feelings to the 





were; to remove them from the core of their psyche. In this way, the internal struggle 
characteristic of the bad conscience (as consciousness of guilt) was diffused and 
poetically transfigured into a struggle against the gods.69 
 
 The second thing I wish to highlight about the passage is that Nietzsche claims 
that there is something ennobling about this expedient of the Greeks: by taking upon 
themselves the moral guilt, instead of the punishment, the gods are depicted as doing 
what is more noble. This is not the only place where Nietzsche makes this claim. The 
phrase recurs in Ecce Homo, interestingly, in inversed manner. There, Nietzsche writes: 
“If one is rich enough for this, it is even a good fortune to be in the wrong. A god who 
would come to earth must not do anything except wrong: not to take the punishment upon 
oneself but the guilt would be divine” (EH, ‘Why I am so Wise’, 5). Thus, whereas in the 
Genealogy taking upon themselves the concept of guilt makes the gods more like noble 
humans, in Ecce Homo it is suggested that adopting the same maneuver would make a 
human being more like a god. What is intriguing about this remark in both cases is that it 
implies that there is a way to use the moral concept of guilt (and if so perhaps also the 
guilty conscience?) for clearly positive purposes. Realizing that the concept of moral 
guilt can have positive connotations for Nietzsche provides an important clue for 
understanding the relationship between the sovereign conscience and the guilty 
conscience. 
 
VI. Conclusion: What of the Puzzle? 
                                                 
69 Greek literature is in great measure all about the struggle between the mortals and the gods. In the Iliad, 
for example, the gods constantly intervene in the battles in part because the mortals, by exercising their free 






 This allows me to transition to the last section of this essay. For, indeed, I now 
seem to have lost track of the puzzle that instigated this whole discussion. The puzzle, 
recall, was this: what is the relationship between the scintillating conscience of the 
sovereign individual and the gloomy conscience of the guilty person? 
 
One thing about this relationship that now seems to have clearly emerged as a 
result of my analysis is that both forms of conscience are more closely connected than 
one might expect, and, certainly, more so than most commentators would be prepared to 
admit or would like to accept. Not only do both forms of conscience require the same set 
of conditions in order to make them possible (in particular, the prolonged labor of the 
morality of custom and the emergence of a primitive form of the bad conscience resulting 
from a reversal of the instinct for freedom), but they both rest on the same conception of 
oneself, namely, a conception of oneself as the liable author of one’s own actions. To 
have a guilty conscience, after all, is to be tormented by what one has done: it is to feel 
responsible for, and therefore ashamed of, one’s own wrongdoings. Similarly, but in a 
reverse fashion, to have a sovereign conscience is to be gratified by what one has done or 
is going to do: it is to feel responsible for, and therefore proud of, one’s own 
accomplishments and good deeds and of one’s power to bring them about. In this sense, 
the two forms of conscience are really two sides of a single thing, a single conception; the 
conception of oneself as a responsible person. Here it might serve us well to stop to 
consider once again the somewhat treacherous and deceptive nature of Nietzsche’s initial 





confessing that in each of the three treatises the beginning “is calculated to mislead”(EH, 
‘Genealogy of Morals’). 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the beginning is misleading because it promises to be a 
commentary on a phenomenon that turns out not to be the primary focus of attention in 
the treatise. But, now we can see that this misdirection betrays a deeper deception: for in 
drawing this apparent contrast between the sovereign individual and the individual of the 
guilty conscience, Nietzsche caters to the reader’s prejudices and foments in him a 
default disposition to treat the two phenomena as absolutely distinct and separate. Among 
other things, I believe this has had the unfortunate consequence of contributing to a 
widespread misunderstanding of Nietzsche as someone who opposes the morality of guilt 
and promotes some other ideal that does not include the feelings and attitudes associated 
with it. However, the fault for this misunderstanding does not lie primarily in Nietzsche’s 
strategy but in the reader himself. For we should understand the strategy of misdirection 
as having a pedagogical aim: Nietzsche is not trying to confound his readers, but is 
instead attempting to instigate in them the sort of puzzlement that should lead them to 
question the text, to approach it slowly, to take their time, to put off judgment, in short, to 
put into practice, and thereby learn, the sort of activities that amount to an exercise in the 
art of reading well.70 Exercising such an art should reveal, I think, the close affinities that 
exist between the two phenomena that Nietzsche at first appears to treat as being distinct; 
                                                 
70 In this connection, it is worth remembering that the preface to the Genealogy ends with an exhortation to 
the reader to practice the art of reading well, an art that requires, as Nietzsche tells us, “something that has 
been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays … something for which one has almost to be a cow and in any 





affinities, one may add, that are after all preemptively announced by the very title of the 
treatise. 
 
One finds independent confirmation of this reading in Ecce Homo. Commenting 
on the new truth that each of the three inquires of the Genealogy reveals, Nietzsche 
writes: “the second inquiry offers the psychology of the conscience – which is not, as 
people may believe, ‘the voice of God in man’: it is the instinct of cruelty that turns back 
after it can no longer discharge itself externally. Cruelty is here exposed for the first time 
as one of the most ancient and basic substrata of culture that simply cannot be imagined 
away” (EH, ‘Genealogy of Morals’). What Nietzsche seems to be asserting here is that 
the second treatise is actually concerned with the history of what we ordinarily 
understand by a conscience: namely, that internal voice in a person that tells him what is 
right and wrong with respect to his actions and urges him to act on that knowledge. This 
claim seems surprising given the analysis of the second treatise pursued in this essay and 
appears at first to be quite at odds with its results; quite at odds, that is, until one recalls 
the ending of GM II, 2. There Nietzsche tells us that the proud awareness of the privilege 
of responsibility, the consciousness of the rare freedom that it represents, has penetrated 
to the depths of the sovereign individual and has become a dominant instinct, an instinct 
that the sovereign individuals calls his “conscience” (GM II, 2). We can now understand 
this claim to mean that a conscience, in the ordinary sense in which we understand this 
word, is precisely the sort of thing that a sovereign individual has in virtue of the rare and 
extraordinary freedom that he has been endowed with. Why is this so? The answer, I 





one’s hand when everything else is pushing one to deviate from the things one has 
resolved to do. This voice is not something alien to the person who understands himself 
as a responsible individual, but rather something with which he identifies completely, it is 
after all, the voice of his freedom, the voice of that extraordinary privilege that he feels is 
most his own. Of course, to speak to oneself in this voice is also to be liable to its scorn 
and not just its praise. We can betray the responsibility that comes with our freedom. In 
doing so, we will come to feel the bite of our own conscience that speaks to us in a 
recriminating voice and punishes us for not living up to that privilege that has been 
bestowed upon us. The guilty conscience is thus just the other side of that coin we call 
responsibility. 
 
This result should make us reassess the way we understand Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality. In the literature it is commonplace to make sense of Nietzsche’s critique of 
morality and his self-proclaimed immoralism by distinguishing between two different 
conceptions of morality, one of which Nietzsche is taken to reject from the standpoint of 
the other which he is said to favor.71 I have no qualms with this strategy of distinguishing 
between different senses of morality in order to dissolve apparent inconsistencies in 
Nietzsche’s claims about morality, but I do have problems with what gets put in one 
category or the other. In particular, I take issue with a tendency in the literature to assume 
that certain things like moral guilt cannot possibly belong to the sort of morality 
Nietzsche takes himself to recommend to us. To be sure, there are many things Nietzsche 
says in his writings that contribute to our falling prey to this tendency, not the least of 
                                                 
71 E.g. For Clark: a narrow and a broad morality. For Leiter: morality in the pejorative and non-pejorative 





which is his often vitriolic attack on Christian morality (which for many is simply 
equivalent to an attack on the morality of guilt). However, if the interpretation I have 
offered here is correct and if we can consider the sovereign individual to be an ideal 
Nietzsche recommends, or at the very least regards favorably (and it is hard to argue that 
he does not given the normative language he deploys to describe this individual in the 
first 3 sections of the second treatise), then we must conclude that moral guilt is not 
something Nietzsche rejects. For indeed, as has been argued, a moral concept of guilt and 
a guilty conscience are the sorts of things that a sovereign individual must bear as 
necessary costs to his being free. He could not enjoy the extraordinary privilege of 
responsibility without also being susceptible to moral guilt. 
 
That Nietzsche’s approach to moral guilt is more nuanced than is usually 
acknowledged allows us to appreciate better and perhaps solve a puzzle that the opening 
remarks of the second treatise present to us, but which I have not yet discussed. Nietzsche 
claims at the beginning of section 1 that the problem of breeding an animal with the right 
to make promises “has been solved to a large extent” (GM II, 1; my emphasis). In saying 
this, Nietzsche implies that there is still some work to be done in order for the human 
creature to become truly sovereign: the task is incomplete. How come? What has 
happened in the course of history to prevent its ripest fruit from being brought forth? 
Why can man not yet claim sovereignty and feel in his flesh “that sensation of mankind 
come to completion”? (GM II, 2). Nietzsche’s answer is that the moralizing tendencies of 
the ascetic ideal and the cunning work of its greatest champion, the ascetic priest, has 





conscience. Modern man cannot be completely sovereign because, for the most part, he is 
in the grips of an ill-conceived notion of responsibility: he thinks of it in terms of sin.  
 
Earlier I claimed that for Nietzsche the sinful or nihilistic conscience is 
ubiquitous, it is not confined to religious institutions and religious thinking but spreads 
even to secular disciplines like modern science. What is characteristic of this form of 
self-understanding is that it incarnates the ascetic ideal’s goal, which Nietzsche describes 
in the third treatise as a “will to nothingness”. Why does the sinful conscience incarnate 
such a will? A full answer to this question would require a close analysis of the third 
treatise; here I can only gesture towards what I take the answer to involve. One thing that 
is manifested by the will to nothingness is a disposition to treat nature and, in particular, 
all of man’s natural inclinations as evil, as something to be extirpated or transcended. In 
this sense the will to nothingness is a will to “the beyond”, to a metaphysical realm of 
truth located outside of nature. This aspect of the will to nothingness fits well with the 
notion that religions like Christianity are advocates of the ascetic ideal since they all posit 
the existence of a transcendent world of truth and happiness that lies outside of the 
confines of nature. But why would modern science be an ally of an ideal that aspires to 
the beyond? It seems that science is precisely in the business of combating such 
metaphysical postulates of a world that exists outside of nature. How can Nietzsche claim 
that it is in the grips of the ascetic ideal? His answer is that all of science “has at present 
the object of dissuading man from his former respect for himself, as if this had been 
nothing but a piece of bizarre conceit. One might even say that its own pride, its own 





as his ultimate and most serious claim to self-respect” (GM III, 25). What makes science 
ascetic is that it expresses a self-contempt of man: it is thus a more spiritualized and 
subtle incarnation of the same sort of disposition to treat man as something loathsome 
and evil. Part of the reason Nietzsche thinks science manifests such a disposition is that it 
is in the business of showing that our faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man is 
mistaken. For science, man is nothing more than an animal, literally and without 
qualification (Ibid.). This links this discussion to that of the sovereign conscience, for the 
latter represents the last reincarnation (or the latest transformation) of the primitive bad 
conscience, whose birth signaled, as was argued earlier, the real separation of man from 
nature by making culture and idealization possible. The sovereign individual is the 
ultimate expression of self-affirmation and self-glorification; he is proud of the power 
vested in him and thinks of this power as setting him apart from everything and everyone 
else. This power makes him irreplaceable; a necessary link in the chain of being and 
culture; in particular, it makes him consider himself as something without which culture 
would be impossible to sustain and develop to ever new heights. 
 
The will to nothingness is a flight from responsibility that manifests itself in 
different ways. In essence, it amounts to the belief that one is insignificant, that one is not 
in control of one’s own life or of one’s own actions. This will has spoiled the fruit that 
was promised to us as the end result of history. But not all is lost. Nietzsche thinks that 
the process is reversible and that we can rid ourselves of the sinful conscience that has 
come to dominate our understanding of ourselves. To do this we require a new ideal that 





an alternative ideal can be found in his book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. However, 
interestingly, he also claims that there are other things we could begin to do now in order 
to contribute to this process of liberation, things which do not require us to construct a 
new ideal with which to oppose the will to nothingness. Instead, all that this strategy 
requires is “to wed the bad conscience to all the unnatural inclinations, all those 
aspirations to the beyond, to that which runs counter to sense, instinct, nature, animal, in 
short  to all ideals hitherto, which are one and all hostile to life and ideals that slander the 
world” (GM II, 24). I take it that the bad conscience Nietzsche speaks about here is not 
the primitive form of the bad conscience but its fully moralized guilty form. In other 
words, the suggestion here is that we can use the apparatus of moral guilt that our 
conscience is now equipped with, in order to learn to feel moral outrage at our tendency 
to fall prey to the sorts of dispositions that the ascetic ideal promotes in us. Doing this 
does not require that we posit a new ideal in its stead, but it does require that we not think 













 In several places throughout his published works Nietzsche seems to recommend 
some sort of ideal of wholeness or unity to his readers. Perhaps the most poignant 
formulation of this ideal is the one given in a well known aphorism of the section entitled 
“Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” in Twilight of the Idols.  There Nietzsche praises 
Goethe for being a truly Dionysian spirit who managed to realize in his own self the 
ideals of a higher humanity. “What he wanted,” Nietzsche tells us, “was totality; he 
fought the mutual extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will … he disciplined 
himself to wholeness, he created himself” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 49). Some aphorisms earlier 
he had written that “today the individual still has to be made possible by being pruned: 
possible here means whole” (TI, ‘Skirmishes’, 41). 
 
 We find similar notions expressed in other books too. In Beyond Good and Evil, 
for instance, we are told that today a philosopher “would be compelled to find the 





wholeness in manifoldness” (BGE, 212).72 We hear Zarathustra also advocate an ideal of 
wholeness when he proclaims in one of his discourses: “Physician, heal thyself: then wilt 
thou also heal thy patient. Let it be his best cure to see with his eyes him who maketh 
himself whole” (Z I, The Bestowing Virtue, 2); and even more poignantly when he 
describes himself as one who “walks amongst men as amongst fragments and limbs of 
human beings” and one who aims through all his poetization and aspiration “to compose 
and collect into unity what is fragment and riddle and fearful chance” (Z II, 
Redemption).73 
 
Nor is this preoccupation with wholeness one that lies exclusively in Nietzsche’s 
so called “late period.” The idea can be found expressed in the books of the “middle 
period” as well. In aphorism 78 of The Gay Science, for example, he praises artists for 
having taught us the art of viewing ourselves as heroes, the art of staging and watching 
ourselves, and concludes by suggesting that a similar merit could perhaps be conceded to 
“the religion that made men see the sinfulness of every single individual through a 
magnifying glass … By surrounding him in eternal perspectives, it taught man to see 
himself from a distance as something past and whole” (GS, 78). In Human all Too 
Human, he welcomes and commends the transformation that sees the true sign of 
morality not in the impersonal nature of actions, as has hitherto been the case, but in their 
personal character: “to make a whole person of oneself and keep in mind that person's 
                                                 
72 In aphorism 257 of the same book, Nietzsche seems to suggest that wholeness is a distinctive trait of 
aristocratic natures, one whose history can be traced back to the fact that the predominance of the noble 
caste in primitive societies was not due mainly to their physical strength but to their strength of soul, to 
their being “wholer men (ganzeren Menschen)”. 
 
73 Zarathustra will recall this point later in the third part of the book, where we find him saying: “I taught 
them all my poetization and aspiration: to compose into unity what is fragment in man, and riddle and 





greatest good in everything one does—this takes us further than any pitying impulses and 
actions for the sake of others” (HAH I, 95). 
 
 Yet, despite the undeniable presence of this ideal in Nietzsche’s work, his concern 
with wholeness has received little direct attention in the secondary literature. Part of the 
explanation for this is familiar enough. Nietzsche rarely treats a topic in a sustained 
manner, which coupled with the fragmented, aphoristic style of his writing, makes the 
task of interpreting his allusions to an ideal of wholeness extremely difficult. The 
situation is aggravated by the fact that, even if the ideal is clearly present throughout all 
the periods of his productive life, the unambiguous and direct references to this ideal in 
Nietzsche’s published work seem few and far between. Moreover, the most popular of 
these references is the one with which I began. Perhaps influenced by an excessive 
reliance on this aphorism from Twilight of the Idols, which seems to establish a relation 
of equivalence between creating oneself and realizing an ideal of wholeness of some sort, 
commentators have tended to assume without argument that becoming whole is just 
another way of naming that ideal that looms much more emphatically over Nietzsche’s 
writings: the ideal of becoming who or what one is. The result is that most of the focus 
has centered on trying to understand what it means to become who one is in a way that 
derivatively allows us to make sense of the injunction to become whole. In other words, 
the tendency has been to explain the injunction to wholeness in the light of an 






In this paper I propose to reverse this order of explanation. I want to see if there is 
some interpretation of the ideal of wholeness in the offing that can stand on its own, and 
that, perhaps, can then be used to shed some light on what becoming what one is might 
mean. In pursuing this strategy, I do not take myself to be arguing against the claim that 
these are just two different names for the same ideal. They may well amount in the end to 
the same thing, but I prefer to initially treat them as separate and to concentrate on the 
one that purports to be about wholeness. In order to do this, I will set my investigation 
against the background of what I take to be the most influential and current 
interpretations of the injunction to become whole, bearing in mind that they are not 
necessarily consciously intended as interpretations of this ideal. I will distinguish two 
broad camps: one that has a more or less well established tradition and whose principal 
exponent is perhaps Alexander Nehamas, and another that, though not yet fully 
articulated, seems to be looming in the horizon and has begun to gain strength in the 
figure of those who defend a “scientific naturalist” Nietzsche and whose main spokesmen 
are perhaps Mathias Risse and Brian Leiter. After briefly presenting these interpretations 
I will turn to an examination of Nietzsche’s most sustained discussion on this topic, 
namely, that which is found in his Untimely Meditations. Because it is located in 
Nietzsche’s “early period,” the interpretation of the ideal of wholeness that I will provide 
faces some difficulties that I will raise at the end of this paper and which, though I may 
not be able to fully answer, I will nonetheless attempt to deflate to some extent. 
 
 Let me turn then to the first camp, which I will call the “aesthetic” camp, and to 










 The guiding thought of Nehamas’s interpretation consists in the suggestion that 
Nietzsche’s model for understanding the world and the objects within it – both organic 
and inorganic – is the literary text and the rules that govern its structure, interpretation 
and composition (Nehamas, 1985: 90). One virtue of Nehamas’s view is that, by 
deploying this model, he is able to construct a compelling reading of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy that accounts for the notoriously obscure doctrines of the Will to Power and 
the Eternal Recurrence in an integrated and coherent way. On his reading the Will to 
Power is understood as a doctrine about the inextricable interconnectedness of everything 
in the world, while the Eternal Recurrence amounts to a psychological doctrine about the 
                                                 
74 Above I said that the ideal of wholeness, while widely recognized as part of Nietzsche’s moral 
psychology, for the most part has not been treated as a topic of its own, but has been handled tangentially in 
conjunction with the interpretation of becoming who or what one is. One exception in this regard is the 
important study by Lucy Huskinson, Nietzsche and Jung: the Whole Self in the Union of Opposites, which 
actually alludes to a concept of wholeness in its very title (see Huskinson, 2004). Huskinson’s book 
belongs to a tradition of commentators that have sought to explore the relation between Nietzsche’s thought 
and psychoanalysis; people such as Paul Bishop (1995) , Graham Parkes (1994), and, especially, Patricia 
Dixon (1999) whose work Huskinson engages with the most, in a relation of both opponent and ally, 
characterizing her own arguments as more thorough and profound explorations of the sort of aim pursued 
by Dixon: the aim of demonstrating that the quest for wholeness, which is the central theme in Jung’s work, 
is also the principal thread that runs through the entire fabric of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Because of its 
roots in psychoanalysis, this tradition interprets the ideal of wholeness as an ideal of psychic unity or 
integration. In turn, this means that the sort of interpretations offered by these commentators, and, in 
particular, that offered by Huskinson, share many features with Nehamas’s own. Since the latter is rooted 
more squarely in the philosophical tradition and is also better known, I have chosen it as representative of 
the camp I will be discussing first, instead of focusing on Huskinson’s study which might seem prima facie 
to be more relevant given the topic I am exploring here. When appropriate, I will refer to Huskinson’s 
book. Here it suffices to say that one important difference between the two is that Huskinson tries to 
incorporate the notion that there is an unconscious and irrational element to the process of becoming whole, 






nature of the self according to which the self is something that has to be created through 
the integration of everything that one has done into a coherent whole. I cannot do full 
justice here to Nehamas’s arguments for these claims, but I will briefly characterize the 
place the two doctrines occupy in Nehamas’s understanding of the process of self-
creation. 
 
 The main lesson Nehamas’s draws from Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Will to Power 
is that the world is not constituted by metaphysically abiding substances or unities. The 
world is a world of becoming in which everything is essentially interconnected and in 
constant flux. If any sort of permanence can be discerned and if we can speak of “things” 
in the world, it is because of the effects of the activity that constitutes the world at its 
most fundamental level, the activity Nietzsche calls Will to Power. This activity 
determines the fundamental character of objects in the world: those objects are 
constituted by the sum of the effects they have on other objects which in turn are 
constituted by the sum of the effects they have on other objects, and so on (Nehamas, 
1985: 79-81). Although this sum provides a kind of unity to the objects in question, it is 
in no way equivalent to a metaphysical unity, since said sum is constantly altering during 
the life-span of the object and nothing is left over beyond it. 
 
This interpretation shapes in important ways Nehamas’s subsequent discussion of 
the process of self-creation. Since the self is also an object in the world, for Nehamas the 
problem becomes how to understand meaningfully Nietzsche’s idea that the self can and 





unity. Nehamas’s solution is to distinguish between the sort of unity the self has as part of 
the world and the psychological unity that it can achieve by the process of self-creation. 
Strictly speaking, as part of the world, the self is simply the totality of its experiences and 
actions, understood as the effects of its activity on other objects, including other selves, 
and the effects of those objects on it. For Nehamas, this means that there is no way to 
distinguish noteworthy from inconsequential actions and experiences, since all of them 
without exception are essential to who and what one is. But if this is true from the 
perspective of the world as Will to Power, there is still room, psychologically speaking, 
to shape the nature of the self, for the significance of one’s actions and experiences can 
still be variable and, thus, what nature they serve to constitute is, according to Nehamas, 
always an open question (Nehamas, 1985: 154-158). The variation is introduced by the 
way in which each person interprets the actions that attach to his own life, by the way in 
which he fits those actions into a pattern that is characteristic of his own conduct as he 
understands it or wishes it to be. 
 
On Nehamas’s story, then, the self-creation that Nietzsche espouses consists in 
the interpretative act of accepting everything that one has done and blending it into a 
coherent whole that is so unified that nothing can be removed from it without making that 
whole crumble (Nehamas, 1985: 191). For Nehamas, the limiting case of this act of 
integration is given by the test of Eternal Recurrence. If the person is willing to repeat his 
life exactly as it has been without removing anything from it, then he must have 
assembled everything he has done into a unity that merits such acceptance. The mark of a 





constitutes who one is and to accept responsibility for it. Our freedom in self-creation 
manifests itself in our not wanting things to be otherwise (Nehamas, 1985: 190-191). 
According to Nehamas, this is precisely the sort of achievement Nietzsche credits Goethe 
for realizing in the aforementioned passage from Twilight of the Idols. 
 
 For our purposes, the chief thing to emphasize about this interpretation is the 
particular character of the ideal of wholeness or unity that Nehamas arrives at and 
attributes to Nietzsche. The unity that is emblematic of a successful process of self-
creation is one that consists in a kind of psychic refashioning or restructuring whose 
primary goal is the organization of the various parts that comprise the personality of each 
individual into a coherent and harmonious whole. Following a suggestion in Zarathustra, 
Nehamas claims that the correct analog for this kind of unity is provided by the organism, 
more precisely, by the body. The body, when working properly, is a multiplicity that is 
organized harmoniously: the various parts have needs and fulfill purposes that are not, 
usually, in conflict with each other but rather work together to ensure the proper 
functioning of the organism as a whole. As it is with the body, so it should be with the 
soul. It too should consist in the coordination and cooperation of its multiple elements, 
which in this case comprise things like instincts, desires, thoughts, and actions. One 
important difference with the body is that in the soul those elements often conflict with 
each other. However, when the soul has been properly unified, this multiplicity is 
controlled and a higher order accord is imposed among the different aspects of the 






 As I mentioned previously, this has probably been the most influential 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s practical philosophy to date. To be sure, many 
commentators take issue with various aspects of Nehamas’s reconstruction, but they tend 
to agree with the two main features of his reading: the first is that Nietzsche recommends 
an ideal of agency (that, for our purposes, turns out to be also an ideal of unity or 
wholeness) which consists in some kind of psychic organization of the personality; and 
the second is that this organization is not something given to the agent naturally, but 
something that he must freely achieve through a process of self-creation.75 The second of 
these features is the main target of the other camp I will discuss here and which, for 
convenience’s sake, I will call the “naturalist” camp. 
 
 Perhaps the person that has done the most to advance a “naturalist” interpretation 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy of the sort relevant for our purposes here is Brian Leiter.76 
According to Leiter, Nietzsche belongs to a tradition of philosophers who were greatly 
influenced by the methods and principles of the natural sciences and adopted a 
thoroughgoing materialist outlook in their theorizing. The main tenet of Leiter’s position 
is that Nietzsche should be construed as a causal essentialist, that is, as someone who 
believes that there are essential properties that necessarily determine the space of possible 
trajectories that a person can traverse in his lifetime. Under this interpretation, 
Nietzsche’s injunction to become who or what one is, turns out to be a description of the 
process whereby a person becomes what, according to his essential attributes, he was 
                                                 
75See, for example, Schacht (1992); Gemes and Janaway (2006). 
 





always causally determined to become (Leiter, 2002).77 On Leiter’s interpretation, then, 
Nietzsche’s commitment to naturalism leads him to reject altogether the concept of free 
will and the cluster of notions associated with it, such as those of guilt and responsibility. 
Instead of understanding himself in terms of those categories, a person who endorses 
Nietzsche’s doctrines learns to conceive of himself – in Nietzschean parlance – as an 
utterly necessary being, as a piece of destiny.78 Such a person will replace the usual 
explanations of agential behaviors (his own and that of others) with naturalistic 
descriptions that capture the phenomena in physiological and biological terms. 
  
However, since it is undeniable that Nietzsche emphasizes the themes of freedom 
and self-creation in his philosophy, to be complete this “naturalist” interpretation must 
also provide a revisionist account of those concepts, one that can preserve the meaningful 
usage Nietzsche gives them while, at the same time, placing them within a perspective 
that answers traditional philosophical questions on the basis of a scientific or naturalistic 
outlook. Thus, for instance, Leiter interprets Nietzsche’s description of the sovereign 
individual as “autonomous” in the second treatise of the Genealogy of Morals in a way 
                                                 
77 Although I say “causally determine,” Leiter is careful to point out that the causal determinism involved 
here need not be understood as including a commitment to the existence of laws of nature. This is what 
distinguishes it, according to Leiter, from classical determinism which usually involves belief in such laws. 
Nonetheless, the main point remains the same in both positions, namely, that a person’s so called free 
choices are the necessary result of causal processes over which they have no control, regardless of whether 
such processes are governed by laws of nature or not. 
 
78 A significant portion of the textual support that is used in defense of this “naturalist” interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy is found in various sections of Twilight of the Idols. Apart from the passages on 
Goethe found in the section “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, which I will discuss shortly, two other 
excerpts are used to buttress the reading I am discussing here: one is found in the section “Morality as Anti-
Nature” where Nietzsche says that “the single human being is a piece of fatum from the front and from the 
rear, one law more, one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be” (TI, ‘Morality’, 6); the other is 
taken from the section “The Four Great Errors” in which Nietzsche asserts that “one is necessary, one is a 
piece of destiny, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole” (TI, ‘Errors’, 8; translation altered). I flag 





that fits Nietzsche’s alleged “naturalism” by insisting that he is using familiar terms in 
unfamiliar ways: for Leiter autonomy in this case simply means necessity and regularity 
of behavior (Leiter, 2002: 227-228).79 Another somewhat more elaborate version of this 
highly revisionist strategy is offered by Mathias Risse, who shares Leiter’s “naturalist” 
perspective and has written a number of essays in defense of this reading of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. In order to explain how Nietzsche can be a philosopher of freedom while 
also being a determinist and an incompatibilist, Risse develops a Spinozistic 
interpretation according to which freedom is measured in terms of degrees of power 
possessed by the agent (Risse, 2007: 75).80 Said degrees of power are causally 
determined in their entirety and consists in the increase in the number of causal relations 
that run through the agent. 
 
But what about the ideal that is the focus of our investigation? If the “naturalist” 
camp offers a revisionist account of the Nietzschean concepts associated with the notions 
of self-creation and freedom, how does it interpret his ideal of wholeness? To my 
knowledge the only one who has tackled this issue is Risse. In a couple of articles 
devoted to the critique of Kantian ethics and the advancement of a Nietzschean 
alternative, Risse touches on the problem of wholeness. Importantly, for Risse this 
problem is part of a more general issue that has to do with the unity of agency, or with the 
answer to the question of what allows an agent to think of himself as one agent (Risse, 
                                                 
79 To advance this claim Leiter needs to equate the sovereign individual with the individual that is the result 
of the prolonged labor of the morality of custom, an equation that has become commonplace among 
commentators of the Genealogy. I argue against this interpretation in Chapter two. 
 
80 It is not at all in clear in my mind why this camp wants to make Nietzsche into an incompatibilist and not 
a compatibilist or why the revisionist strategy does not amount to a compatibilist view. I obviously leave it 





2007: 76-80). More specifically, the ideal of wholeness is the complement to Nietzsche’s 
conception of agential unity as the joint presence in one body of a complex structure of 
drives and affects with shared memories and cognitive capacities. What the realization of 
the ideal of wholeness signals is a particular instance of this kind of agential unity or 
integration; one that Risse calls Wohlgeratenheit – well-turn-out-ness (Risse, 2007: 77). 
The ideally unified agent exhibits a kind of physiological co-functionality within his 
organism: in him, everything works well together; he is mentally and physiologically 
well-balanced and stable (Ibid.). According to Risse, the individual who has turned out 
well is characterized by the successful integration of various elements of his personality 
into a single pattern and the absence of internal psychological and physiological turmoil. 
The chief example in this regard is again Goethe. Risse emphasizes two things about 
Nietzsche’s description of Goethe in the aforementioned passage of Twilight of the Idols: 
on the one hand, Goethe instantiates a healthy self-centeredness and self-assuredness that 
manifests itself in the integration of various parts of his personality into a whole through 
which he is able to find peace of mind and to rest in himself; on the other hand, Goethe is 
a fatalist who comprehends and accepts his place in the causal web that comprises the 
whole universe (Risse, 2007: 78-79). For Risse, this second aspect of Nietzsche’s ideal of 
wholeness supports the first: the person who has turned out well is able to self-assuredly 
rest in himself because he embraces a fatalistic attitude through which he understands 
himself as a part of a causal web that relieves him of any thoughts of responsibility, 






This fatalistic feature is one that sets Risse’s reading most at odds with the 
aesthetic interpretation we discussed previously. Indeed, what distinguishes both camps is 
that the former, but not the latter, believes that wholeness is an achievement attributable 
to the free agency of the person. However, despite this important difference, both camps 
share certain things in common: on the one hand, for both the ideal of wholeness is an 
ideal of psychic unity and integration; it consists in the harmonious structuring of the 
mental phenomena that comprise the person and make up his personality. On the other, 
both interpret this psychic integration as a sort of backward-looking event. For both 
camps wholeness is solely the result of the interplay of past and present considerations, or 
the working out of the past in the present: for Nehamas it consists in the active unification 
of one’s past with one’s present, while for Risse it consists in the fortunate, but wholly 
passive, manifestation of past physiological determinants in one’s present state of being. 
What is absent in both positions is the notion that the future may play an important role in 
the person’s process of becoming whole.81 As we shall see later this is an important 




 Having set these two frameworks in place, we can now test them against 
Nietzsche’s earlier preoccupation with wholeness in his Untimely Mediations. One 
striking feature of these four books is that infused throughout them all is a concept that 
also seems to lie at the heart of the ideal of wholeness, namely the concept of unity. The 
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actions that one may perform could prove to be impossible to unify or integrate with the self one has 





notion of unity had, of course, already played an important role in Nietzsche’s first 
published book, The Birth of Tragedy. There it figures prominently in descriptions of the 
phenomenon of the Dionysian: an artistic, religious and metaphysical element or reality 
in which the person is stripped of his individuality and absorbed back into the Primordial 
One, where he finds redemption in a mystic feeling of unity with nature and his fellow 
men. What I think is distinctive about Nietzsche’s discussion of unity both in The Birth of 
Tragedy and in the Untimely Meditations, is its connection to the theme of redemption: 
unity is the thing that justifies the individual person’s life, that gives meaning to his being 
and furnishes some type of consolation in the face of the absurdity of existence and death. 
This provides an important clue for understanding the ideal of wholeness and I will return 
to it later. 
  
In the first meditation, entitled David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer, the 
concept of unity appears briefly, but significantly, in Nietzsche’s bold and strange thesis 
that “culture is, above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of the life of a 
people” (UM I, 1). Nietzsche uses this definition to castigate the false complacency of the 
“cultivated” German nationalists who – following the foundation of the second German 
Reich in the aftermath of Prussia’s victory over France in the Franco-Prussian war – were 
convinced that world events had proven the superiority of their culture and had 
vindicated the greatness of German taste and ideas. Against these conceited and self-
deluded chauvinists, Nietzsche argued that there was no culture to speak of in Germany. 
Instead, he claimed, one found a fragmented and pastiche society, resting merely on 






Although in this first meditation Nietzsche does not bother to elaborate or explain 
what he means by his somewhat cryptic definition of culture, he reaffirms it again in the 
next book, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. This time Nietzsche took 
special care to warn the reader not to misunderstand this definition as implying an 
antithesis between beautiful and barbaric style; as if having a culture meant simply 
exhibiting a uniformity of pleasing and beautiful modes of aesthetic expression or an 
agreement in artistic techniques. This constitutes a superficial way of rendering the thesis. 
Instead, Nietzsche insists that “what is meant [by this thesis] is that a people to whom one 
attributes a culture has to be in all reality a single living unity and not fall wretchedly 
apart into inner and outer, content and form” (UM II, 4). What does Nietzsche mean by 
this statement? And how can one tell whether a living unity among these things (content 
and form) exists or has been achieved? Interestingly, Nietzsche discusses these issues in 
the context of furthering the indictment that “cultivated” Germans and German culture in 
general suffer from a “weak personality.” What defines this weakness in personality is 
precisely the antithesis between interior and exterior: to be weak is to incarnate a being in 
which content and form fail to correspond to one another (Ibid.). 
 
 How exactly is it that this failure of correspondence manifests itself? The answer 
Nietzsche gives to this question in the second meditation is bound up with a complicated 
argument about history and its relation to the individual human being, as it has come to 
be understood and practiced by modern historiographers. I cannot do full justice to that 





Nietzsche’s quarrel with contemporary historians in this work boils down to the claim 
that they pose a real threat to life because they have made history into a positivistic 
science that is concerned with knowledge of the past for its own sake: modern historians 
have transformed history into an exercise for emasculated individuals, who suck the life 
out of everything that they touch and are at the brink of becoming walking corpses 
themselves (Ibid.). These individuals reveal their weakness precisely in their incapacity 
to put history into creative use and their tendency to turn history itself into a creative 
wasteland; their weakness is a kind of impotence. As Nietzsche provokingly puts it, “this 
is a race of eunuchs, and to a eunuch one woman is like another, simply a woman, 
woman in herself” (UM II, 5). The sexual language that Nietzsche employs here is no 
accident. Truth – all truth; whether historical, or biological, or psychological, and so on – 
is a woman82, Nietzsche asserts: it desires individuals who are strong enough to conquer 
and engender something out of her; it wants to be inseminated and give birth to the 
future. 
 
Here Nietzsche is sounding a theme that he will continue to hammer throughout 
his intellectual life: that the unconditional will to truth, the pursuit of truth at all costs and 
for its own sake, is a sign of sickness.83 It is worth dwelling a little further on this point, 
since this sickness is equivalent to the weakness of personality we are searching after. By 
focusing on it we can hopefully uncover and be able to understand the failure of 
correspondence between content and form that so worries Nietzsche. Surmising the 
arguments in the second meditation, I think one can extract the following ways in which 
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the unconditional will to truth manifests itself in modern historiography: first, it foments 
a mistaken notion of “objectivity” according to which to be objective means having a 
disinterested relation to one’s object of study (UM II, 6). The investigator of history 
according to this model should be a dispassionate spectator of past and present events; he 
should capture them as they happened or are happening without ever interposing his own 
subjectivity (or personality) in the matter. His operations should be analogous to those of 
a photographic camera that generates, through a purely passive medium, true 
reproductions of the phenomena it captures (Ibid.). This objectivity, Nietzsche claims, 
leads historians “to tolerance, to allowing validity to what they cannot deny happened, to 
explaining away and extenuating” (Ibid.); characteristics, he claims, that are often 
interpreted as indications that historians possess the highest virtue of all, namely, justice. 
But this interpretation is of course mistaken: the type of objectivity that modern 
historians are proud of has nothing to do with true justice.84 To be just, according to 
Nietzsche, is to exercise power of judgment correctly, and this is opposite to being 
“disinterested”. On the contrary, the individual who imparts justice is someone who, far 
from according equal validity to everything that happened, is in the business of 
discriminating and appraising the past in order to adjudicate and evaluate its importance. 
“Only superior strength can judge,” Nietzsche claims, “weakness is obliged to tolerate” 
(Ibid.). 
 
The second and related feature of modern history that Nietzsche decries is its 
preoccupation with the accumulation of facts. Contemporary history pursues two tasks 
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that are related to this feature and it pursues them as if they were ends in themselves: one 
results from treating history on the model of the natural sciences and consists in the goal 
of uncovering the “laws of history”, those generalizations that explain human actions in 
terms analogous to the mechanisms that operate in the natural world, of which human 
history is simply a subdivision (Ibid.). The other is the collection of the events that are 
underlain by such laws in a comprehensive registry or encyclopedia of history that, going 
back to Nietzsche’s metaphor above, can be likened to a photographic album in which all 
the empirically veridical moments of reality are contained and displayed (UM II, 4). The 
essential problem with these two tasks is similar to the one contained in the modern 
notion of “objectivity” and that is that they constitute purely passive attitudes with 
respect to the past. Nietzsche insists that the importance of history cannot reside in 
uncovering banal generalizations about human behavior that do not mean anything to the 
person who studies them, other than as curious trinkets of knowledge to be talked about; 
instead the value of history lies in taking past events and extracting meaningful and 
comprehensive symbols from them that “[disclose] in the original theme a whole world 
of profundity, power and beauty” (UM II, 6).85 Past events should be appropriated by the 
historian in order to produce “effects”, they should not become the objects of pure 
“critical” musings that only generate further “critical” musings and that leave everything 
as it was before (UM II, 5). For the same reason, the goal of the historian cannot be to 
simply collect information about what has happened. Insofar as history is used in this 
way, it contributes to foment a form of spiritual dyspepsia that leads again to stagnation. 
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As Nietzsche puts it, “knowledge, consumed without a hunger for it and even counter to 
one’s needs, now no longer acts as an agent for transforming the outside world but 
remains concealed within a chaotic inner world” (UM II, 4). The problem with an 
unconditional pursuit of knowledge and truth, then, is physiological: it is like ingesting 
things that do not stimulate the organism’s nourishment, but lay rumbling or dormant in 
the belly. 
 
Finally, Nietzsche focuses on a third feature of modern history that he thinks is 
symptomatic of the weakness of personality afflicting German culture, namely, its total 
submission to Hegelianism. On this view, history is seen as a narrative of the progressive 
unfolding of reason and freedom. It is the account of how the human race emerged from 
primitive chaos and barbarism and gradually developed with logical necessity into the 
highest and strongest form of order and civilization. On this interpretation, modern 
culture is regarded as the end point and completion of this story, the final rung in which 
genuine freedom is realized and actualized most fully (UM II, 8). For Nietzsche, the 
effect of this type of conception of oneself and one’s relation to history is of the worst 
kind, since it makes us utterly passive and resigned to accept things as they are. He insists 
that in itself there is nothing wrong with considering oneself a latecomer of previous 
ages, insofar as this serves as a spur for life and leads to action; otherwise, it is a danger 
and a disease. Worst of all when we not only consider ourselves the inheritors of the past, 
the necessary fruit of a historical process, but with unbridled pride elevate ourselves to 
the godlike status of perfected beings in which the ultimate goal of world-history is 





it an ironic self-awareness that eventually leads to a cynicism and to a practical egoism 
that destroys the forces of life. The irony is that deep down the modern historian knows 
that there is nothing to rejoice about in this alleged self-completion of history, and he 
harbors the presentiment that our hopes and energies may not survive into the future (UM 
II, 9). Many find refuge from this awareness and fear by taking a step further and 
embracing a cynical attitude that Nietzsche finds epitomized in a phrase he takes from 
Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophy of the Unconscious: “the total surrender of the 
personality to the world-process” (Hartmann, 1869: 638). In essence, the cynicism 
inherent in this phrase, as Nietzsche understands it, consists in the belief that the 
individual is nothing but a cog in the machine of the world-process which will be served 
no matter what the individual does or fails to do (Ibid.).  For Hartmann there is a promise 
of redemption that comes with the realization of the utter powerlessness of the individual: 
the redemption from the suffering and absurdity of existence by the painlessness of non-
being, by the complete extinction of the personality, by the cultural nihilism of the will to 
nothingness. In my view, all this anticipates the theme of the third treatise of the 
Genealogy of Morals on the ascetic ideal, whose fundamental character and goal is 
precisely the will to nothingness. 
 
Although earlier Nietzsche had announced a connection between this cynical 
mood and the development of a practical egoism that paralyzes and destroys the forces of 
life86, by the time he gets around to discussing it, he does not actually develop that 
connection in detail.  In the last sections of the meditation he simply asserts that this kind 
of historical approach he has been discussing (bent on writing history from the standpoint 
                                                 





of the masses and the laws that move them), prepares the way for “systems of 
individualist egoism, brotherhoods for the rapacious exploitation of the non-brothers, and 
similar creations of utilitarian vulgarity” (UM II, 9). And he laments later on that 
“mankind seems near to discovering that the egoism of individuals, groups or the masses 
has at all times been the lever of the movements of history; at the same time, however, 
this discovery has caused no perturbation of any kind, but on the contrary it has now been 
decreed: egoism shall be our god” (Ibid.). What Nietzsche fails to explain, however, is 
how these things are connected; an explanation that is made all the more urgent given the 
previous analysis: after all, as we just saw, Nietzsche believes that modern history 
foments cultural nihilism, that is, it furthers a will to nothingness that spells out the utter 
extinction of the personality, the annihilation of all individual willing. But now he seems 
to contradict this claim by suggesting that modern history actually leads to an 
exacerbated egoism that prima facie seems to be the opposite of a renunciation of all 
individual willing. Is there a way to reconcile these two views? 
 
 To answer this question we need to take a step back and observe that the thing 
that unites all these criticisms that we have been discussing is Nietzsche’s preoccupation 
with the way modern historical practice contributes to a dangerous passivity of the will. 
This is the essence of that weakness of personality whose scrutiny we hoped would allow 
us to interpret Nietzsche’s claims about unity (between inner and outer, content and 
form). But what does this passivity of the will have to do with the petty egoism Nietzsche 
speaks about towards the end of the second meditation? What does it have to do with 





to a will to nothingness, whose fundamental character, at the individual level, crops up as 
a renunciation of the personality. Such a renunciation can take place in a variety of ways. 
I have mentioned some already: for instance, as a completely disinterested pursuit of truth 
and knowledge; or as the adoption of a purely contemplative disposition toward the past; 
or as the disposition to become tolerant of everyone and everything and to relinquish 
one’s power of judgment; or as the lack of belief in one’s capacity to affect things (the 
cynical attitude); to name a few. But this renunciation of the will can also manifest itself 
in a slavish tendency to adopt the received conventions of society and in the individual’s 
complacent search after comfort and ease. This latter permutation is the one that I think 
links the will to nothingness to the petty practical egoism that Nietzsche attributes to our 
modern nihilistic culture. Modern life is ruled and defined by the pursuit of individual 
wellbeing and pleasure: what people desire is relief from the exigencies of life. If we 
labor, it is in order to procure the monetary security that will allow us to comfortably 
afford those things that we take to be the ultimate goals of life, namely, food, shelter, 
recreation, and the like. For Nietzsche, this means that we are preoccupied with a life that 
has been degraded to the most vulgar level, a life that mistakenly believes that the 
maximization of happiness and of egoistic concerns can justify and give meaning to one’s 
existence. This is a life whose overarching goal is not action, but rather the opposite of 
action: rest. As such, it is a life that is geared toward a practical egoism that, in common 
with the cynical mood we discussed earlier, seeks the renunciation of the personality and 






Instead of seeking to give expression to his individuality by revealing in external 
form his interior self, the person who settles for this kind of life loses himself in the 
pursuit of goals that are meant to satiate or satisfy his animal nature, that is, the part of 
him that is less suited to make him distinct or to manifest his own creative willing.87 
Notice that this means that the practical egoism that Nietzsche is talking about shares 
with the unconditional will to truth a general incapacity to nourish or stimulate the spirit 
into creative activity. The goal in both cases is either to appease the interior self that 
seeks to express itself in outward movement or to fill it with things that will simply 
rumble in its entrails, keeping it distracted from becoming a unity (i.e. finding a form that 
will truly correspond to his own interior). I think this also allows us to see that the failure 
of correspondence we have been investigating is a kind of evasion of responsibility. Each 
of us has been endowed with an interior that is uniquely our own, a spiritual nature that 
must be expressed outwardly in an authentic fashion. Unifying oneself, then, is a matter 
of being true to one’s inner drive and fashioning for it a form that will genuinely 
correspond to it, and in this way manifest one’s unique personality. Failing to do so is, in 
a sense, failing to execute a task that has been entrusted to each of us alone. Since it is a 
task that is always within our reach, the individual that persists in being a fragmented 
entity in which outer form fails to correspond to an inner content, is guilty of this failure 
                                                 
87 In this connection it is worth remembering that the second meditation begins with a reflection about 
animal happiness and its relation to the capacity to live unhistorically (see UM II, 1). Nietzsche claims that 
this kind of happiness is no longer possible for us because we also have an obverse capacity to live 
historically (to remember and recycle lived experience). This is why human beings often envy the 
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the animal level again means renouncing our own uniqueness and living a life that is false and inauthentic. 
According to Nietzsche, instead of doing this what we need to do is find the right balance between the 
historical and unhistorical aspects of our being. See also UM III, 5, where Nietzsche claims that “man is 





and can thus be described as living a life that is in constant flight from responsibility and 
maturity; a life that is, in Nietzschean terms, contrary to all new planting, bold 
experimentation, and free aspiration. 
 
 I think this brief analysis allows us to understand somewhat better Nietzsche’s 
cryptic concept of unity and its opposite, the failure of correspondence between inner and 
outer, content and form. Since the weakness of personality is in a kind of escapism that 
seeks to avoid active and independent willing, the failure of correspondence Nietzsche is 
referring to consists, as I have indicated, in a failure to manifest in outward form, that is, 
by way of action, one’s innermost drive to freedom and responsibility. In other words, by 
the inner content that can fail to find correspondence in an outer form, I take Nietzsche to 
mean the person’s will itself and the energies that compose it. When those energies are 
manifested in a healthy manner, the outer form of the individual becomes a true 
expression of that will, and the person can be said to possess a genuine (as opposed to a 
false or borrowed) personality. Using terms that Nietzsche would later employ in a more 
self-conscious manner, one could say that this inner aspect of the person is the will to 
power, that spontaneous, aggressive, form-giving force88 that does not simply want to 
endure or propagate itself, but, more fundamentally, seeks to expand itself by pouring 
itself into outward movement; a force that wants to appropriate and exploit other forces in 
order to express itself more fully and with greater vigor. The strong person is the one who 
possesses the self-discipline to channel the river of this force effectively;89 by contrast, 
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the weak person seeks to dam this force; he wants to contain it and quiet it down, to 
pacify or subjugate it into a state of quietism and self-cancellation. Accordingly, if the 
weak, chaotic personality encourages an inauthentic culture (i.e. cultural nihilism) that is 
oriented toward making life more comfortable and self-complacent (a culture obsessed 
with entertainment and conventions), the strong, unified personality must be the engine of 
genuine culture; its productive activity must constitute and guarantee the wholeness or 
harmonious unity of both the individual person and the culture in which he operates. 
 
But what is this productive activity?  What is the action or act that should be the 
overarching goal of the individual? Thus far the analysis has been mostly negative: I have 
tried to draw near to this positive activity of the will by way of Nietzsche’s description of 
what it is not like. This has permitted us to see that the activity or act that manifests a 
unity between inner and outer must consists in a proper or healthy channeling of the 
essential energy (or will to power) that lies at the core of the individual, into some outer 
form that truly corresponds to it or that represents it fully.  But this does not tell us how 
Nietzsche thinks such a channeling happens or even what sort of act is the one in which a 
form corresponding to the individual’s content is brought to life. To flesh this out we 




Before exploring this issue, let me recapitulate and emphasize what I take to be 





the first two meditations is to combat the disunity between content and form that is 
characteristic of modern societies and therefore also of the individuals that inhabit them. 
These individuals and these societies are weak in the sense that they do not reveal who 
they are in their outward forms, but remain concealed in everything they do. Their 
chaotic and fragmented inwardness (an inwardness that seems to search in vain for a form 
in which to reveal itself) leads thus to the renunciation of their unique personality and 
individuality, it leads to the loss of their own true selves. To that extent, I think it is 
warranted to interpret the search for unity that Nietzsche wants to defend as a search for 
wholeness. The ideal of wholeness is the ideal of restoring the proper unity between 
content and form that is characteristic of the strong person and of genuine culture (since 
culture, recall, is the unity of a people: what prevents them from falling apart into outer 
and inner. In other words, it is the outward expression of their true inner soul or the 
genuine revelation of who they are). This also means that in becoming whole the person 
will express his independence and autonomy, that is, he will stop being the plaything of 
other powers that keep him fragmented and prevent him from revealing his unique 
inwardness, and will instead take charge of his life by manufacturing a genuine form for 
his inner content, one that can truly express who he is. We will be able to appreciate this 
connection more fully once we explore the question of how this unity or wholeness is 
restored or achieved in the first place. How can individual inwardness find genuine 
expression in outward activity? It is to this question that I now turn. 
 
 In order to delve into this issue, let me pick up another thread from the second 





the weak personality is unable to take real things seriously, and equates the chaotic, 
fragmented nature of this personality with insensibility, a condition of emotional atrophy 
in which existence and the real produce only a slight impression in the person (UM II, 4). 
This emotional incapacity turns out to be one of the chief reasons why history is 
dangerous in the hands of weak personalities. The danger, once again, lies in a possible 
loss of one’s sense of self. “The reason,” Nietzsche claims, “is that history confuses the 
feelings and sensibility when these are not strong enough to assess the past by 
themselves. He who no longer dares to trust himself but involuntarily asks of history 
‘How ought I to feel about this?’ finds that his timidity gradually turns him into an actor 
and that he is playing a role, usually indeed many roles and therefore playing them badly 
and superficially” (UM II, 5). The sense of self that Nietzsche is worried may get lost 
here is intimately bound up with a capacity to be affected by things and to know how to 
feel about them. The weak person cannot trust his own feelings and this leads him to the 
nihilistic condition we discussed above; it leads him to capitulate and to surrender his 
personality to other forces, like those of the state, or religion, or some ideology or other. 
Such a person learns how to feel about things according to the dictates of these forces and 
the ideas they espouse regarding what should be one’s proper attitudes and reactions. 
Instead of finding his authentic personality and expressing it outwardly, the person hides 
behind masks and becomes a role-player in which no genuine inwardness is revealed, but 
always only an empty shell manufactured by one part or thread of himself that has been 
beguiled to pledge allegiance to one of these external forces. The outward movement of 





revelation of the totality of the interior but only a feeble or crude attempt on the part of 
one or other of these threads to pose as being the whole” (UM II, 4). 
 
For Nietzsche, nowhere is this phenomenon of self-renunciation more pronounced 
than in German culture. He is concerned that soon we will be forced to conclude that the 
Germans have been ruined by history and are only capable of feeling in abstractions. This 
conclusion, he thinks,  
 
would destroy at its roots all hope of a future national culture: for any such hope 
grows out of the belief in the genuineness and immediacy of German feeling, out 
of the belief in a sound and whole inwardness. What is left to hope for or believe 
in if the source of hope and belief is muddied, if inwardness has learned to make 
leaps, dance, to paint itself, to express itself in abstractions and with calculation 
and gradually to lose itself! (UM II, 4). 
 
The incapacity to awaken genuine and immediate feeling lies at the heart of the problem 
of modern culture and its sickness. We are not capable of true feeling because we get lost 
in the web of concepts that we have spun in order to mediate our relation to things.90 
These concepts deafen our sensibility; they make us numb to life and incapable of 
genuine wonder. According to Nietzsche, if there is something that truly distinguishes us 
from the ancient Greeks is precisely this loss of the sense of strangeness and the capacity 
to wonder. In contrasts to the youthful culture of the Greeks, the culture of modern man is 
gray-haired and elderly. We do not know how to approach things with the curiosity of the 
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child, nor are we capable of being moved or awed by life (the kind of awe that gives one 
goose bumps). Instead, we approach things with the clinical, cold, and distant heart of the 
specialist and the spectator of life. 
 
 This issue of genuine feeling connects with two basic ideas that will allow us to 
finally understand the nature of the activity and the act that Nietzsche thinks is the seal of 
wholeness. The first idea is that precisely because we are incapable of being surprised by 
life and incapable of being shaken by the riddle of existence, we are unable to address the 
most fundamental question of all: what justifies our being? Or, what is the same thing, 
how can we give meaning to our existence? Modern man either fails to be summoned by 
and pay heed to this fundamental question, or mistakenly thinks that the answer is rather 
obvious: that existence is given meaning by a political event such as the foundation of the 
Reich, or by winning fame, honor and prizes, or by the accumulation of wealth, or by 
maximizing pleasure, or the like. Nietzsche seems to believe that because we are not 
affected by life in the proper way, because we do not possess the capacity for true feeling, 
we fail to realize that these are not satisfactory answers to that fundamental question. It is 
very telling that the last three mediations all touch in one way or another on this problem 
of existence. After decrying the notion of a goal of world history and calling it laughable 
and presumptuous, Nietzsche writes: 
 
on the other hand, do ask yourself why you, the individual, exist, and if you can 
get no answer try for once to justify the meaning of your existence as it were a 
posteriori by setting before yourself an aim, a goal, a ‘to this end’, an exalted and 
noble ‘to this end’. Perish in the pursuit of this and only this – I know of no better 
aim of life than that of perishing, animae magnae prodigus (prodigal of a great 






And then, again, in the opening sections of the third meditation, Schopenhauer as 
Educator, we read: 
 
The fact of our existing at all in this here-and-now must be the strongest incentive 
to us to live according to our own laws and standards: the inexplicable fact that 
we live precisely today, when we had all infinite time in which to come into 
existence, that we possess only a shortlived today in which to demonstrate why 
and to what end we came into existence now and at no other time. We are 
responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently we want to be the 
true helmsman of this existence and refuse to allow our existence to resemble a 
mindless act of chance (UM III, 1). 
 
Finally, in the fourth and final meditation, Richard Wagner in Bayreuth, Nietzsche claims 
that “he before whom there stands such a nature as Wagner’s is from time to time 
compelled to reflect upon himself, upon his own pettiness and frailty, and to ask himself: 
what would this nature have with you? To what end do you really exist?” (UM IV, 7). 
The issue of the justification of individual existence is thus a crucial axis upon which all 
these mediations revolve. 
 
Recall that earlier I had said that for Nietzsche the notion of unity and wholeness 
is linked to the theme of redemption. The notion of genuine feeling is the point of 
connection of these ideas. When a person possesses the capacity for true feeling, he is so 
attuned to the mystery of existence and its weight that he cannot dismiss lightly the need 
to somehow find justification and meaning. In Nietzsche’s account the ideal of wholeness 
provides the adequate answer and thus redeems the individual from the suffering caused 





the notion of genuine feeling. This consists in the problem of how to reawaken in the 
individual human being the capacity to be moved by things. Nietzsche believes that we 
need to educate ourselves once again to feel properly. For that we must engage in a 
pedagogical reformation aimed at combating the forces of culture that conspire against 
the reawakening of our sensibility.91 If modern culture is bent on dampening our emotive 
faculties in order to transform us as quickly and as effectively as possible into productive 
laborers that can meet the pseudo needs of society, what we require is to enlist the aid of 
educators that can help us to find ourselves again and thereby learn what our true needs 
are. Going by its title, it is obvious that the third meditation deals precisely with this 
topic. However, the issue is nicely and succinctly put in a passage from the fourth 
meditation. There Nietzsche writes: 
 
with the decline of language we are the slaves of words; under this constraint no 
one is any longer capable of revealing himself, of speaking naively, and few are 
capable of preserving their individuality at all in the face of an education which 
believes it demonstrates its success, not in going out to meet clear needs and 
feelings in an educative sense, but in entangling the individual in the net of ‘clear 
concepts’ and teaching him to think correctly: as if there were any sense whatever 
in making of a man a being who thinks and concludes correctly if one has not first 
succeeded in making of him one who feels rightly (UM IV, 5). 
 
I want to draw attention to two things in this passage. The first is that here Nietzsche 
reinstates the thought that self-revelation of one’s individuality (which is in some sense 
the aim of wholeness or the purpose behind the unity of content and form we spoke of 
earlier) is a matter of feeling correctly, something that is made almost impossible by that 
sickness of language we referred to earlier, namely, that we have spun a web of abstract 
                                                 
91 In this connection, it is worth pointing out that, in his early career, Nietzsche was preoccupied by the 






concepts to mediate our relation to things in the world. Instead of aiding us to reveal our 
true inwardness, these concepts confuse our feelings and make it harder for us to really 
know who we are and what we want, thereby impeding us from communicate this 
knowledge outwardly to rest of the world. The second is that Nietzsche asserts that true 
education consists in meeting clear (or genuine) needs. This latter issue is significant 
because the notion of a “true need” is the gateway to an important concept in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and one that plays a crucial role in the ideal of wholeness, namely, the 
concept of “necessity.” 
 
 Indeed, what does Nietzsche mean by one’s true needs? I think we are in a 
position to know what false or pseudo needs look like: they are the sorts of things that we 
normally tend to confuse with our real needs, namely, things like food, shelter, physical 
health, pleasure, professional success, public respect, and so on. To be sure, Nietzsche is 
not suggesting that these things are of no consequence for human life or that they should 
not be pursued. The point is rather that these things must not be pursued as ends in 
themselves, that they should not be confused with the real needs of the individual. The 
latter are the sorts of things that allow the individual to attain wholeness, the things that 
are required for each of us to be able to channel our creative energy outward into the sort 
of action that constitutes a revelation of our unique inwardness. Such things may vary 
depending on our particular situation, but what they have in common is that they are the 
things necessary to avert the loss of our genuine inwardness. For instance, part of the 
burden of the second meditation is to show that since modern man is afflicted by an 





need a dose of the powers Nietzsche calls unhistorical and suprahistorical (UM II, 10). 
Similarly, if a future post-modern culture should find itself, say, afflicted by an excess of 
the unhistorical, then their true needs would be different from ours and the historical 
power which is a danger to us would be the proper medicine for them. 
 
As I stated above, there is an important connection between the notion of a true 
need and the concept of necessity. However, it would be a mistake to think that this 
connection is simply that a true need is what is necessary for authentic expression of 
one’s inwardness. The connection is a bit more complex than that and to explore it let me 
revisit an issue we have repeatedly mentioned, namely, that in our age language is sick 
and in a state of distress. In an important passage from section 5 of the fourth meditation, 
Nietzsche elaborates a bit more on this point. The passage occurs in the midst of a 
discussion about the value and function of modern music. Nietzsche notes: 
 
[Language] is no longer capable of performing that function for the sake of which 
alone it exists: to enable suffering mankind to come to an understanding with one 
another over the simplest needs of life. Man can no longer express his needs and 
distress by means of language, thus he can no longer really communicate at all … 
As soon as men seek to come to an understanding with one another, and to unite 
for a common work, they are seized by the madness of universal concepts, indeed 
even by the mere sounds of words, and, as a consequence of this incapacity to 
communicate, everything they do together bears the mark of this lack of mutual 
understanding, inasmuch as it does not correspond to their real needs but only to 
the hollowness of those tyrannical words and concepts (UM IV, 5). 
 
According to Nietzsche this state of distress of language is the reason why music has 
appeared with such force in the life of modern man. Indeed, he insists that it is a mystery 





our own. The answer to the mystery, however, is that this music is not an accident, but a 
response to the loss of the capacity for communicating one’s true needs; an attempt to 
redress this deficiency by creating art in which genuine feeling becomes audible again. 
And this means that it is “necessity that rules here” (Ibid.). The series of great artists in 
modern music – of which Wagner is supposed to be the latest link in the chain, at least 
for the young Nietzsche –, is a manifestation of the pressing urge or necessity to find a 
way to communicate one’s true needs again. In that sense, the appearance of these artists 
shows “that true music is a piece of fate and primal law; for it is impossible to derive its 
appearance at precisely this time from an empty, meaningless act of chance” (UM IV, 6; 
emphasis added). Notice that the notion of necessity is being contrasted here with the 
concept of chance, accident or arbitrariness.92 Necessity is not the opposite of freedom, 
nor is it compulsion or causal determination. Instead, the notion of necessity captures the 
pressing urge to oppose the contingency that operates in nature and in which one blindly 
lives one’s life, and to take charge of one’s own self, heeding one’s true needs, and 
thereby truly revealing one’s own uniqueness or inwardness. As such, the notion of 
necessity (and indeed, the notion of fate) is intimately bound up with the manifestation of 
one’s true needs, whose realization signals the achievement of wholeness. What I take 
this to mean is that by becoming whole and manifesting his true needs the person 
becomes the helmsman of his own life and successfully triumphs over contingency and 
arbitrariness; it is in that sense that for Nietzsche necessity is freedom and freedom, 
necessity. Of course, the important point is that the person can fail to become whole; he 
                                                 
92 In this connection, recall that the admonition from the third meditation entreats us not “to allow our 
existence to resemble a mindless act of chance” (UM III, 1; emphasis added). See also UM IV, 1 and 5 (I 
cite the relevant passage from the last reference bellow), where the notion of necessity is similarly 





can let the world and others be the helmsmen of his existence and, instead of paying heed 
to the admonition I quoted earlier, allow his life to become a mindless act of chance (UM 
III, 1). 
 
 I think we can find confirmation of this reading throughout many other passages 
where the notion of necessity occurs in the Meditations. A bit further along section 5 of 
the fourth meditation, after the segment I just discussed, Nietzsche claims once again that 
modern man is not visible in what he represents but rather chooses to hide his authentic 
being behind customs and conventions. He then goes on to assert, “whenever ‘form’ is 
nowadays demanded, in society and in conversation, in literary expression, in traffic 
between states, what is involuntarily understood by it is pleasing appearance, the 
antithesis of the true concept of form as shape necessitated by content, which has nothing 
to do with ‘pleasing’ or ‘displeasing’ precisely because it is necessary and not arbitrary” 
(UM IV, 5; emphasis added). Here we find the notion of necessity applied directly to the 
concepts of content and form that are central to the idea of unity and wholeness. The 
weak personality who surrenders his will to external forces becomes a form that fails to 
correspond to its true content; he becomes a sycophant preoccupied with pleasing others 
with his external demeanor and poise. In doing so, he makes of his existence a play thing 
of society and history and surrenders himself to the whim of blind arbitrariness. By 
contrast, the strong person wants to be in control of his life and refuses to let it be 
dictated by others. In becoming whole, then, he becomes an outer form that truly 
corresponds to an inner content (and vice versa), and in this way is necessary or, better 






It is precisely because one can fail to become necessary, that Nietzsche thinks that 
cultural reformation is the fundamental task of our age. But the forces that work against 
us are so great that today almost nothing is known of this aim and, indeed, the sense is 
lacking that here there is a task that needs pursuing. At one point in the third meditation 
Nietzsche disparagingly asks: “If the philosopher as a rule appears in his age by chance – 
does the state now really set itself the task of consciously translating this fortuitousness 
into necessity and here too rendering assistance to nature?” (UM III, 8; emphasis added). 
The answer, of course, is that it does not. According to Nietzsche, the modern state 
promotes the academic philosopher precisely to impede the ascendancy of the true 
philosopher, who together with the artist and the saint is the genuine agent of culture 
(UM III, 5). In his later life, Nietzsche will combine these three figures into an all 
encompassing figure of the philosopher of the future who becomes the ideal of true 
strength and nobility, whereas the other two for the most part seem to recede to the level 
of manifestations of weakness and decadence. But in the early works, each of these 
figures are unequivocally the real representatives of culture and the engines of wholeness 
who have become whole themselves and, in so doing, contribute to the wholeness of 
society at large, that is, they contribute to forge the single living unity in the life of a 
people that is the true definition of culture. These figures also represent, at a metaphoric 
level, three different aspects of the act of self-revelation that is the mark of individual 
wholeness. The philosopher represents the legislative power that becomes manifest in this 
act of self-revelation: the power that says, “thus it shall be” against the blind (accidental) 





clearly expressed, in BGE, 211); the artist represents the creative and symbolic power of 
the deed that collects into a comprehensive and simplifying image both what came before 
and what, through the act itself, will come later in the future, by synthesizing and 
compelling things that seemed irreconcilable to come together for a higher purpose (UM 
IV, 4-5; UM II, 6); and, finally, the saint represents the redeeming power of wholeness 
that is manifested in the manner in which the external deed the person performs becomes 
part of the chain of greatness that will continue to live past his own physical demise, and 
through which he can feel identified and unified with all of mankind (UM III, 5; UM II, 
2). In the third meditation Nietzsche uses the concept of the “genius” as the placeholder 
of these three powers. The genius is something that each individual human being 
possesses and that makes him distinct, it is the productive uniqueness of the person (UM 
III, 1, 3). In other words, it is what I earlier called, using the language of the later 
Nietzsche, the inner energy or force of the individual human being, his will to power, or 
his drive or instinct for freedom. 
 
With this notion of the genius we come back to the issue of education and the task 
of finding ourselves again. Modern man suffers from false needs and is in constant flight 
from himself. He represents the form of a man who has evaded his genius and has 
become wholly exterior; he is a bag of clothes without kernel (UM III, 1). Since the 
problem lies in the fact that he is unknown to himself, the solution is to set him on the 
road of self-knowledge, so that he can learn his true needs and come to understand that he 
must not betray his unique inwardness. How can this reorientation be effected? 





individual can happen only through the influence of true educators. These people are the 
genuine philosophers, artists and saints who, having become whole, command our 
affection and inspire us to become whole ourselves.93 Through our love for them we learn 
to listen to the calling of our own genius and engage in the process of self-overcoming 
that will make us whole. In the Meditations, the ancient Greeks, Schopenhauer and 
Wagner function as models of true educators. 
 
How do these models educate? According to Nietzsche the chief way they do so is 
by alienating us from the inauthentic selves that, as a matter of course and because of the 
external forces that surround us, we tend to inhabit (UM III, 6; UM IV,7).94 Through this 
self-alienation these models instill in us a longing for the genius that stirs within us. In 
other words, what I take Nietzsche to be saying is that we acquire the desire to take the 
reins of our will to power, to become free and independent ourselves, by seeing true 
independence and freedom reflected in the mirror of those great human beings that have 
become whole. The principal thing these individuals have to teach us is not their 
particular doctrines, their belief systems, but whether or not they were or are the 
incarnation of truly independent beings themselves. This is why Nietzsche does not really 
analyze or explore the philosophical doctrines of Schopenhauer in a book that appears to 
                                                 
93 In section 5 of the third meditation, Nietzsche calls these people true men. I take it that this is meant to 
indicate that in these people content and form truly correspond to one another, that is, that they represent 
genuine (and not false) personalities in which inwardness is truly revealed. To that extent, they have 
become an authentic unity and, therefore, whole. In the same section Nietzsche claims that these 
individuals (the philosophers, artists and saints) lift the rest of us from the stream of sociability in which we 
live in constant flight from ourselves, that stream of labor and haste that keeps us submerged in an 
incessant fear of memory and of turning inward (UM III, 5). 
 
94 In a characteristic passage Nietzsche claims: “It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-
knowledge because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow on the soul, not only a 
clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view of itself, but also a desire to look beyond itself and to 





be about this philosopher’s teachings. What Schopenhauer has to teach us is a way of life 
that is itself the reflection of achieved wholeness: as Nietzsche puts it, “his greatness lies 
in having set up before him a picture of life as a whole, in order to interpret it as a whole” 
(UM III, 3). Although it is not completely clear what Nietzsche understands this picture 
to have been, it is undeniable that he thought an important part of it consisted in living a 
life that was independent from state and society and in conflict with the establishment of 
academic philosophers.95 In essence, what Schopenhauer (as well as Wagner and any 
other great human being) has to teach us is that the genius in us should not fear entering 
into conflict with his age. Indeed, in a very profound way, becoming independent means 
becoming a criminal of sorts: the person who seeks to emancipate himself must appear as 
a law breaker. He is attempting to bring something new into the world and that means 
destroying or displacing what was there before. The old must perish to make way for the 
new. But this is an affront to the traditional order of things, and the person who 
perpetrates this act of independence incurs a guilt that he can only expiate by pursuing 
greatness, otherwise his freedom is a piece of impudence and presumption (UM II, 1, 3; 
UM III, 8).  
 
 Here, then, is the answer to the question of what sort of act is the one that bears 
the seal of wholeness. The act is one through which the person places himself in the chain 
of greatness, that is, the chain of creativity and culture in which nature is increasingly 
                                                 
95 In an important passage from Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche spells out more clearly what he understands 
the totalizing vision of Schopenhauer to have been. He characterizes it as “a maliciously ingenious attempt 
to adduce in favor of a nihilistic total depreciation of life precisely the counter-instances, the great self-
affirmations of the ‘will to life,’ life’s forms of exuberance. He has interpreted art, heroism, genius, beauty, 
great sympathy, knowledge, the will to truth, and tragedy, in turn, as consequences of ‘negation,’ or of the 





being perfected.96  Indeed, the self-alienation that Nietzsche claims results from the 
influence of true educators is simply the starting point of the road that leads to the 
realization of wholeness. This alienation only serves to awaken the person from his 
inauthentic slumber and to point him in the right direction: towards culture and its 
fundamental aim which is the procreation of genius (or the perpetual renewal of greatness 
in the chain of ever ascending humanity) (UM III, 3). Nietzsche calls this awakening the 
first consecration to culture. Its distinctive feature is a hatred (born of love for one’s true 
educators) of one’s narrowness of spirit and of all the things that keep one’s uniqueness 
imprisoned, and, in this hatred, a feeling of shame without distress, and a longing to 
become whole. This first consecration leads to a second one, 97 which Nietzsche describes 
in the following terms: 
 
the individual has to employ his own wrestling and longing as the alphabet by 
means of which he can now read off the aspirations of mankind as a whole. But 
he may not halt even here; from this stage he has to climb up to a yet higher one; 
culture demands of him, not only an inward experience, not only an assessment of 
the outward world that streams all around him, but finally and above all an act, 
that is to say a struggle on behalf of culture and hostility towards those 
influences, habits laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal: which 
is the production of the genius (UM III, 6; emphasis added). 
 
The goal, then, that will make the individual whole is a cultural struggle on behalf of the 
genius. It is crucial not to misunderstand this as a sacrifice of the individual person for 
the betterment of a few great individuals or as the command that he devote all his efforts 
                                                 
96 In this connection, see UM III, 1, where Nietzsche asserts that “culture is liberation … it is the perfecting 
of nature when it deflects her cruel and merciless assaults and turns them to good” and also UM III, 3, 
where he describes the goal thus:  “to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the physis (nature) and to 
be for a while the corrector of its follies and ineptitudes.” I cite this latter passage more fully bellow. 
 
97 In the fourth mediation Nietzsche speaks of the two acts of purification or consecration that Wagner had 





to the production of greatness in others.98 The production of the genius that Nietzsche 
claims is the goal of wholeness is always first and foremost the realization of that genius 
in each and every one of us.99 Nietzsche makes this clear throughout many passages in 
the third meditation. Take for instance the following section where Nietzsche speaks of 
one of Schopenhauer’s great lessons for us: 
 
he teaches us to distinguish between those things that really promote human 
happiness and those that only appear to do so: how neither riches nor honours nor 
erudition can lift the individual out of the profound depression he feels at the 
valuelessness of his existence, and how the striving after these valued things 
acquires meaning only through an exalted and transfiguring overall goal: to 
acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the physis and to be for a while the 
corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure; but 
through yourself in the end for everyone (UM III, 3; emphasis added). 
 
Or, then again, in section 5, where he refers to the circle of duties that the person who has 
been educated by the example of great men will adopt as his own: 
 
                                                 
98 This is the way, for instance, that Thomas Hurka understands it. He thinks that Nietzsche is a 
perfectionist in the sense that he advocates a maximax principle that requires all agents to maximize the 
perfection of the most exceptional agents. See, Hurka (2007). 
 
99 In his essay on Schopenahuer as Educator, James Conant also correctly argues that Nietzsche’s focus on 
the genius is not meant to be exclusive and that the term stands for the productive uniqueness that each 
human being harbors within himself (Conant, 2000: 224-225). However, his own interpretation fails to 
connect the development of the genius in oneself with the project of unifying one’s content and one’s form 
and is, thus, silent with respect to the ideal of wholeness that lies at the heart of the concept of the genius. 
Indeed, for Conant, Nietzsche does not prescribe any content to the ideal he is recommending (that of 
attaining one’s higher self or of becoming who one is) (Conant, 2000: 216-217).  On my interpretation, by 
contrast, there is a specific content to the ideal: one can only work at the production of the genius in oneself 
by means of a struggle on behalf of culture, that is, by devoting one’s efforts to the promotion of that realm 
that sustains one’s genius in the first place and makes it possible, the realm of culture in which freedom is 
preserved and guaranteed for all. To be sure, the form that the struggle is supposed to take is not something 
Nietzsche prescribes, since it will vary depending on the person’s talents and the milieu in which he lives: 
some will struggle on behalf of culture by promoting great music in which genuine feeling is made audible 
again, others by pursuing political conquests and reforms that seek to free and unify all nations, others by 
transvaluing values, and the like. Still, as will become clearer in what follows, even with respect to the 
form of the act itself there is some prescriptive content to Nietzsche’s view, since he suggests that the 
struggle consists in combating the oppositions and divisions that keep society and the individuals who 





these new duties are not the duties of a solitary; on the contrary, they set one in 
the midst of a mighty community held together, not by external forms and 
regulations, but by a fundamental idea. It is the fundamental idea of culture, 
insofar as it sets for each one of us but one task: to promote the production of the 
philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby to work 
at the perfecting of nature (UM III, 5). 
 
The fundamental goal of each individual is to manifest his own personal freedom, to give 
true form to his inner being and uniqueness. Nietzsche seems to think that he can do so 
only by placing himself in the circle of genuine culture, in which he works together with 
other individuals in the promotion of the perfection of freedom and individual expression 
in himself and in all. In doing so, he contributes to the communal goal of forming cultural 
institutions in which he and others will be protected from the forces that threaten to 
destroy or misappropriate each person’s drive to freedom. As Nietzsche puts it, “these 
individuals have to complete their work – that is the sense of their staying together; and 
all who participate in the institution have, through continual purification and mutual 
support, to help to prepare within themselves and around them for the birth of the genius 
and the ripening of his work” (UM III, 6; emphasis added). In that sense, the birth of the 
genius in one’s own self or in others coincides with the birth of true freedom, with the 
manifestation of a genuine as opposed to a false, borrowed or weak personality. 
 
 This is the sense in which the Wagner of the fourth meditation became free and 
whole. In that work, Nietzsche tells the story of Wagner’s liberation from the forces that 
were threatening to misappropriate his inner drive to freedom. For instance, he had to free 





a critic of effectist art;100 he also had to become a social revolutionary to revive the folk 
and their mythical medium of expression and release them from the clutches of a society 
that uses art to enslave artists, makes art into a luxury and promotes an entertainment 
industry that keeps people content and properly narcotized; and then later Wagner had to 
also overcome this revolutionary tempestuousness itself in order to learn to become more 
impersonal and to transform his desire for power into pure artistic creativity (UM IV, 8). 
The liberation of his own genius allows Wagner to liberate art itself, and thereby 
contribute to the liberation of all us by promoting a culture that is genuine, that teaches 
people right feeling again, and inspires them to become promoters of culture themselves 
(i.e. geniuses). For Nietzsche, an important part of what it means to liberate art in this 
way, or for that matter, to struggle on behalf of culture in general, is to combat the 
dividing forces of society, to unify the elements that keep culture fragmented. Thus, if 
language has been divorced from true feeling, then someone like Wagner, who wants to 
fight for culture, must unite again true music (the medium of expression of genuine 
feeling) with language. The seal of wholeness, then, is an act that attempts to master the 
chaotic wilderness of forces that is our world; an act that brings together into unity things 
that appear to be set irreconcilably asunder (UM IV, 5).101 For this reason Nietzsche 
                                                 
100 By effectist art, Nietzsche seems to mean art that seeks to simply entertain the public through an 
impressive and flashing display of forms, colors and appearances (in a word, of effects) that can keep 
spectators suitably dazzled and distracted. A substantial part of Nietzsche’s criticism of modern art is 
directed at the fact that this art is meant only as a pastime, and not as an educational tool or as a stimulant 
for life and action. 
 
101 In this respect, my account conflicts with that of Huskinson. Although, she correctly attributes the task 
of uniting opposites to wholeness, for her this is principally a psychic project consisting in attempting to 
harmonize the relation between the rational and irrational aspects of the personality (Huskinson claims that 
for Nietzsche the former elements are metaphorically represented by the figure of Apollo and the latter by 
that of Dionysus). According to Huskinson, this unification (perhaps paradoxically) is not really a uniting 
of these forces, but consists rather in their being balanced out or harmonized with one another, yet in a way 
that keeps the conflict between them alive (Huskinson, 2004: 3; 24-27; 29-31). In my view, it is unclear 





claims that “Wagner’s music as a whole is an image of the world as it was understood by 
the great Ephesian philosopher [Heraclitus]: a harmony produced by conflict, the unity of 
justice and enmity” (UM IV, 9). The suggestion, then, is that to be in the business of 
assessing and then combating the oppositions that prevail in society is a significant part 
of what it means to become whole, to become a guarantor of freedom and culture. 
 
 But this analysis raises an issue that many people sympathetic to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy find unpalatable and embarrassing, namely, his anti-egalitarianism. It is 
evident that most of us will not become artists, philosophers and saints; at least not if that 
means becoming a Wagner, or a Schopenhauer, or a Nietzsche. If becoming whole means 
expressing one’s genius in this way, if it means succeeding at becoming icons of culture, 
then it seems most of us are condemned to remain mere fragments of men. We may 
struggle to liberate ourselves and attempt to become whole by pursuing the goal of 
promoting the genius in ourselves and in all, but since most of us will not be capable of 
revolutionizing music, literature, philosophy or the like, in the way Nietzsche’s 
paradigmatic examples of wholeness did, we also appear to be incapable of laying any 
claim to wholeness. Is there any hope for us? Many things Nietzsche says appear to deny 
us such hope. The fourth meditation, for example, begins in the following terms:  
                                                                                                                                                 
opposing forces seeking to unify is like, given that they can never really unify. Nevertheless, be that as it 
may, the important point is that on my interpretation the opposing forces do not reside primarily in the 
individual, but first and foremost in the world. Moreover, these forces do not necessarily divide neatly into 
rational and irrational powers. They can consist of all sorts of things: like the historical, unhistorical and 
suprahistorical faculties, as we saw in the second meditation; or, as in the case under consideration, music 
and language; or, as we will see later, reason, the senses, feeling and the will. In my judgment, what all 
these different oppositions have in common is that their continued presence constitutes a danger and an 
obstacle to the task of forming a living unity of content and form, that is, to the task of individual and 
societal wholeness. This is why, for Nietzsche, the person who wants to become whole and seeks thereby to 
make his society whole, will have to combat these oppositions and reconcile those forces that threaten to 






for an event to possess greatness two things must come together: greatness in 
spirit of those who accomplish it and greatness of spirit in those who experience it 
… this is why even the individual deed of a man great in himself lacks greatness 
if it is brief and without resonance or effect; for at the moment he performed it he 
must have been in error as to its necessity at precisely that time: he failed to take 
correct aim and chance became master over him – whereas to be great and to 
possess a clear grasp of necessity have always belonged strictly together (UM IV, 
1). 
 
This passage seems to suggest that being great is a matter of producing acts that do 
resonate into the future, the sorts of deeds that someone like Wagner accomplished and 
that have transformative effects in the culture at large. Only the performance of these 
kinds of acts seems to guarantee that one can lay claim to the redemptive power of 
wholeness. Wagner and his deeds are necessary because they are responses to the real 
needs of society and this means that Wagner can find redemption from the suffering of 
individual existence by entering into the community of greatness. He and his deeds will 
continue to exist in the chain of culture that lies outside of time and the endless flow of 
becoming, and that is the engine of all the future fruitfulness of human creativity. For the 
rest of us who may be incapable of performing such acts, or who may fail to have a clear 
grasp of necessity, the redemptive feeling of belonging to the circle of genuine culture 
seems to be forever banned; we will remain mere fragments despite all our struggles. 
 
 Yet, there are other things that Nietzsche says that seem to restore our hope. In 
section 6 of the third meditation, he asserts that “the young person should be taught to 
regard himself as a failed work of nature but at the same time as a witness to the 





himself; but I will honour its great intentions by serving it so that one day it may do 
better. By coming to this resolve he places himself within the circle of culture” (UM III, 
6). This makes it sound as if what matters for wholeness is not so much whether one 
succeeds at becoming a philosopher, artist or saint, but rather whether one resolves to 
become such people and to help others do so as well.  After all, as Nietzsche himself puts 
it, “anyone who believes in culture is thereby saying: ‘I see above me something higher 
and more human than I am; let everyone help me to attain it, as I will help everyone who 
knows and suffers as I do’” (Ibid.). To strive to attain the higher self each of us harbors 
within himself is to embrace a task that guarantees the wholeness of ourselves and also 
the ecumenical culture on whose behalf one is struggling. Even if one should perish 
without reaching the goal itself, one has perished in pursuit of the great; and that makes 
one already great and certainly not the weak or inauthentic person that those who evade 
their genius are said to be. Even the passage from the fourth meditation I quoted above 
seems to hint at the fact that one can be a great human being even if one’s deeds 
themselves fail to be great. In that passage Nietzsche appears to suggest that there is a 
greatness that resides in simply being able to value and experience the creative acts of 
geniuses (of philosophers, artists and saints). In that sense, it may be possible to interpret 
his injunction to place oneself within the circle of culture as the resolve to join a 
community of appreciation, thereby becoming whole and great ourselves. Having said 
this, however, I think it is crucial to emphasize that this appreciation must be more than 
mere contemplation or admiration of greatness. Indeed, mere admiration that is not a 
noble aspiration to actually become a genius oneself and struggle on behalf of culture by 





fragmented, would probably strike Nietzsche as being too passive in nature. Freedom 
must be actualized in an activity that is more than an experiencing or witnessing of 
greatness. Such experience after all is just the starting point of the individual’s journey to 
become whole: the geniuses whose work we admire awaken in us, as I argued above, the 
longing to become whole ourselves. But this first consecration to culture must lead to the 
second one which is the resolve to fight on behalf of culture itself. What seems to matter, 




In my judgment, overall the evidence on this issue is ambiguous. Nonetheless, I 
personally find that it is more in consonance with Nietzsche’s overall view, to conclude 
that what truly matters for wholeness is to strive after the goal of culture and not whether 
one is able to perform the sorts of deeds attributable to a Wagner or a Nietzsche. In that 
respect, wholeness is an ideal that falls within the reach of every human being that 
chooses to become independent and refuses to remain a mere fragment and an accident of 
nature. Through his striving on behalf of culture and its goal (the procreation of genius), 
such a person becomes necessary himself even if his external deeds do not, and he can 
participate in the sort of consolation and redemption that Nietzsche claims is guaranteed 
through wholeness: he becomes part of the single line of ascending humanity in which 
the great fighters of culture live contemporaneously with each other in an eternal spiritual 





accomplishments – though they may be many –, as by their commitment to genuine 




 It is now time to examine how the two principal interpretations of wholeness fair 
when balanced against the preceding analysis of this ideal. Of the two, I think that the 
“naturalist” interpretation is the furthest removed from Nietzsche’s description of the 
injunction to become whole, at least as it is articulated in the Meditations. Indeed, the 
fatalistic aspect that lies at the heart of this camp’s account of wholeness puts it 
unsavorily close to the sort of weakness of the will that Nietzsche decried throughout this 
writings, and that is in fact the exact opposite of the correspondence between content and 
form that is the hallmark of wholeness. To think of ourselves as beings that belong to a 
causal web that thoroughly determines the trajectory of our lives is to surrender our 
personality to the whim of external forces that are for the most part completely 
impersonal. Far from allowing us to realize the ideal of wholeness, this kind of fatalistic 
attitude is merely another way to evade our genius and to descend to the level of the mere 
animal or, worst still, to that of the automata (UM III, 4). 
 
 Although the aesthetic interpretation fairs a bit better because it correctly 
attributes the achievement of wholeness to the free agency of the person, it nonetheless 
also falls short of the full scope and meaning of this ideal. The main problem is that for 





aspects that compose the personality. To be sure, there are things Nietzsche says in the 
Meditations that warrant this reading. In section 2 of the third meditation, he asserts that 
the true educator is one whose task is “to mould the whole man into a living solar and 
planetary system and to understand its higher laws of motion” (UM III, 2). This makes it 
sound as if wholeness were only a matter of refashioning the psyche of the person into a 
harmonious system that is governed by a central dominating force. For the aesthetic 
camp, this means that the person is supposed to blend the various aspects of his soul into 
a coherent narrative of his past and present life, weaving a pattern in which nothing can 
be removed without making the whole psychic structure collapse. Although this 
interpretative act is an expression of the person’s active willing, there is still an element 
here that I think would strike Nietzsche as being too passive. The activity of interpreting 
one’s life is purely retrospective and intellectual in nature: it is like the act of reading a 
literary text. And while intellectual creativity of this sort may be important for Nietzsche, 
it is clear that he thinks that what matters most for wholeness is the activity of 
manifesting one’s freedom in the external world by becoming a champion of culture and 
its goals. Indeed, the thing that integrates the person psychologically is the pursuit of the 
lofty task of developing the genius within him and without him, the task of struggling on 
behalf of genuine culture. For that he needs to develop whatever talent he possesses that 
will contribute to this task. Such a talent, whether in the realm of literature, music, 
philosophy, politics, religion, or what have you, becomes the living center of this 
person’s life and governs every other aspect of his being so that he can work together 
with others in the promotion of culture, that is, in the perfection of nature and freedom. 





only derivative and not the essence of the ideal. It results from placing oneself in the 
circle of culture which is the real aim of wholeness. In striving to do that, one constructs 
a soul governed by a living center that harmonizes all the various aspects of one’s 
personality.102 
 
 This is also the reason why the aesthetic camp fails to incorporate the future as an 
important aspect of the ideal of wholeness. For Nehamas, the future is a danger to 
wholeness because the actions a person may perform in the future could enter into 
conflict with the interpretation he has constructed for himself, and in this way threaten 
the harmonious integration of his personality (Nehamas, 1985: 185). But for Nietzsche, 
far from being a danger to the man of wholeness, the future is the place where all his 
hopes and aspirations lie. In a section entitled Redemption, Zarathustra says: “I walk 
amongst men as the fragments of the future: that future which I contemplate. And it is all 
my poetization and aspiration to compose and collect into unity what is fragment and 
riddle and fearful chance” (Z II, Redemption). The future is the target and objective of 
the man of wholeness, it also the place where he finds redemption from the absurdity of 
individual existence. This person has faith in himself and believes that his energies will 
survive into the future, past his own physical demise, because he has placed himself 
within the circle of culture in which life and creativity are perpetually renewed and 
                                                 
102 My account is also at odds with Huskinson’s in this point. For her, the unifying principle of the psychic 
opposites that comprise the personality of the individual is the will to power itself, which she interprets as 
the power of adaptation by means of which the capacity for creation in the person is increased (partly 
through the drive to unify opposites itself). For Huskinson the will to power is the force that originates the 
psyche’s fragmentation into opposites and is also responsible for its reunification (Huskinson, 2004: 32-33; 
151). On my reading, by contrast, the will to power itself (or the internal energy of the individual) must be 
directed toward the higher goal of culture; it is this goal that propels the individual to unite the opposites 
that seem irreconcilable and that, on my reading, exist first and foremost in the social world the person 





guaranteed. And even if he fails to accomplish great deeds that will become necessary for 
everything that is and that is yet to come, this person has nonetheless become necessary 
himself by placing himself in this chain of universal culture, and he can find consolation 
in the feeling of unity he experiences with all human beings that belong to it. 
 
Finally, let me conclude by considering a difficulty for this interpretation of 
wholeness that I have provided. The problem is that my account relies very heavily on the 
Meditations, which is a work that is located in Nietzsche’s early period. It is 
commonplace in the literature on Nietzsche to assume that there are significant 
philosophical changes that occurred during the three main productive periods of 
Nietzsche’s life. In particular, a prevalent view is that Nietzsche’s position on truth and 
on other important metaphysical and epistemological issues underwent radical revisions 
starting with the texts of the middle period.103 In this period, so the story goes, Nietzsche 
embraced the scientific paradigm that was on the rise during his lifetime and he adopted a 
completely materialistic outlook in all of his theorizing. From this perspective, the worry 
is that my account is blind to those important changes and, indeed, abounds with notions 
and figures that Nietzsche later abandoned or disowned, like the belief that Schopenhauer 
and Wagner where incarnations of greatness, or the belief in mystic notions of unity, or 
the notion that art and artistic creativity can justify one’s existence, or, for that matter, the 
view that the will moves things and that human beings have some kind of free will, and 
so on. Even if my account is correct about the early Nietzsche, it is probably not 
applicable to whatever ideal of wholeness he retained in his later life. The kind of account 
                                                 





that would be applicable for that later Nietzsche is more likely one that follows the 
“naturalist” path I laid out earlier or some version of it. 
 
Since this worry rests on a particular view of Nietzsche’s overall philosophical 
trajectory, to dispel it completely I would have to take direct issue with that picture, and 
show either that Nietzsche did not really alter his views as radically as it is alleged, or 
that, even if he did, the particular metaphysical and epistemological doctrines that he 
revised do not affect the overall picture of wholeness that I have outlined. Obviously, I 
cannot pursue either of these strategies in the space of this essay. However, I think I can 
go a long way toward assuaging this worry if I am able to show that the passage on 
Goethe from Twilight of the Idols, that is taken to be representative of the later 
Nietzsche’s view on wholeness, can be read in the light of my analysis of this ideal. Here 
is the passage in its entirety: 
 
Goethe – not a German event, but a European one: a magnificent attempt to 
overcome the eighteenth century by a return to nature, by an ascent to the 
naturalness of the Renaissance – a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that 
century. He bore its strongest instincts within himself: the sensibility, the idolatry 
of nature, the anti-historic, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary (—the latter 
being merely a form of the unreal). He sought help from history, natural science, 
antiquity, and also Spinoza, but, above all, from practical activity; he surrounded 
himself with limited horizons; he did not retire from life but put himself into the 
midst of it; he was not fainthearted but took as much as possible upon himself, 
over himself, into himself. What he wanted was totality; he fought the mutual 
extraneousness of reason, senses, feeling, and will (—preached with the most 
abhorrent scholasticism by Kant, the antipode of Goethe); he disciplined himself 
to wholeness, he created himself. In the middle of an age with an unreal outlook, 
Goethe was a convinced realist: he said Yes to everything that was related to him 
in this respect – and he had no greater experience than that ens realissimum [most 
real being] called Napoleon. Goethe conceived a human being who would be 
strong, highly educated, skillful in all bodily matters, self-controlled, reverent 





being natural, being strong enough for such freedom; the man of tolerance, not 
from weakness but from strength, because he knows how to use to his advantage 
even that from which the average nature would perish; the man for whom there is 
no longer anything that is forbidden, unless it be weakness, whether called vice or 
virtue. Such a spirit who has become free stands amid the cosmos with a joyous 
and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only the particular is loathesome, and that 
all is redeemed and affirmed in the whole—he does not negate anymore. Such a 
faith, however, is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the 
name of Dionysus (TI, ‘Skirmishes,’ 49). 
 
I trust that the reader who has followed me up to this point will read this passage and find 
that it resonates strongly with the themes I have been sounding throughout my analysis. 
First of all, notice that Goethe is said to have been a European event and not a German 
one. Part of what makes him great is that he was not concerned with the petty narrow 
interests of a nation, but rather had his eye on more global endeavors and as such was 
part of an ecumenical society and culture.104 Second, a distinctive feature of Goethe’s 
striving is that he struggled to unite the aspects of his century that seemed to be set 
irreconcilably asunder: the oppositions between reason and the senses, between feeling 
and will, and so on. This, as we saw, was an important aspect of Wagner’s wholeness in 
the fourth meditation: he too fought the dividing forces of society that kept culture 
fragmented. Notice also that Goethe’s wholeness is a matter of self-discipline and self-
control as it was for the Nietzsche of the Meditations. But, finally, Goethe stands amid 
the cosmos with a joyous and trustful fatalism that consists in believing that the particular 
is loathsome and that all is redeemed in the whole. For Risse, as I indicated earlier, this 
means that Goethe thinks of himself as someone who belongs to a chain of causal 
determinants that relieve him from notions of responsibility or guilt. But we now have 
available an interpretation that fits this passage more comfortably and makes better sense 
                                                 
104 In Ecce Homo Nietzsche claims that nationalism is “the most anticultural sickness and unreason there 





of what Nietzsche is asserting here. Goethe’s fatalism consists in the fact that he 
understands himself as a piece of fate or destiny, in the same sense in which Nietzsche 
claimed in the fourth meditation that true music is a piece of fate and primal law (UM IV, 
6). Like this music, Goethe refuses to be an accident of nature, a meaningless act of 
chance. Instead, he has faith in himself, and he trusts that by taking charge of his life and 
defeating contingency he has become (or he will become) necessary, one more law for 
the future and for all that is yet to come. And he has done this by placing himself in the 
higher circle of universal culture. This is why for him, the individual as such is 
loathsome, what truly counts and what gives meaning to individual existence is the 
suprapersonal goal of culture: the procreation of genius in us and in everyone else. 
 
My interpretation not only makes better sense of this important passage, it also 
sheds some light on other puzzling passages in Twilight that tend to be used – in my view 
unwarrantedly – in support of the “naturalist” interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Take for instance Nietzsche’s claim that “one is necessary, one is a piece of destiny, one 
belongs to the whole, one is the whole” (TI, ‘Errors’, 8); or his insistence that “the single 
human being is a piece of fatum [destiny] from the front and from the rear, one law more, 
one necessity more for all that is yet to come and to be” (TI, ‘Morality’, 6). Contrary to 
what some commentators suggest, these statements are not expressions of Nietzsche’s 
belief in causal determinism. They belong rather to the cluster of ideas that he deploys in 
the service of his practical philosophy and, in particular, of his ideal of individual 
wholeness. The same is true of another characteristic passage that reads: “The single one, 





error after all: he is nothing by himself, no atom, no ‘link in the chain,’ nothing merely 
inherited from former times—he is the whole single line of humanity up to himself” (TI, 
‘Skirmishes’, 33). In all these statements, Nietzsche is hammering his conviction that the 
individual human being is unique and indispensable for genuine culture and thereby for 
the future of humanity as a whole. He is not a monad nor is he the product of the chain of 
causal determinism that stretches all the way past his birth. Instead each individual 
human being is all of humanity: he represents either its ascending or its descending line. 
If he does the latter, then he is lost to himself and to all of us. He becomes an inauthentic 
person that is the plaything of time and the endless stream of becoming. But, if on the 
contrary he represents the ascending line of life, then he is a great human being, a piece 
of destiny and a spirit that governs the world by placing himself within the community of 
greatness that redeems him from the suffering and the absurdity of his individual 
existence. Nietzsche’s hope for all of us is that we will be fortunate enough to find true 
educators that can liberate our spirit, and set us on the path of that supreme autognosis by 












 The results of the preceding three essays not only vindicate the piecemeal 
methodology they employ, but also open avenues for further investigation and set us on 
the right path to a better understanding and appreciation of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
 
I think that, for the most part, the secondary literature on Nietzsche has failed to 
engage him directly. Focus on his philosophy has been motivated and mediated by other 
concerns such as those of rescuing Nietzsche from the clutches of movements one may 
find deeply problematic (like Nazism, or egoism, or even postmodernism); or making 
him palatable and relevant to contemporary analytic discourse; or building a coherent and 
systematic picture of his thought as a whole around some central metaphysical or 
epistemological principle he is alleged to have held. It is not that these goals are 
unimportant or that they should not be pursued. My point is rather that if we approach 
Nietzsche’s philosophy from these angles, if we remain bent on making him satisfy our 
own concerns, we run the risk of misunderstanding his thought and thereby miss the very 
goals we set out to attain. Nietzsche will be able to speak to us and answer our own 
concerns only if we meet him on his own turf. We need to look once more at Nietzsche’s 
philosophy with eyes unclouded by the hustle and bustle of the secondary literature. This 





way he framed and tackled the issues that concerned him. In my judgment, doing so 
requires adopting humbler projects than those that are traditionally pursued. The 
questions that guide our interpretative endeavors should be narrower and more localized. 
Instead of trying to figure out Nietzsche’s overall metaphysics and epistemology of 
value, or attempting to systematize his philosophy under some overarching principle, or 
the like, we should ask questions of the following sort: what does Nietzsche mean by the 
unconditional will to truth? Or what distinguishes for him the genuine philosopher from 
the mere scholar? Or what is the ascetic ideal and why is science its latest incarnation? Or 
what lies behind the notion of the Dionysian and the cluster of symbols and ideas that 
surround it?  In my view, pursuing humbler projects of this sort is a precondition for 
engaging in more ambitious and comprehensive studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a 
whole. In this dissertation I have tried to embark on that kind of piecemeal labor focusing 
on three specific ideals that seem to dominate Nietzsche’s practical philosophy. The 
results I have achieved, and that I hope will lead us to reassess more traditional readings, 
should aid in the more ambitious and global tasks I have mentioned. I leave it to the 
reader to assess my success on this score. 
 
 Let me now say some things about what I take to be the main lessons of these 
three studies. I think that perhaps the principal lesson is that Nietzsche should be 
considered first and foremost a philosopher of freedom. Underwriting all of these 
practical ideals is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with the fostering of individual activity and 
creativity, and the avoidance of its opposite, the passivity of the will – the will to 





phenomenon: the achievement of maturity in the exercise of one’s creative activity, of 
one’s freedom. For Nietzsche there seem to be two fundamental values or normative 
standpoints a human being can inhabit: he can be in the business of undermining freedom 
and creativity both for himself and for others, or he can promote and champion this 
fundamental life bestowing force. More often than not, the person who does the former 
does not know what he is doing. He is simply the plaything of powers greater than 
himself or he may honestly believe, like some ascetic priests probably do, that he is doing 
good when in fact, from Nietzsche’s standpoint, he is promoting values that are 
detrimental for life and for freedom. However, it is also possible to consciously renounce 
one’s freedom; and one of Nietzsche’s complaints about his age was that, despite the fact 
that it was an informed age, it still knelt to Christianity and to values that it knew to be 
oppressive. Still, freedom is always possible for the person who chooses to stop evading 
the responsibility to be his own self, honestly endeavors to know himself (his true needs), 
and seeks independence from the forces that keep him imprisoned. 
 
 It is important that for Nietzsche this type of freedom is a social and political 
phenomenon. It should not be confused with the faculty that is the focus of a lot of 
contemporary theorizing in the philosophy of action, namely, the capacity to be 
autonomous (i.e. to be the causes of our own behavior). Indeed, as I indicated in the first 
chapter, it seems that Nietzsche presupposes that we are autonomous in that sense; that 
we are capable of control of our actions and, thus, more than an arena for causal events to 
which we cannot contribute. For him, the problem is that this capacity can be and, indeed, 





realize the ideals of Sovereignty, of Wholeness and of Becoming Who One Is, Nietzsche 
is urging us to regain control of our capacity to be the causes of our actions, to liberate 
this faculty from the subdued state of immaturity in which it is kept. 
 
This does not mean that Nietzsche was an advocate of unbridled individualism 
and egoism. To the contrary, as we learned in chapter three, genuine individual freedom, 
as Nietzsche understood it, is actualized and exercised in the pursuit of goals that are 
suprapersonal and ecumenical. The full and healthy expression of one’s individuality 
occurs when one reaches beyond the narrow and petty confines of one’s individual 
existence, consecrating oneself to the promotion of genuine culture in which ascending 
life and creativity are continually renewed and guaranteed for all. This pursuit also 
harbors the only true possibility of redemption from the suffering and absurdity of 
existence. Contrary to his teacher Schopenhauer, Nietzsche believed that redemption did 
not lie in the suspension of individual willing, but in its opposite, in a more emphatic 
resolve to foster the procreation of freedom for oneself and for all. 
 
 Since, as I have indicated, this type of freedom seems to rest on the possibility of 
autonomy in the technical sense (i.e. our capacity to be causes of our own behavior), from 
the perspective of contemporary philosophy of action, one may wonder whether 
Nietzsche’s understanding of autonomy was compatibilist or incompatibilist. The story 
Nietzsche tells in the Genealogy about the emergence of sovereignty appears at first 
glance to be more amenable to a compatibilist perspective. As we saw in chapter two, 





freedom that lies at the core of the primitive human beast. The reversal of this instinct, its 
discharge upon its possessor, brings to life the sort of self-conception that eventually will 
issue in the possibility of guiding one’s behavior autonomously and morally (i.e., in 
accordance to one’s own understanding of oneself and what one is doing). Prior to this 
reversal, the instinct for freedom was causally responsible for the bodily movements of 
the human creature: it allowed movement to issue from the body of its possessor, 
presumably by recruiting desires, dispositions, beliefs, and so on. But this is no more than 
a capacity to insert one’s body into the causal stream (to be a vessel for movement), and 
the creature that behaves in this way is not yet capable of enjoying that supreme privilege 
of responsibility that is the hallmark of sovereignty and that, according to Nietzsche, 
makes moral behavior possible for the first time. Sovereignty requires the internal 
discharge of the instinct for freedom. The same instinct that injected one’s body into the 
causal stream of events will now permit one’s own self to insert itself into it, by enlisting 
one’s self-conceptions. It is via those self-conceptions (or practical identities) that one 
will now count as participating whole-heartedly in one’s acts. 
 
This account is obviously naturalistic in the sense that it offers a kind of 
evolutionary story about the origin of autonomy and moral responsibility out of natural 
and historical events. As such it seems to fit more properly within a compatibilist 
orientation. But things are a bit murkier than one may expect. The instinct for freedom 
that is one of the principal actors in these transformations is a manifestation of the will to 
power which Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy as a spontaneous force. This makes it 





serve as the basis for an incompatibilist account of human agency. In my view, 
Nietzsche’s discussion of autonomy and responsibility is sufficiently ambiguous on this 
score to be recruited by either camp. In the end, I believe it is a matter of indifference 
whether one wants to align Nietzsche to an incompatibilist or to a compatibilist 
conception of human agency. 
 
However, I think that the ambiguity regarding Nietzsche’s position on this issue is 
not accidental. In a deep sense and in a way that is very much consonant with the overall 
tenor of his philosophy, Nietzsche was truly beyond this debate, and trying to place him 
within the bounds of these categories does violence to his thought.  In the first place, I 
think that this kind of preoccupation with the truth about our status as agents would have 
struck Nietzsche as being too ascetic: it is the sort of sterile questioning that he so often 
decried as the mark of decadence and weakness proper of those scholars who search after 
truth for the sake of truth itself, and not for the sake of creativity and life or to use truth as 
a plastic power with which to engender the future. But, secondly, this issue is at bottom a 
metaphysical problem and to solve it one would need to peek into the nature of reality in 
a way that I think Nietzsche thought ultimately impossible. This dissertation is mostly 
mute with respect to Nietzsche’s metaphysical beliefs and I cannot defend this claim 
here. Nonetheless, I believe that for Nietzsche metaphysical questions are fundamentally 
opaque: either the world is indeterminate regarding issues such as those underwriting the 
debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism, or we will simply never know. I 
suspect that one of the main lessons Nietzsche drew from his numerous excursions into 





that it is in principle impossible to find the final ground of reality. For him there is no 
promissory note when it comes to the project of unveiling nature completely: we will 
always encounter another veil behind all our unveilings of nature (in principle, we will 
never hit rock bottom). 
 
 But let us leave this matter aside and let me return to the value Nietzsche places 
on freedom. The three ideals that were the subject of this study contain some of the most 
important elements of this fundamental value. But there are still other aspects of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of freedom that need to be explored and that can be the subject 
of future investigations. Some of these have been suggested by the results of my analysis, 
as in the case of Nietzsche’s distinction between a skepticism of strength and a 
skepticism of weakness, or his suggestion that some form of self-deception is required to 
become free. But there are others as well, like Nietzsche’s notion of a free spirit, his 
concept of the Overman, and the relation of the thought of Eternal Recurrence to 
freedom. Constructing a complete picture of Nietzsche’s thought on this subject requires 
pursuing these parts of the puzzle as well. 
 
Discovering that Nietzsche’s main preoccupation was freedom, in my view, also 
provides an invaluable compass with which to approach the rest of his philosophy. To be 
sure, I do not mean to suggest that the concept of freedom that I have unveiled in this 
dissertation should be used as an exegetical principle in the way others have used 
naturalist precepts, or the ontological category of the will to power, or the metaphor of 





correct approach to Nietzsche’s philosophy should be piecemeal and tackle narrow topics 
on their own terms. Still, in this case, pursuing this kind of approach has revealed that 
there is a point of commonality and an underlying concern behind the issues that 
Nietzsche wrote about, at least in the practical side of his philosophy. Given this result, I 
think we would do well to keep a vigilant eye when exploring other aspects of his 
thought, as they are probably implicated with Nietzsche’s project of fostering the 
conditions under which human freedom can flourish and grow. Take, for example, the 
problem of Nihilism. For the most part, this concept is usually understood to signify the 
meaninglessness of existence. But, as understood by Nietzsche, this characterization is 
only partly true. More fundamental than the meaninglessness of existence, is the notion 
of a renunciation of the will and of active willing. Nihilism is the opposite of freedom; it 
stands for a will that seeks its own cancelation and destruction. Because genuine freedom 
is the only thing that can really give meaning to our existence, Nihilism also leads 
derivatively to the meaninglessness of existence. For Nietzsche, true freedom consists in 
the proper use of one’s energies, a use that guarantees that those energies will not get lost 
in the oblivion of death to which we are all condemned. To evade freedom, to live life in 
constant flight from responsibility, is to curtail the only possibility we have of giving 
meaning to our lives. 
 
 In this same way, I think we gain the correct insight into the importance and 
significance of the concept of Genealogy in Nietzsche’s philosophy when we keep in 
mind the centrality of freedom. Genealogy is not so much about revealing the erroneous 





spurious origins of our moral values. Instead, I believe that for Nietzsche the value of 
Genealogy resides in its role as a tool for self-knowledge. To be free we must know 
ourselves, otherwise we risk remaining caught up in values that unbeknownst to us keep 
us enslaved. In this connection, it is worth remembering that the preface to the Genealogy 
begins with the observation that we are unknown to ourselves. The task of exploring the 
origins of our moral values not only reawakens hidden possibilities for normative 
creation and keeps our concepts malleable; it also reveals the elements and the forces that 
may still be at work and lurking in the shadow of those concepts we use in our everyday 
moral trafficking and philosophizing. This is crucial for the healthy exercise of our 
freedom in what is perhaps its most important capacity: that of creating the values that 
are to govern our lives and those of future humanity; a task reserved for the genuine 
philosopher who, more than a mere diagnostician and seeker of truth, according to 
Nietzsche, is fundamentally a law-giver. 
 
In this regard, I think Nietzsche’s thought is still current and can make important 
contributions to contemporary philosophy, especially to its analytic branch which for the 
most part proceeds ahistorically. Even if the particular account Nietzsche offers in the 
Genealogy is incorrect, it is still valuable insofar as it teaches us to ask questions about 
our moral concepts and to be more cautious about the motivations that may be impelling 
us to define them in the way we do and to frame the problems that drive our moral 
investigations and debates. Similarly, the conception of philosophy as fundamentally a 
commanding discipline that sets the goals and values we are to follow, offers a different 





psychology today exhibits the ever increasing tendency to answer normative questions 
statistically, or to vindicate philosophical models and opinions by empirically 
investigating the “folk morality” of ordinary life. Nietzsche would have found this 
tendency deplorable and degrading of the noble role of the philosopher. For him, 
philosophy should not let the way ordinary people think, judge and behave morally 
dictate the creation of values (indeed, Nietzsche would have claimed that this method 
stagnates creativity since its goal is that of averaging values down to the level of the 
customary morality of the common man). On the contrary, it is the philosopher himself 
who should ordain the future moral struggles of humanity and set us on the right path to 
renovate and transform our values. Some may find this posture arrogant and absurd. 
It is certainly not my intention to take Nietzsche’s side on this issue. But I think that, 
even if we reject it in the end, there is nonetheless value in this perspective insofar as it 
awakens unusual possibilities and sets before us a different image of philosophy that can 
help us positively rethink the goals of all our moral theorizing. 
 
 Finally, I think that Nietzsche’s thought is also relevant as a means for cultural 
criticism and reformation. Our society today, as it was in Nietzsche’s time, is still a 
society preoccupied with empty forms and appearances; a society that is obsessed with 
entertainment, comfort and ease. To that extent, as Nietzsche would put it, our planet 
continues to be an ascetic planet inhabited by creatures that seem bent on promoting a 
nihilistic culture that ossifies the creative forces of life. Nietzsche offers us a deep and 
powerful criticism of that blind focus on happiness that governs our time and impels us to 





philosophy we can tighten the spiritual bow of our age (to use one of Nietzsche’s favorite 
metaphors) and learn to strive for something higher, so that – who knows?  – perhaps one 
day we may find ourselves reaching newer and mightier goals that can guarantee a loftier 














For Nietzsche’s works I use the following abbreviations for the texts in English translation: 
 
 
UM for The Untimely Meditations 
HAH for Human All Too Human 
GS for The Gay Science 
Z for Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
BGE for Beyond Good and Evil 
GM for On the Genealogy of Morals 
TI for Twilight of the Idols 
A for The Antichrist 
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